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ABSTRACT 
 
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in America and the occurrence of other 
new and emerging threats to civil aviation, the international community has been 
faced with the harsh reality in the field of aviation security, hence, several legal 
attempts were made to address such aviation threats. Consequently, the International 
Civil  Aviation Organization (ICAO) in its  37th Diplomatic  Conference of 2010  held 
in Beijing,  China, adopted two new international legal instruments namely; 
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation (Beijing Convention of 2010) and Protocol Supplementary to the Convention 
for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Beijing Protocol of 2010). This study 
reviews the historical background to the development of international air law on 
aviation security and further assesses and analyzes in detail the provisions of the 
Beijing legal instruments in comparison with the previous treaties. Finally, the key 
question of whether or not the new Beijing Convention and the Protocol are adequate 
and effective in combating  threats  to  aviation security is addressed through doctrinal 
research. In this regard, information was collected from various primary and 
secondary sources of law including books, articles, conventions, protocols, statutes 
and internets. Further information was gathered from various aviation stakeholders 
including aviation experts, security staff, lawyers, passengers, ground handlers, crews, 
regulators, airline  and airport operators.  From the information collected, the study 
comes up with conclusion, observations and recommendations which may be useful in 
addressing new and emerging threats to aviation security. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
                                   1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since 1960’s the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)1 has made 
pioneering efforts to combat unlawful interference against civil aviation leading to 
adoption of several worldwide multilateral treaties in the form of Conventions and 
Protocols on aviation security. These treaties along with Annex 17 to the Chicago 
Convention2 were considered to constitute a solid legal framework in addressing 
aviation security threats. However, following the incident of September 11 attacks in 
the United States of America3 the international community discovered that the 
existing legal framework governing aviation security threats4 was so inadequate to the 
extent that there were demonstrated significant, longstanding vulnerabilities in 
                                                        
1 ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which was created in 1944 to promote the safe 
and orderly development of international civil aviation throughout the world. It sets the standards and 
regulations necessary for which safety, security, efficiency and regularity as well as for aviation 
environmental protection. ICAO is a forum for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 191 
member states, who become members by ratifying or otherwise issuing notice of adherence to Chicago 
Convention. See ICAO Doc. 7300/9 Ninth Edition 2008. 
2 During the drafting conference of the Chicago Convention on international Civil Aviation in 1944, 
though several States made references to significance of the Convention to national security and safety 
of air travel, no explicit mention was made of aviation security against unlawful acts since such acts 
were not known at that time. Hence according to Assembly Resolution A 17-10 and A 18-10, the ICAO 
Council adopted” international Standards and Recommended Practices- Security- Safeguarding 
International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference” on March 22, 1974 and designated 
it as Annex 17. 
3 The September 11th attacks were series of four coordinated suicide attacks on the United States in 
New York City and the Washington DC areas, in America on September, 11 2001 where the a group of 
Al-Qaida hijacked four passenger jets. The   hijackers intentionally crashed two planes, American 
Airlines Flight 11 and United State Airlines Flight 175 into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre 
in New York City; both towers collapsed within two hours. The Hijackers further crashed American 
Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and the fourth jet, United Airline Flight 93, crashed 
into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to take control before it could 
reach the hijackers’ intended target in Washington DC. Nearly 3,000 people died in the attacks. 
4 The term “aviation threats” is not directly defined in the 2010 Beijing Treaties. However it is related 
to the term “ unlawful acts against civil aviation " which  means an act  which jeopardize the safety and 
security of persons and property, seriously affect the operation of air services, airports and air 
navigation, and undermine the confidence of the people of the world in the safe and orderly conduct of 
civil  aviation for all states. 
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aviation industry especially in the areas of screening of passengers and baggage, 
controlling access to secure areas at airports and protecting air traffic control system 
and facilities.5 
 
In response to the September 11 attacks and the increasing number of criminal acts to 
civil aviation worldwide, the International community considered the need of 
reviewing and updating the laws to be in line with the new developments. Hence, 
following the reviews of the international legal instruments in a series of meetings by 
ICAO, it was discovered that the international air laws did not cover notable aspects 
of new and emerging threats to the safety of civil aviation. 
 
It is on that premises that, in 2010 ICAO held a Diplomatic Conference on Aviation 
Security in Beijing, China6 with the objective of updating the international legal 
framework on civil aviation whereby reviews to the Montreal Convention of 19717 
and amendments to the Hague Convention of 19708 were adopted to cover new and 
emerging threats to civil aviation. At the end of the Conference, ICAO came up with 
the two new treaties namely:  
                                                        
5 ICAO, Aviation Transportation System Security Plan, Supporting Plan to the National Strategy for 
Aviation Security, issued March, 2007. 
6 ICAO’s Diplomatic Conference on Aviation Security, Augu.30-Sept.10, 2010. Final Act of the 
International Conference on Air Law (Sept.10, 2010) available at htt://www.icao.int/DSCA2010/ 
restr/Beijing-final_act_multi.pdf (accessed on 20/03/2014. 
7 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation, Done at Montreal 
on 23 September, 1971. 
8 Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Done at Hague on 16 December, 
1970. 
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(a) Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil 
Aviation (hereinafter referred to as ’’Beijing Convention of 2010”) replacing the 
1971 Montreal Convention and the Airport Protocol of 19889 and; 
 
(b) Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft (hereinafter referred to as “Beijing Protocol of 2010”) 
amending the 1970 Hague Convention.10 
 
In comparison with the previous legal instruments, this study critically examines the 
adequacy and effectiveness of these new treaties11 in addressing aviation security 
threats. 
 
1.2 Background to the Problem 
Criminal acts which are threats to aviation security are not new. As early as 1948, 
hijacking of aircraft was used as a means of illegal flight across national borders and 
through the 1980s there were a number of serious attacks on aircraft carried out for 
political purposes which resulted in significant casualties. These attacks included the 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 which killed 259 
people on board the aircraft and 11 on the ground. Also, the first threat to use an 
aircraft as a weapon to impose broader casualties occurred in 1994 when Algerian 
terrorists hijacked an Air France flight enrooted to Paris from Algiers. Worldwide, 
                                                        
9 Text at https://www.unode.org/tldb/en/2010_convention_civil_aviation.html, (accessed on 
3/09/2012). 
10 Text at https://www.unode.org/tldb/en/2010_protocol _convention_unlawful _seizure_aircraft.html, 
(acessed on  3/09/2012.)  
11 These new international legal instruments are available at www.icao.int/DCAS201(accessed on 
3/09/2012). 
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aviation security entered a new phase following the hijacking of four passenger 
aircraft and the subsequent attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001.12 
 
It is worth noting that, before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the international 
community had not sought to amend or update the 1970 Hague Convention which 
addresses hijacking of civil aircraft in international aviation. However, by contrast the 
1971 Montreal Convention dealing with sabotage of aircraft in flight was amended by 
the Airport Protocol in 198813 to enhance the international legal framework on 
terrorist acts affecting international civil aviation.  
 
It is worth noting that, the 1988 protocol was negotiated in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks in international airports terminals at the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985 and 
hence expanded the reach of Montreal Convention to extend beyond aircraft in flight. 
The significant feature of the Protocol is that it covers offences targeted at airports 
serving international civil aviation where air passengers are assembled before and 
after travel. 
 
However, following the September, 11 attacks, the international community began to 
consider the need for reviewing and strengthening the law for international 
                                                        
12 Supra note 3. 
13 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airport serving international civil 
aviation (Montreal Protocol of 1988), Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention of 1971), signed at 
Montreal Canada on 24 February 1988. 
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cooperation to address issues raised by the attacks14 and because the September 11 
attacks were committed by persons piloting aircraft, ICAO took a leading role in the 
process of reviewing the laws and hence directed the legal commission to conduct a 
study of the existing legal instruments.    
 
The study by ICAO on the review of the international air laws and other international 
dialogue sparked a negotiation process which took several years leading to the 
successful Beijing Diplomatic Conference which was held in Beijing, China, from 30 
August to 10 September, 2010. The Conference adopted the two international e 
treaties  namely,  the  2010 Beijing Convention and the 2010  Beijing  Protocol to 
cover new and emerging criminal acts which were otherwise not covered by the 
previous Conventions and Protocols on aviation security. 
 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Threats to civil aviation security is a global problem that requires global solution.  It is 
on that premises that the International Community under the auspicious of ICAO has 
always been working hard to adopt legal instruments including Conventions, 
Protocols and Annexes which can effectively addressing the problem. 
 
It is obvious that, with an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, air 
transport is facing more challenges which may require more enhanced legal regimes.  
In that context,  ICAO has always been active in addressing the challenges by testing 
                                                        
14 Noelle Quenivet, “The World after September 11: Has It Really Changed” an Article Published in the 
Journal of International Law, Vol 16, No. © EJlL, 2005, pp. 361-577. 
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the adequacy of the existing legal regime on aviation security and where necessary 
adopted or reviewed  the legal instruments as it can be traced from the historical 
Chicago Convention of 1944 to the new Beijing Convention and Protocol of 2010.   
 
However, while aviation Security is becoming more important with the increasing 
demand for transport by air for both passengers and cargo, the issue that is still 
questioned is whether the legal framework is adequate and effective in addressing the 
problem taking into consideration  the existence of new and emerging threats to civil 
aviation15. 
 
1.4 Literature Review 
A good number of previous and current writings discuss the concept of aviation 
security but not much has been written on the Beijing Convention and the Protocol 
which were adopted in 2010 to address new and emerging security threats to civil 
aviation.  However, several  authors focus on the historical development of the  law on 
aviation  security   and  try to consider  the impact of the new  legal  instruments  in 
addressing  aviation  threats. 
 
Denys Wibaux for example is of the view that, the 2010 Beijing Convention and the 
Protocol, taken together, effectively establish a much broader and stronger civil 
aviation security legal framework. 16   From what is highlighted by the writer, it is my 
considered view that given the scale and complexity of the challenges involved in 
                                                        
15 See “Beijing Convention and Protocol on Aviation Security adopted”, Report by the Office of the 
Spokesman, Washington DC, of September, 2010. 
16 Director, ICAO Legal Affairs and External Relations Bureau. 
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designing and ratifying effective legal instruments governing counter-terrorism, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the international aviation community, which has 
historically demonstrated a uniquely high degree of cooperative achievement, should 
now find itself assuming a vital role in helping to determine effective and 
implementable legal tools in this area. 
 
On the other hands, Xia Xinhua17 pointed out that, if one draws a positive experience 
from other international conventions on counterterrorism, the 2010 Beijing 
Convention and the Protocol have further expanded the coverage of different forms of 
offences against civil aviation by criminalizing certain new and emerging aviation 
threats.  He adds, the treaties also include clauses for fair treatment and other 
associated concern, thereby representing a collaborative and concrete action by the 
global civil aviation community to ensure that the global air transport system stays 
clearly focused on protecting the safety and security of aircraft passengers.18.    
 
It is obvious that, the author in his writing considers these new Beijing instruments as 
important tools for strengthening the crackdown of offenders but still they 
incorporated the concept of fair trial which is very important for  observing human 
rights in dealing with the suspects. 
 
Georgilas19 goes back to the 1960s when quite a few international conventions on 
aviation security were concluded under the auspicious of ICAO. According to him, 
                                                        
17 President of the 2010 Beijing Diplomatic Conference. 
18 “A Statement from Xia Xingua during the Beijing Diplomatic Conference of 2010”, published in 
ICAO Journal Issue No. 01-201,  p.11 
19 Stratis G. Georgilas, “Suppression of Illegal Acts (international) Civil Aviation and the Responsibility 
of States: New Development”, paper  delivered at the Annual (2011) Conference  of the  Hellenic 
Society of International  Law & International Relations, Athens, 2011,pp 1-10. 
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the earlier legal instruments have attracted almost universal adherence and acceptance 
and surely form part of general international law.  
 
He points out that, the term “unlawful interference convention”, vividly reflects their  
“code” name with the objective of criminalizing acts against international civil 
aviation and facilitate the cooperation between states to make sure that such acts, 
which by definition hamper aviation security and commercial aviation, do not go 
unpunished. He is of the view that, though, utterly successful, the legal regime needed 
some re-adjustment which prompted the ICAO to reform the international law regime 
on aviation security.   
 
It seems, the author considers the reforms to be very important in updating the legal 
framework and tactfully addressing new and emerging threats to civil aviation.  To 
him, while the new Beijing Convention creates new principal and specific criminal 
offences such as the use of aircraft as a weapon to cause death or injury or damage to 
property, the Beijing protocol extends the scope of criminal offence of hijacking of an 
aircraft to cover situations when this is done by coercion or other form of intimidation 
or by technological means.    
 
In his message published in the ICAO Journal20  ICAO Secretary General, Raymond 
Benjamin, briefly highlights the historical background of aviation security. He points 
out that aviation security first arose as a serious issue for international aviation in the 
                                                        
20 Raymond Benjamin, ” Establishing A New Era of Consensus and Action on Global Aviation 
Priorities” Message from the Secretary General published in ICAO Journal,  Issue 01-2011, pp 3 & 4. 
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1960s, when criminal individuals and groups first began to threaten aircraft and their 
passengers for personal or political gain. According to him, as a response to this new 
phenomenon of aircraft hijackings and the complex legal ramifications they posed, 
States adopted the Tokyo Convention21 as the worldwide international legal 
instruments on aviation security, providing clearer guidelines on the security of in-
flight passengers and property and concluding decades of debates and negotiations 
surroundings jurisdiction issues and some of the foremost outstanding problems in 
international air law.  
 
 In highlighting landmark achievements in the area of civil aviation law and security, 
Benjamin analyses the development of the laws by adoption of the new 2010 Beijing 
treaties aimed at covering new and emerging threats to civil aviation by criminalizing 
a comprehensive range of related activities and actions including that led to the 
destruction of the New York’s World Trade Centre on 11 September, 2001.  To him, 
this remarkable legal accomplishment has served to make 2010 one of the most 
important years in the history of international cooperation on the protection of air 
transport system.  
 
Benjamin is of the view that, with the adoption of the new Beijing treaties, the Beijing 
Conference have leveraged and built on the strong global consensus that generated 
past 9/11 to strengthen and modernize every aspects of global aviation security and 
related regimes. He believes that, the new legal instruments together with the 
                                                        
21 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft adopted by the 
International Conference in Tokyo on 20th August to 14th September, 1963 and entered into force on 
14th December, 1969. 
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Assembly Security Declaration highlight more than anything else the strength and 
scope of the political will which exists today in support of more robust, 
comprehensive and collaborative aviation security and legal frameworks22. 
 
In her article titled “Evolving Threat to Civil Aviation is Countered by Legal 
Instruments as well as new Technology”23 Biernacki24 is of the view that, 
safeguarding international civil aviation against unlawful interference is a grave 
concern to governments, the United Nations and ICAO.  According to her, ICAO’s 
first response to acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation was to establish legal 
procedures by taking part in the development of several international legal instruments 
of which together with other civil aviation security matters become the basis for 
international law. She points out that, the problem of crime aboard aircraft in the late 
1950s and early 1960s called for an international solution, as the complications 
associated with such acts ranged from political issues, such as extradition and the right 
of asylum, to the practical problem of keeping unruly persons in custody aboard 
aircraft or at airports and with these particulars in mind, the Convention on Offences 
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft25 was signed at Tokyo on 14th  
September, 1963. 
 
She further clarifies that, the Tokyo Convention of 1963 is concerned not only with 
crimes but also all acts which may jeopardize the safety of aircraft or of persons or 
                                                        
22 See International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Journal- issue No.01-2011 pp.3& 4. 
23 See an Article: “ Evolving threat to Civil aviation is Countered by Legal Instruments as well as new 
Technology” Published in ICAO Journal, December, 1997. 
24 Ms. Halina M. Biernacki is an Aviation Security Officer in the Aviation Security and Facilitation 
Branch of the Air Transport Bereau at ICAO Headquarters, Montreal –Canada. 
25 See the Tokyo Convention of 1963. 
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property therein, or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board. As for 
unlawful interference with aircraft, she is of the view that, the Tokyo Convention 
attempted for the first time to address this issue.  
 
She further highlights that with the dramatic increase in aircraft hijackings in the late 
1960s a second legal instrument was signed at the Hague in 16 December, 1970 which 
among other things defined for the first time the act of unlawful seizure of aircraft  as 
an offence and this was  followed by Montreal Convention which was signed in 27th 
September, 1971 which was later amended by the Airport Protocol of 1988 which 
requires Contracting States to implement physical security measures at airports and 
aboard aircraft. She concludes by highlighting that, the above named aviation-related 
security legal instruments adopted under auspices of ICAO, is substantial contribution 
to the development of new principles of international law responding to the challenges 
of today. 
 
Diana’s work; “Beyond Chicago Until Beijing”, analyses the historical development 
of international air law by reviewing several international legal instruments such as 
the Tokyo Convention of 1963, The Hague Convention of 1970 and Montreal 
Convention of 1971 and their associated protocols. She goes further to highlight the 
aims and objectives of these early international legal instruments in comparison with 
the new Beijing Convention and Protocol and she urges the international community 
to acknowledge the fact that the former air law instruments reflected the focus of the 
states at the time of their adoption.  
 
She adds, the unlawful transport of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and 
their related material becomes now punishable; directors and organizers of attacks 
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against aircraft and airports will have no safe haven and making a threat against civil 
aviation may also trigger criminal liability.26 I agree with her that, there is a need for 
the international community to go on updating the laws to respond to new and 
emerging threats, either in their form of a new international instrument or as an 
amendment.   
  
In the recent book titled “International Air Law and ICAO”,27 Milde considers 
aviation as the most extensive and strictly regulated human activities. He is of the 
view that, the technical and operational complexity and the concern for safety and 
security in the operations of aircraft and airports are reflected in detailed legal 
regulations that is enforced by national and international mechanism.   
 
The author points out that, since aviation is by its nature international in character, 
extensive international legal framework must be developed from the very inception 
into aviation operations to unify and harmonize the fundamental legal principles 
governing aviation and the appropriate standards and procedures. To him, the uniform 
international legal framework such as the newly adopted 2010 Beijing Convention and 
Protocol was indispensable to permit and facilitate the development and globalization 
of civil aviation. 
                                                        
26 Diana M. Stancu,“Beyond Chicago Until Beijing”,  an article on AVSEC Conventions, published  in  
Aviation Security International Journal, October, 2010. 
27 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO, Eleven International Publishing, Essential Air and 
Space Law (Vol. 10) 2012, ISBN 978-90, p 20. 
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Dillingham’s recent book titled: Aviation Security: Current Issues and Development28 
gives some highlights on aviation screening trends before the September 11 attacks in 
America where screeners who by then were hired by airliners, often failed to detect 
threats objects located on passengers or their carry on luggage.  According to him, 
cause of screeners’ performance problems were rapid turnover and insufficient 
training and that control for limiting access to secure areas of airports, including 
aircraft, did not always work as intended.  He says, under this situation, it was 
possible for people to carry weapons, explosives or other dangerous objects into 
aircraft. He, therefore, considers the new 2010 Beijing Convention and the Protocol as 
the solution for addressing such trends. 
 
In the article titled “Aviation Security Law System Revisited: Will the Beijing Regime 
Fill the Gap”, Anusha29 analyses the previous laws on aviation security and consider 
whether with the adoption of the 2010 Beijing Convention and the Protocol, the legal 
regime now fill the gaps existed for many years in aviation as far as aviation security 
is concerned. He is of the view that, the 9/11 incident exposed the gap in aviation law 
system both nationally and internationally. He further points out that, the failure of the 
2009 Christmas day terror plot, reminded the World of the bitter reality that civil 
aviation remains a target for terrorists.  
 
From what the author pints out, it is obvious that, civil aviation is now a global 
network and if threatened, the threats touch the entire international community. In that 
                                                        
28Gerald, L. Dillingham, Aviation Security: Current Issues and Development, Wara Science Publishers, 
USA, 2003, ISBN: 1-59033-970-7, 2003, pp.2&3. 
29 Anusha Wiekramasinghe, Aviation Security Law System Revisited: Will the Beijing Regime Fill the 
Gap” Annual Academic Sessions, ISSN 2012-9912, Open University of Sri Lank, 2012. 
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context, there is need for accelerated efforts by the concerned parties to meet such 
threats , to enhance technical cooperation to track terrorist activities and to update the 
international aviation security law system to include necessary development. 
 
In the article published in the CTC Sentinel Journal, Brandit30 analyses aviation 
related threats since 9/11 and the Regulatory responses. He highlights a number of al-
Qaeda affiliated plots sought to target commercial aviation since 9/11 which are 
named to include the “shoe bomber” plot in December 2001, an attempt to shoot down 
an Israeli airliner in Kenya in 2002, the liquid explosives plot against transatlantic 
flights in 2006, the Christmas Day plot in 2009 and the cargo bomb plots in 2010.  He 
names other threats during the period to include the 2002 plot to hijack an airliner and 
crash it into Changi International Airport in Singapore, the 2002 El ticket counter 
shooting at Los Angels International Airport, the 2004 bombings of two Russian 
airliners, the 2007 Glasgow Airport attack and a 2007 plot against Frankfurt Airport 
by extremists to target fuel lines at JFK International Airport in New York.  Others are 
the 20011 suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport and the 
2011 shootings of U.S military personnel at Frankfurt international Airport.  
 
According to Brandit, international community responded to these plots by 
dramatically increasing aviation security measures to prevent or deter to future 
attacks. Many of these measures include hardening of cockpit doors, federalization of 
airport security screening staff and the creation of the Transport Security 
Administration (TSA) in America. He lists other measures to include implementation 
                                                        
30 Ben Brandit, “Terrorist Threats to Commercial Aviation: A Contemporary Assessment”, published in 
CTC Sentinel of November, 2011 Vol. 4 ISSUES 11&12, p. 4. 
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of new detection equipment and methods, such as Advanced Imaging Technology 
(AIT) often referred to as “body scanners”, increased amounts of screening for cargo, 
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD), full body “pat down”, Behavioral Detection 
Officers (BDOs) and the use of watch lists to screen for terrorists to prevent them 
from boarding flights or from getting employment in airports or airlines.   
 
The author further points out that, certain measures such as invasive “pat downs”, AIT 
scanning, inducing passengers to remove jackets, belts and shoes for inspection and 
requiring them to travel with minimum amounts of liquid in their possession- have 
drawn widespread complaints regarding their inconvenience, as well as questions 
about their supposed efficacy.  What was pointed by the writer is very important in 
that in dealing with such measures to promote aviation security we have challenge of 
balancing the same with human dignity. 
 
Dillingham31 gives highlights on aviation screening trends before the September 11 
attacks in America where screeners who by then were hired by airliners, often failed 
to detect threats objects located on passengers or their carryon luggage. According to 
him, cause of screeners’ performance problems were rapid turnover and insufficient 
training and that control for limiting access to secure areas of airports, including 
aircraft, did not always work as intended.  He says, under this situation, it was 
possible for people to carry weapons, explosives or other dangerous objects into 
                                                        
31Gerald, L. Dillingham, Aviation Security: Current Issues and Development.  Wara Science Publishers, 
USA, 2003, ESBN: 1-59033-970-7, 2003. P.3. 
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aircraft. He therefore considers the provisions of the new 2010 Beijing Convention 
and the Protocol as the solution for addressing such trends. 
 
The famous aviation law writer, Abeyratne32 analyses the importance of the law in 
promoting aviation security and he is of the view that the 2010 Beijing treaties can 
play a crucial role in furthering this objective as they are intended to combat new and 
emerging threats to civil aviation. He further points out that, since the events of 11 
September, 2001 there have been several attempts against the security of aircraft in 
flight, and these threats ranged from shoe bombs to dirty bombs to explosives that can 
be assembled in flight with liquids, aerosols and gas but in every instance, the global 
community has reacted with pre- emptive and preventive measures that prohibit any 
material on board that might seemingly endanger the safety of flight. He further points 
out that, new and emerging threats to civil aviation are a constant cause for concern to 
the aviation community and ICAO has been addressing these threats for some time 
and continues to do so on global basis. According to him, the 2010 Beijing 
Convention serves international civil aviation well33. 
 
In his another book titled Aviation Security; Legal and Regulatory Aspects, 
Abeyratne34, briefly analyses the significance of international air law by pointing out 
that the law should be expected to play  significant role in promoting aviation security. 
                                                        
32Abeyratne, Ruwantissa “The Beijing Convention of 2010: An Important Milestone in the Annals of 
Aviation Security” Air and Space Law 36, No.3 (2011), pp. 243-255. 
33 Abevraten, Ruwantissa “The Beijing Convention of 2010 on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating 
to International Civil Aviation”- An interpretive Study, 4J Transp. Secur. (2011), pp.131, 143. 
34 Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyant, Aviation Security; Legal and Regulatory Aspects, IMPRINT Aldeshot, 
Hants: Bookfield, Vt; Ashgate; c1998. 
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He addresses the new and emerging threats to civil aviation and evaluates security 
tools in use to combat such threats. According to him, the tools include the Public Key 
Directory, Advance Passenger Information, Passenger Name Record and Machine 
Readable Travel Documents in the context of their legal and regulatory background.  
He goes on to discuss the applicable security treaties while providing an insight into 
the process of the security audits conducted by ICAO. He further examines issues of 
legal responsibility of states and individual for terrorist acts against civil aviation. 
 
Gonzalez35 points out the importance of promoting global aviation security. He said 
aviation security has been one of the highest priorities of ICAO and he named the 
abhorrent attacks of 11th September, 2011 to be a demonstration as to how civil 
aviation has been and remain a primary target of terrorism. According to him, the 
objective of adopting the Beijing Convention and the Protocol is among other things 
to send a clear message to the international community and the terrorist groups, that 
any unlawful interference against civil aviation is not tolerable.  He urged member 
states to ratify the instruments in a short time insisting that by adopting the instrument 
is constructing a modern great wall to safeguard international civil aviation. He  
insists on the importance of the two treaties by saying:  
 “…the new Beijing treaties on aviation have constructed a new 
great wall that will both deter terror networks from targeting the 
lives of innocent aviation passengers as well as safeguarding 
international civil aviation more effectively from all types of new 
and emerging terrorist acts36” 
 
                                                        
35 Address by President of the Council of ICAO, Mr. Robert Kobeh Gonzalez, on Aviation Security in 
Beijing Diplomatic Conference held in China on 30th August, 2010. 
36 The ICAO Journal, Volume 66, Issue Number 1-2011, page 14. 
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He addresses the need for ICAO member states to reaffirm their commitment to fight 
criminal acts and respond more effectively to new and emerging threats in aviation. 
He, finally, congratulates the ICAO Diplomatic Conference of Beijing which adopted 
the two new treaties which among other things, criminalize the acts of using aircraft as 
a weapon and of using dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets on the 
ground37. 
 
Nielsen38 discusses aviation security measures as a concept which affects many 
people’s lives including businessmen, travelers and tourists.  According to him the 
strengthening of security is the objective of many legal instruments which are closely 
connected to criminal law governing among other things, the punishment of alleged 
offenders while other instruments lay down rules on very specific security measures. 
 
In the article published in the Central Law Journal titled “The Adequacy of Aviation 
Security Laws and Airport Security”, Acharya39 points out the need for international 
community to focus on the formulation of stringent laws, procedures and requirements 
applicable at an early stage, mitigating dangers before they come to fruition. He says, 
for the civil aviation industry, the early stage is the airport and that if airport laws, 
procedures and requirements were tightened and rigorously monitored for 
consistency, then much time efforts and money could be saved. What the writer means 
is that in order to address the problem effectively, there must be tight and  
implemented by all states. 
                                                        
37 Ibid 
38Kenneth Melaneton Nielsen, Aviation Security: Legal Framework and Technical Management,  
International Journal  of Private Law , 2008.  Vol.1 No.12,  pp, 82-93 
39 Acharya, Gautam, “The Adequacy of Aviation Security Laws and Airport Security”, Central European 
Journal and Security Studies, Vol. 2 Issue 1 , 2003,  pp.107-125. 
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In his welcome address during the 2010 Air Transport Conference held in Singapore, 
the Director General of Singapore Aviation Authority, Mr. Yap Ong Heng40 outlined 
the importance of harmonized legal framework in aviation industry. According to him, 
a sound international legal framework has underpinned the development of civil 
aviation over the last 60 years, facilitating the orderly and sustainable growth of air 
travel and the aviation industry.  He is of the view that, the continual enhancement of 
the law owes much to ICAO’s harmonization efforts in practically all areas of civil 
aviation, including safety, security, facilitation, liability and financing.   
 
On the other hand, Li Bin Sa Chula41 in the article titled “New Development of 
International Aviation Security Legislation: Comments on 2010 Beijing Convention 
and Beijing Protocol”, examines the 2010 Beijing Convention and the Beijing 
Protocol from the aspects of development of substantive and procedure laws. 
According to her, the two international legal documents strengthen and improve the 
existing legal system of international aviation security, intensify the combat against 
terrorist activities and promote international anti- terrorism cooperation. 
 
In his article titled “Aviation Security”,42 Thomas considers aviation as a vital service 
to the general public and welfare of the global economy. He further points out that, 
commercial airlines present threats to society in myriad ways in that terrorist groups 
and malicious criminals have already considered and clearly exploit and secured 
airlines as visible lethal weapons that can produce monumental damage and 
                                                        
40 Yap Ong Heng’s Welcome Address by the Director General Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore at 
the Opening of the Air Transport, Air Law and Regulation on 24th March, 2010. 
41 Li Bin Sa Chula, “New Development of International Aviation Security Legislation: Comments on 
2010 Beijing Convention and Beijing Protocol” Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, Beijing 100919, China. 
42 Andrew R.Thomas, Aviation Insecurity, Auherst, NY, Prometheus Books, 2003. 
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destruction to edifices, infrastructure and society in general. He give an example of 
the September 11, attack in United Sates and the 1994 FedEx  Flight 705 hijacking by  
a disgruntled  employee who intended  to use the aircraft as  a missile  against FedEx 
Headquarters,43 
 
On the other hand, Elias44 highlights the importance of air cargo security and the 
challenge facing cargo operators.  He says, while the primary policy focus of the laws 
has been on cargo carried aboard passenger aircraft, air cargo security also presents a 
challenge for all-cargo operators.  He is of the view that, there is some concern that 
heightened security measures for passenger aircraft which may make cargo aircraft a 
more attractive target to terrorists.    
 
 This study concurs  with the writer in  sense that,  unlike passenger operations threats 
from explosives introduced in air cargo represents the greatest perceived risk, the 
greatest perceived risk associated with air cargo operations is the potential for an 
individual or individuals with access to aircraft to hijack a large transport category 
aircraft to carry out a suicide attack against a ground target.  Therefore, looking 
beyond aviation security, there is also a broader risk that terrorists may attempt to ship 
weapons, including possible weapons of mass destruction, into and within the United 
States using the global cargo distribution network. 
 
                                                        
43 Ibid 
44 Bart Elias, “Aviation Security: Background and Policy Options for Screening and Securing Air 
Cargo” published in the Report for Congress of February, 2008, 
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Generally, several works cited herein above give historical background to the laws on 
aviation security and others highlight the need for having updated legal regime such as 
the 2010  Beijing  treaties in promoting aviation security.  This study hopes to 
contribute to the above academic writings with a focus on the potential impact of the 
2010 Beijing  legal instruments to the development of the  international air law  in 
addressing new and emerging  threats to aviation security. 
 
1.5 Objective of the Study 
This research is aimed at analyze the adequacy and effectiveness of the 2010 Beijing 
Convention and Protocol in addressing threats to aviation security. As a result, the end 
objectives of this study include:  
(a) To examine the development of international legal system on aviation security 
and identify the gaps thereof; 
(b) To analyze the 2010 Beijing Convention and Protocol with the view of 
investigating the efficacy of the new legal regime in addressing the problem of 
criminal acts to civil aviation; and 
(c) To suggest certain legal measures that may help to minimize criminal acts 
targeted to civil aviation on global; regional and national levels. 
  
In so doing, the study will provide new ideas for better understanding the previous and 
the new legal regime on aviation security and hence examine whether the laws really 
fulfill the intended goal of preventing and combating threats to civil aviation in line 
with new developments and technological changes. 
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1.6 Research Questions 
Basing on what was highlighted herein above, this study, therefore, seeks to answer 
the following research questions:  
(a) What is the significance of the 2010 Beijing Convention and Protocol in the 
development of the laws on aviation security?  
(b) How adequate and effective are the 2010 Beijing legal instruments in addressing 
threats to civil aviation? 
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
The Study is very important in that it will identify challenges, weaknesses and gaps in 
aviation legal instruments to their coverage in relation to new and emerging threats to 
aviation security.  That being the case, the study is significant as it contributes some 
new ideas to further develop and update the laws by pointing out areas which may 
need further improvements for the purpose of ensuring that aviation industry is 
accorded its status of being recognized as secure and safest mode of transport in the 
world. 
 
 1.8 Methodology 
The study employed doctrinal research methodology which allowed a systematic 
exposition  of  legal  instruments and other  related materials  on aviation security.  It 
was through that methodology that analysis of the primary and secondary law was 
done, areas of weaknesses were  identified  and observed and recommendations  were 
made  for  future development. In that context primary sources of international air law 
were used which include Conventions, Protocols, statutes, judicial decisions and other 
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legal instruments on aviation security. Secondary sources of law were also used 
including Journals articles, text books, ICAO and IATA reports, policies and working 
papers, and publications and law reports and internets.  Strict care was taken to 
acknowledge these sources.   
 
In addition, the researcher participated in several national and international seminars, 
conferences, workshops, short courses and study tours in which he exchanged ideas 
with several aviation experts45.  The researcher also during the period attended several 
national and international meetings on aviation46 and in several of these events, the 
issues of aviation security  threats were discussed in line with necessity for member 
States to speed up in signing, ratifying and domesticating the several newly adopted 
international legal instruments including the 2010 Beijing Convention and the 
Protocol for further implementation. Finally, consultations and discussions were made 
to various aviation stakeholders including aviation staff, security officers, crews, 
passengers, airline and airport operators, regulators and lawyers. 
 
It is through the above named methodologies, the researcher managed to collect 
enough information which assisted in coming up with the conclusion, observations 
and recommendations. 
                                                        
45 Airports visited by the researcher on study tours from 2010 to 2013 are Istanbul Ataturk Airport and 
Ankara Airport-Turkey, Lanaka International Airport-Cyprus, SSR International Airport-Mauritius, 
Jomo Kenyatta International Airport-Kenya, Cairo International Airport-Egypt and Entebbe 
International Airport- Uganda.  During the research, short courses on aviation studies were also 
attended by the researcher at Singapore Aviation Academy- Singapore, (2010), Huston Airport 
System-Texas- United States (2010), International Law Institute (ILI) at Uganda (2012), the United 
Arab Emirates- Dubai (2012 and Ghana Civil Aviation Training Academy, Accra (2013). 
46 They include the Conferences by the Airport Council International (ACI)46 held at Calgary-Canada 
(2012), ICAO High- Level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCS) in Montreal, Canada (2010) and 
The African Union Conference of Ministers Responsible for Transport, held in Luanda, Angola 
(2011). 
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1.9  Conclusion 
This study examines the general concept of international air law governing  aviation 
security threats in line with the changes in technology and tactics used by terrorists. In 
so doing, the historical development and types of aviation threats will be analyzed 
together with the notable events of such criminal acts.  Finally, the study  critically 
analyzes  the  2010 Beijing  legal instruments  and  determines   their  adequacy and 
effectiveness  in  addressing  such  new and emerging threats to civil aviation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 2.0 GENESIS OF AVIATION SECURITY THREATS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the earliest days of aviation, there have been no much threats to aviation sector and 
people experienced loose security in which they could go around the airport or 
boarding flight without feeling threatened and hence aviation security was only a 
minor concern. However, with the increasing number of aviation attacks globally, the 
concept of aviation security is now high on the list of priorities, especially after the 
September 11 attacks and the bomb threat of 2006 at Heathrow airport47. 
 
2.1.1 Aviation Security 
Aviation security is simply defined to include the techniques and methods used in 
protecting airports and aircraft from crime48. However, Annex 17 to the 1944 Chicago 
Convention further defines aviation security as a combination of measures of human 
and material resources intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference”49. 
 
The main objective of aviation security was further elaborated in one of the famous 
aviation magazines as follows: 
                                                        
47 Following this event, a Scottish man, Adam Bushby was convicted and sentenced to two years 
imprisonment after being proved that he sent two hoax bomb threats to Heathrow Airport purported to 
be from the National Scottish Liberation Army. 
48 Sunketh Reddy, Global Air Safety and Security Regulations: Current Advancements, Submitted in 
Fulfillment of Post Graduate Diploma in Aviation Law and Air Transport Management 
(PGDALATM) at the University of Law, Hyderabad and the Institute of Applied Aviation 
Management, Calcuta, Kerala for the Academic year 2011& 2012, p. 4. 
49 Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention is a Security Convention for Safeguarding International Civil 
Aviation Against the Acts of Unlawful Interference and it was adopted by ICAO Council in March 
1974 under Article 37 of the Chicago Convention and reviewed from time to time. 
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”Aviation security exists to prevent criminal acts which include but not limited 
to aircraft hijackings, Bombings, attacks at airports, off- airport facility 
attacks, shooting at in-flight aircraft, assaulting passengers and aviation 
staff”50. 
 
The statutory responsibility of aviation security is the management in the airports. As 
clearly spelt out in Annex 17 and the Security Manual, aviation security is mandated 
to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. 
 
Generally, from what is briefly highlighted herein above, it is obvious that the primary 
objective of aviation security is to safeguard passengers, crew, ground personnel and 
the general public against acts of unlawful interference perpetrated in flight or within 
the confines of an airport. Aviation security also seeks to protect aircraft and facilities 
serving civil aviation, such as fuel, catering, air navigation facilities and the premises 
of listed air cargo agents, against acts of unlawful interference. 
 
2.1.2   Aviation Threats 
On the other hand, the term aviation threats refer to acts of unlawful interference to 
civil aviation which are further defined to mean acts or attempted acts as to jeopardize 
the safety of passengers and aircraft including but not limited to: 
(a) unlawful seizure of aircraft, 
(b) destruction of an aircraft in service, 
(c) hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes, 
(d) forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an 
aeronautical facility, 
                                                        
50 See “Criminal Acts against Civil Aviation Trends 1993-1997”, Published in Aviation News and 
Resources Online Magazine of 1997. 
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(e) introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device 
or material intended for criminal purposes, 
(f) use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily 
injury, or serious damage to property or the environment, 
(g) communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft 
in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general 
public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility51 
 
2.1.3 Terrorism and Aviation Security 
Terrorism is said to be an extremely dangerous form of criminal activity that needs 
suppression at both national and international levels. Unfortunately, it has been noted 
that states have found it impossible, thus far, to agree on a general definition of 
terrorism as an international crime. In other words so far, there is neither an academic 
nor an international legal consensus regarding the definition of the term terrorism.52 
Hence, as several authors points out, the distinction between terrorism and national 
liberation movements is hardly clear, especially since some groups use both guerilla 
and terrorist tactics53.  
 
While so far there is no global acceptable definition of terrorist, some writers have 
tried to define it the way they see it. For example, FarlexHE simply defines the term 
terrorism as “the use of force or violence against persons or property in order to 
                                                        
51 See chapter 1 of   Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, 13th Edition, which came into force in, 15th 
July, 2013. 
52 Schemid, Alex P, “The Definition of Terrorism” The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, 
Routledge, ISBN 0-203-82873-9, P 39.  
53 Huffiman,B, Inside  Terrorism” Columbian University Press, ISBN 0-231-11468-0 (accessed on 
20/9/2014). 
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coerce or intimidate a government or the civilian population in furtherance of political 
or social objective”.54  
 
 The US Department of States defines terrorism to be  “premeditated politically-
motivated violence perpetrated against  non- combatant targets by sub- national 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”55 On the 
other hand, FBI uses  this definition: “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives”56 On  the other hand  the UN Convention  for Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism defines terrorism as  an act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm 
to civilian or non- combatants with the  purpose of intimidating a population or 
compelling a government  or  an international organization to do or abstain from 
doing any act57 
 
 Upon going through  the  several  definitions, it is obvious that most of them have 
some common characteristics which include use of  illegitimate force  or violence  
against  innocent  civilian or properties  with political, economic, social or religious 
motives. Basing on that, it is my considered view that the term terrorism means “the 
illegitimate use of force or violence by  individuals, State, Government, organization  
                                                        
54 See The Free Dictionary by Farlex. 
55 See Terrorism Research, International Terrorism and Security Research, University of  St Andrew. 
USA. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Article 2(1), International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism, G.A Res , 109, 
U.N. GAOR, 54th  Sess., Supp. No. 49, UN Doc  A/54/49 (Vol.1) (1999), S. Treaty  Doc. No. 106-49 
(2000), 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) adopted 9 Dec. 1999 entered into force 10 Apr., 2002. 
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or  any group  of people to achieve political, economic, social or religious objective by 
the perpetrator (s) when innocent people or property are targeted”.   
 
 It was further stated in the Report on the Task Force on Disorder and Terrorism that 
international terrorism is designed to influence government or intimidate  the public 
through the threatening of civilians, murder, kidnapping of persons or group of 
persons and the mass destruction  of property in order to achieve a political, religious, 
social or economic aim.58 It is believed that, lack of democracy, disrespect for human 
rights, armed conflicts, blocked democratic transitions, underdevelopment, poverty 
and lack of respect for the right to self-determination may all provide the setting for 
the discontent and frustration that lead to terrorism59. 
 
It should be noted that the appearance of terrorism as a challenge to aviation security 
has practically concurred with the rise of aviation as a mode of transportation. For 
example, in 22 July 1968 three gunmen from the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a passenger airliner of the Israeli airline El Al on a flight 
from Rome to Tel Aviv and demanded to exchange hostages for their comrades-in-
arms who were imprisoned in Israel60.  This operation, although it was the twelfth 
case of civilian aircraft seizure in 1968, was qualitatively different in its content and 
ultimate aim. It was the first time that an aircraft had ever been hijacked not out of 
                                                        
58 See Disorder and Terrorism Report on the Task Force on Terrorism, National Advisory Committee 
on Criminal Justice, Standard and Goals (1976: Washington) 11. 
59 Ntahmburi, N.” Fighting  Terror in East Africa: Less Liberty for More Security? Analysis on Anti- 
Terrorism Legislation and Its impact on Human Rights, Dissertattion submitted for fulfillment of 
Master Degree (L.L.M.) of the University of  Cape Town , p.13. 
60 Jangir, Arasly, ”Terrorism and Civil Aviation Security: Problems and Trends” Paper Presented to a 
Meeting of the Combating Terrorism Working Group, the PfP Consortium, Sarajevo, February, 2004,  
p 8. 
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criminal motivation or for personal reasons, but with the specific goal of politically 
pressuring an opponent and using the incident as a propaganda message to bring a 
political cause to the world’s notice.  
 
In considering the examples discussed above, it is no mere chance that the largest 
terrorist attacks the world has ever seen—the September 11 attacks on New York and 
Washington—were committed by hijacking civil airliners. For the first time, the 
airplanes were steered by suicide pilots. Instead of being employed as leverage for 
negotiations or as a platform for putting forward demands, the airliners were used as 
weapons (in effect, manned cruise missiles) designed for defeating specific targets61. 
  
2.2 Background to Aviation Security Threats 
Criminal acts or threats to aviation security is a form terrorism  which  has a long 
history  going  back to as early as 1920s when aircraft hijackings were used as a 
means for illegal flight across national borders. Also from1940s, there were a number 
of serious attacks on aircraft carried out for political or terrorist purposes which 
resulted in significant casualties. The situation became worse from 1980s when the 
aviation sector continued to have a number of characteristics making it an attractive 
target for terrorists who were knowledgeable about aviation operations and hence 
identified vulnerabilities to mount catastrophic attacks. One example of such attacks is 
the bombing of Pan AM flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 which killed 259 
people on board the aircraft and 11 on the ground.62 
                                                        
61 Ibid. 
62 Following that incident of Lockerbie bombing, a Libyan former Intelligence Officer, Abdelbaset al 
Megrahi was charged in 1988 and upon conviction he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2001, 
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Further, following the famous September 11 attacks in America and with the 
technological advancement and changes of tactics by the terrorists, many governments 
have started to impose more strict laws and rules as preventive measures to counter 
such criminal acts. Canada and the United States for example, introduced sweeping 
reforms within their territories63 after identifying vulnerabilities in the legal 
instruments related to security of aviation sector. Other states were also forced to re- 
examine how security is handled at their own airports, and speculate on the 
probability of similar threats to their territory.64 
 
On the other hand, ICAO considered the need of reviewing and updating the 
international legal framework to make it more relevant and adequate for enhancing the 
international community to effectively fight the war against the new and emerging 
threats to aviation security. It is on that spirit that, the Beijing Convention and Beijing 
Protocol were adopted in 2010 to criminalize a number of such new and emerging 
threats to civil aviation.65 
                                                                                                                                                               
however in 2009 he was released on compensation grounds by the Scottish government after being 
diagnosed with terminal cancer and died a few months later. 
63 Since the 9-11 attacks, both Canada and the United States have enacted several pieces of aviation 
security legislation to strengthen air and ground security. Federal agencies help enforce these statutes 
by partnering with air carriers, intelligence, law enforcement, and the airport authorities in a multi-
disciplinary regime. When one compares the Canadian and American legislation and policies, many 
similarities and differences can be found with respect to the content and application of key aviation 
security provisions. Common themes are found in aviation security legislation in Canada and the 
U.S., which reflect the guiding principles, including laying the federal regulatory framework for air 
and ground security; research and development for screening technologies; appropriation of funding 
for various security programs; promoting intra-agency and inter-agency cooperation as multiple 
layers. 
64 Mathew Valmeluem, “Legal Issues in the Fight Against Terrorism: Aviation Security Update”, 
posted in the Lift Magazine, in September, 2010. 
65 The new and emerging threats to civil aviation include using aircraft as a weapon to cause death, 
injury or damage, using civil aircraft to discharge biological and nuclear weapons or similar 
substances to cause death, injury or damage, using biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to attack 
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2.3 Common Types of Aviation Threats 
There are various types of aviation security threats that pose a grave danger in the 
aviation industry and the most common are Aircraft Hijackings and Bombings. Other 
threats include Missiles Attacks (SAM), Man Portable Air Defense System 
(MANPADS) and Extortion.  The list also include Use of Aircraft in Flight as a 
Weapon, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) such as the use of liquids, gels and 
aerosols explosives (LAGS) and attacks to aviation related targets such as airports and 
airport’s facilities and  other New and Emerging Threats.66 
 
2.3.1  Aircraft Hijackings 
Civil aviation has been threatened by criminal attacks for decades and from the first 
hijackings and bombings to recent attempt against the UPS and FedEx Cargo aircraft, 
the threats have remained constant.  For example, unsuccessful attempts for suicide 
hijacking took place in 1974 in America when Samu Byke attempted to hijack plane 
at Bellmore Washington International Airport and fly it into the White House, in an 
attempt to assassinate President Nixon. Also in 1994, four terrorists hijacked an Air 
France aircraft at Algiers in an apparent attempt to fly it into the Eifel Tower or 
explode it.67 
According to Professor Dempsey,68 aircraft hijackings accounts for the largest 
percentage of all attacks which are threats to civil aviation. He defines aircraft 
                                                                                                                                                               
civil aircraft unlawful transport of biological, chemical and nuclear weapon s or  certain related 
material, unlawful transport of explosive or radioactive material for terrorist  purposes, a cyber  attack 
on air  navigation  facilities  and  organizing, directing and financing acts of terrorism. 
66 An Article by Ben Brandit, “Terrorist attacks to Commercial Aviation: A contemporary Assessment” 
published by the Combating Terrorism Centre, November 2011 Vol. 4 issue 11& 12,  P.5. 
67 Attacks that involved modular explosive devices smuggled into planes and left aboard. 
68 Article by Professor Dr. Paul Stephen Dempsey on “Aviation Security and the Role of International 
Law” a Teaching Material at the Institute of Air and Space Law, published in 2008. 
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hijackings to mean unlawful seizure of an aircraft by an individual or a group of 
people. Research conducted shows that the first recorded aircraft hijacking occurred in 
Peru in the year 1930 when Peruvian revolutionaries seized a Pan American mail 
aircraft with the aim of dropping propaganda leaflets over Lima and in most case, 
during aircraft the pilot is forced to fly the aircraft according to the orders of the 
hijackers.  However, in a few cases the hijackers flew the aircraft themselves as it was 
the case for the September 11 attacks where they later used the aircraft as weapons. In 
another case a plane was hijacked by the official pilot.69 
 
Over the past several decades, aircraft have been hijacked by members of different 
actors, including North Korean intelligence officers, Sikhs, Palestinian, Hezbollah 
militants and mentally disturbed individuals. However, the Hijackers are sometimes 
members of organizations that are waging guerilla campaigns against particular 
countries or Governments and are seeking to gain publicity for their causes. Other less 
organized groups have also taken over aircraft- sometimes in a desperate attempt to 
escape the authoritarian regime of their homelands.70 For example, between the year 
1947 and 1958, about 23 events of aircraft hijackings were recorded mostly 
committed by Eastern Europeans seeking political asylum.71 
 
To cut the story short, aircraft hijackings have come to the fore in recent decades with 
the growth of air travel, where hijackers normally take over aircraft with the intention 
                                                        
69 Air China Captain, Yuan Bin, hijacked and diverted the Boeing 737 to Taiwan because he was 
displeased with Air policies and his pay. 
70 An Article on “History of airliner hijackings”, found in http;//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/157818.stm, 
(accessed on 29/03/2012). 
71 Publication on “Aviation Security” in US Centennial of Flight Commission, in http//: 
centennialoflight.gov. (accessed on 6/09/2012). 
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of using their passengers as bargaining chips to advance their interest. The following 
are such good examples of acts of aircraft hijackings in Africa: 
 
(a)  The Entebbe Hijacking72 
On 27 June 1976 Air France Flight 139 an Airbus A300B4-203 originating  from Tel 
Aviv Israel, carrying 248 passengers and 12 crew from Athens Greece heading to 
Paris. Soon after 12.30 take off, the flight was hijacked by two Palestinians from the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine External Operation (PFLP-EO) and two 
Germans from the German Revolutionary Cells- Wilfred Bose Brigitte Kuhlman. The 
Hijackers diverted the flight to Benghazi, Libya where it was held on ground for 7 
hours for refueling during which time a female hostage was released who pretended to 
have a miscarriage.  
 
The Plane left Benghazi and more than 24 hours after the flight original departure, it 
arrived at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. At Entebbe, the four hijackers were joined by   
at least four others, supported by the pro- Palestinian forces of Uganda President, Iddi 
Amin. The hijackers demanded the release of 40 Palestinians held in Israel and 13 
other detainees imprisoned in Kenya, France, Switzerland and West German. 
 
The hijackers held the passengers for a week in the transit lounge of Entebbe Airport, 
now old terminal. Some of the hostages were released, but 105 remained captives. The 
Hijackers threatened to kill the hostages if Israel did not comply with their demands. 
After days of collecting intelligence and planning by the Israel, their four Air Forces 
                                                        
72 See Operation Entebbe in http://en.wikipendia.org/wiki/Operation-Entebe.   Accessed on 6/09/ 2012. 
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C-130 Hercules Transport Aircraft flew secretly by cover of night, without aid of 
Entebbe air traffic control. 
 
The rescue operation took place at night, as Israel transport planes carried 100 
commandos over 2500 miles (4,000) to Uganda for rescue operation.   The operation 
which took a week of planning, lasted 90 minutes and 102 hostages were rescued. 
Five Israeli Commandos were wounded and one Lt. Col. Yonatan Netanyahu was 
killed. 24 hours later a fourth Israel hostage, Mrs. Dora Bloch was executed by 
Ugandan forces at nearby hospital where she was admitted.73 
 
(b) Hijacking of Air Tanzania Flight74 
On 1st July, 1982, Air Tanzania flight No. 5H –ATC-Boeing 737-2R8C which left 
Mwanza Airport with 99 passengers  and  five  crews was hijacked by five Tanzanians 
who were demanding for resignation of the then President of United Republic of 
Tanzania, Julius Kambarage Nyerere. The Hijackers  who  were  standard  7 and  form 
4 levers, forced  the  flight to land in Nairobi Kenya where five passengers  were 
released. Weapons used include two wooden imitation pistols, an imitation hand 
grenade, two candles wrapped up to appear like geligilite explosive, three knives, had 
gun (038) revolver which was surrendered to the captain of the plane by a passenger 
on boarding. 
 
                                                        
73 Ibid 
74 “The Hijacking of A Tanzanian Aircraft, February ,1982 “  A Statement  by His Excellence the 
Tanzania High Commissioner in United Kingdom, published in Tanzanian Affairs. See also  
http://www/tzaffairs.org/1982/07/hijacking-of-a-tanzanian=aircraft. Accessed on 6/9/2012. 
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The aircraft was refueled after nearly six hours on the ground and later took off to 
Jeddah, South Arabia where it was refueled again and continued to Athens, Greece 
where two other passengers were released. From Greece, the flight continued to 
London- Stansted in United Kingdom where the hijackers demanded to speak to 
exiled Tanzanian Oscar Kambona. After Kambona spoke with the hijackers as they 
demanded, they surrendered on February 28, 1982.  Upon their surrender, the 
hijackers were charged in UK under the UK Laws and Tanzania made no attempt to 
seek extradition of the five hijackers. 
 
(c) Hijacking of Ethiopian Airline 
On 23 November, 1996 Ethiopian Airline flight No. 961- Boeing 767-260ER was 
hijacked on route from Addis Abba, Ethiopia to Nairobi, Kenya and the hijackers 
were 3 Ethiopians who were seeking political asylum in Australia. It was discovered 
that the Hijackers were using fake bomb which was actually a covered bottle of liquor.  
Some hours after the hijacking, the plane crash- landed in the Indian Ocean near 
Comoro Islands due to fuel starvation, killing 125 of the 175 people on board along 
with the hijackers. Among the survivors were the Captain of the plane and the co-
pilot.75 
 
2.3.2  Missile Attacks to Aircraft 
Apart from aircraft hijackings, another common type of aviation security threats is the 
use of Missile (SAM) and rockets in attacking civil aviation. This threat goes back to 
1973 when Italian police arrested five middle- Eastern terrorists armed with SA-7s 
                                                        
75 http//www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian Airline Flight 196. Accessed  on 20 May, 2012. 
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who rented an apartment under the flight path to Rome Fumicino Airport and were 
planning to shoot down an El Al Airliner coming into land at the airport.76 The plot of 
missile attack on El Al Airliner derived from an appealing incident on 21 February, 
1973, when Libyan aircraft B-727 was shot down over the Sinai desert by an Israel 
fighter, killing the 108 people on board The Libyan people called for vengeance 
against Israel and urged the other Arab states to send their warplanes against Israel’s 
major cities and destroy Israel airlines wherever they could be found.77 
 
On 5 January, 1974, 220 soldiers and 20 police sealed five squares around Heathrow 
International Airport in London after receiving reports that terrorist had smuggled SA-
7s into Britain in diplomatic bags of middle –Eastern Embassies and were planning to 
shoot down an El Al Airliner.78 Another significant incident of missile attack to civil 
aviation occurred on 13 January, 1975 when terrorists attempted   to shoot down an El 
Al Plane after driving their car into the apron of Orly Airport where they set up a 
rocket launcher and fired at El Al Airliner which was about to take off for New York 
with 136 passengers.  
 
The first round missed the target and hit another Yugoslavian DC -9 plane parked 
nearby.  The rocket failed to explode and the terrorist escaped by a car. The French 
traced the PFLP Venezuelan terrorist and leader of the PFLP group in Europe, Carlos. 
It is also known that once again an El Al Airliner had been deliberately chosen as a 
                                                        
76 See Ruwantissa Abeyratne,” Civil Unrest and airport and Aviation Security” in Journal of Air 
Transportation Security, Vol. 4, No. 4  (2011) , pp.285-295. 
77 See an article titled:“ Forgotten History: The Case  of Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114”, authored  by 
Steven Katsineries and published in the Media Monitors Network of Friday, February 1, 2008. 
78 Debson & Payne book on Aviation Security Law (1977) p.53. 
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target by Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in an attempt to avenge the loss of 
Libyan airline shot down by Israel over the Sinai desert.79  
 
Despite this failure, on 25 January, 1976 another abortive attempt of missiles attack 
was carried out by three PFLP terrorists who were arrested by police at Nairobi 
Airport, Kenya before they had time to fire SA-7 missile at El Al Aircraft carrying 
100 passengers.  After 10 days the terrorists were handed over to Israel by Kenyan 
Government and few months later there was unsuccessful attempt to gain their release 
in June 1976 when Palestinian hijacked an Air France aircraft to Entebbe, in 
Uganda.80 
 
There has been a marked increase in missile attacks to aircraft since 1984 and the 
possibility of undeterred use of missile is said to be encouraged by the rapid 
proliferation of such weaponry on the publicity to be gained by using such systems 
and the enhanced effectiveness of missiles against aircraft makes the threat of such 
attack real.  For example, on 21th September 1984 Afghan counter- revolutionary 
fired a Surface- to air missile and hit a DC-10 Ariana aircraft carrying 308 passengers. 
The explosion tore through the aircraft’s left engine, damaging its hydraulic system 
and wing containing fuel tank. The captain of the aircraft managed to land the aircraft 
safely at Kabul International Airport.81 
 
                                                        
79 Ibid 
80 The Palestinian hijackers were overpowered and killed by Israel Commandos in a special operation 
carried out at night at the Entebbe Airport. 
81 U.S Department of Transport (FAA), Worldwide Significant Acts Involving Aviation, 1984, Pg.4. 
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In 4 April, 1985 a members of Abu Nidal group fired an RPG rocket at an Alia 
airliner as it took off from Athens Airport. Although the rocket did not explode, it left 
a hole in the fuselage82.  On 29 November, 2002, there was an attempted missile 
attack on an Israel passenger’s plane, Boeing 757-300 flying from Mombasa Airport, 
Kenya with 261 people on board.  This attempt is said to be another long-feared 
aviation threat on the rise. In that incident, the terrorists attempted to shoot down the 
commercial aircraft with shoulder-fired missile designed for battle field attacks on 
swift combat jets83. 
David Benjamin who was a Senior Counterterrorism advisor to President Bill Clinton 
had this to say:  
 “Recognizing that there so many of this type of missile attacks is a 
manifestation that there terrorists who would truly like shooting down 
civil airliners, we have to understand that the threats has now gone up”84 
 
2.3.3 Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) 
Man Portable Air Defence System (MANPADS) are sometimes known as threats 
from ranged weapons and is the type of criminal acts which have posed a serious 
threat to aviation industry.  It is worth noting that, after the September 11 attacks in 
America, there had been several attempts against the security of aircraft in flight 
through MANPADS which are extremely effective weapon which are prolific in their 
availability worldwide85. 
 
                                                        
82 U.S Department of Defense, “Terrorist Group Profiles (Washington DC: hs, GPC, 1984. Pg. 7. 
83 See http:www.smh.com.an/articles/2002/12/02/10. Retrieved on 30 May 2012. 
84 The New York Times” Terror in Africa. Security Concerns; Ideal Terror Weapons: Portable, Deadly, 
Plentiful Missile” by Thomas Shankar, Published on 29 November, 2002. 
85 See http:// www.janes.com/security/manual (accessed on 3/07/2013) 
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Introduced in the 1950 and originally meant to deter terror attacks from air to ground 
to be used by state authorities and other protection agencies, MANPADS if got into 
the wrong hands are being used to pose threat to civil aviation. The surface to air 
MANPADS is a light weapon which offer very little warning before impact, and is 
often destructive and lethal86 and it is believed that  there is 70% chance  that a civil  
aircraft will  be destroyed  if  hit by MANPADS87. 
 
It is believed that, the location of most airports in Africa render them particularly 
vulnerable to missile attacks as most of approaches to runways of these airports are 
located in bushy areas or residential area with high density of population that are 
difficult to police and susceptible to acts of unlawful interference. Incidents of 
missiles attacks could occur at the most critical stages of flight such as just before 
landing or take off when the aircraft is laying low and lower speeds. Africa, for 
example, had its share of such attacks in 6 April, 1994 when a SAM 7 missile was 
believed to have been used in attacking a civil aircraft carrying President 
Habiyarimana of Rwanda and Ntaryamira of Burundi. Both Presidents died in the 
attack and this incident has sparked the Rwandan genocide. Also in November 2002, 
an Israel airliner carrying hundred of tourists flying back to Israel was shot at the 
Mombasa International Airport by surface to air missiles causing damage to the 
aircraft88. 
 
                                                        
86 Ibid 
87 MANPADS, ploughshares Mantra, Autumn, 2004. P 83. 
88 Mutali K. Kapchangah, “African Aviation Security: Implication for Peace and Security”,   published 
in the Situation Report by Institute for Security Studies, 15 July, 2008. See p. 9. 
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Although MANPADS are believed to be unable to target aircraft at cruising altitudes, 
commercial aircraft would become vulnerable for several miles while ascending and 
descending, particularly due to their lack of countermeasures systems. In addition to 
the MANPADS threats, a significant variety of ranged weapons could be used to 
target commercial aircraft, particularly taxiing prior to takeoff or after landing. 
 
2.3.4 Extortion 
Extortion is a criminal offence in which an individual or group of individuals get 
money or property through threatening airlines and in some cases the criminals called 
the head offices of the airline or airport authorities and communicated false 
information that they planted a bomb in the aircraft or airport and the bombs will 
explode if they will not be paid.  It is one of the most common aviation threats which 
affect the development of aviation industry.  
 
This type of aviation threat may be covered by the definition of the unlawful acts 
defined by Article 1(g) of Annex 17 of The Chicago Convention which refers to 
communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in 
flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at 
an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.89 
 
One of the most popular case of extortion in an airline happened in May 26, 1971 in 
Qantas Airlines where Qantas got a call from a person named “Mr. John Brown” who 
said that there was a bomb in one of their aircraft bound to Hon Kong and he 
                                                        
89 Chapter 1 of   Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention,13th  Edition,  which came into force in, 15th July, 
2013. 
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threatened to activate it unless he was paid $500,000. The Management of Qantas 
treated the incident seriously when Mr. Brown pointed the police to a locker inside the 
airport where there is bomb. Arrangement was made; after Mr. Brown has obtained 
the money he called again the office stating that it was only a hoax. He was arrested, 
and the person named Mr. Brown was proved to be Peter Macari and hence was 
charged and sentenced to 9 years jail imprisonment90. During the 1970s the 
technology and surveillance in the aviation industry was not as tough and strict as it is 
today.  
 
Therefore instance like what happened in Qantas Airlines could   be easily done by 
any individual. But nowadays, because of the new technologies and advance 
surveillance systems, extortionists can be easily be located and identified, aside from 
that there are advanced and sophisticated software that can locate and detect 
individuals in  the intelligence, after 9/11 aviation industry  as well the  cart  has spend 
a great  amount  of efforts and money in order to detect the individuals that are threats, 
and also individual that are  just playing a joke  with  the airline companies. 
 
Aside from the advance technology and intelligence, governments of different 
countries have passed tougher laws regarding extortion and the fact that the airline 
companies are often advised not to give out money to individuals who call  and inform 
that there is bomb planted in the plane, but  first identify the caller and work  closely 
with  the police  officers.91 
 
                                                        
90 See http://doenetwork.org/cases/541dmnsw.html (accessed  on 23/04/ 2012). 
91 Ibid 
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2.3.5 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) 
Another type of aviation security threat is the Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) 
which is an established name for explosive devices that are usually utilized in 
unconventionally warfare by guerillas92. Generally, IEDs are composed of explosive 
charges, detonators and initiation system and in some instances it may be also consists 
of metal objects, like nails and it is initiated by different technologies such as through 
remote controls, cell phones, magnet and wires. 
 
It has been noted that, terrorist groups, particularly the Al Qaida, are believed to have 
continuously refined their ability to conceal improvised explosive devices (IEDS) 
from security screening equipment, as shown in the 2009 Christmas Day, where a 
would- be a suicide- bomber concealed explosives in his underwear, and 2010 cargo 
bomb plot, where bomb makers hid explosives in a printer cartridges. 
 
Over the past decade terrorist have utilized Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as 
their preferred tactic in spreading terror. Examples of attacks that used IEDs are that 
of 1993 bombing in the World Trade Centre, 1995 bombing  of the Federal Building  
in Oklahoma, attacks on the East Africa American  Embassies on  1998, the 2000 
attack on the USS Cole  and the 9/11 attacks in New York.93 
 
In August 10, 2006, United Kingdom intelligence has detected the plan of extremists 
in engaging in a plot wherein multiple passengers’ airlines that were to fly from 
                                                        
92 It is a bomb that is constructed by combining diverse parts in an improvised manner in which it 
integrates destructive, lethal and deadly chemicals that are created to destroy and disable civilians and 
vehicles. It may combine commercially- sourced explosive and homemade explosive. 
93 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The Unites States, of 21 August, 
2004. 
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United Kingdom to United States would be destroyed.94 Following that plot, three 
people namely, Abdullah Ahmed, Assad Sarwar and Tanvir Hussein were charged and 
convicted of conspiracy to murder crew and passengers on Transatlantic flights in 
what would have been the biggest terrorist outrage since September 11 attacks in 
America in 2001.95 
 
2.3.6 Notable Plots of Threats To Aviation 
The other recent criminal acts which form new and emerging threats to civil aviation 
are also increasing and these include but not limited to: 
 
(a) Liquids Explosive Plot of 2006 
One of the new threats to civil aviation was the liquid explosive plot against 
transatlantic flights on August, 200696, when the British law enforcement discovered 
the plot involving components of liquid explosive to be carried on board civil aircraft 
flying across the North Atlantic. In response to the foiling of the alleged plot, security 
restriction on the carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGS) in hand baggage were 
introduced on the same date to ban using impoverished explosive devices containing 
homemade liquids explosives.  In further response to this threat, an initial ban on the 
carriage of  all hand  baggage on flight  leaving UK  was subsequently  modified to a 
restriction  on the amount of  liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGS) which were  permitted 
                                                        
94 According to the Wall Street Journal published on August 11, 2006, the alleged plot to bring down 
several trans-Atlantic flights simultaneously involved liquid explosives. 
95 “Three Guilty of Transatlantic Bomb Plot the Guardian” an article by Vikran Dodd published in  the 
Guardian of  Monday 7 September, 2009  (see  also http: www .guardian.co,uk). 
96Following this plot, three Britons namely Abdullah Ahmed Ali, Assad Sarwar and Tauvir Hassan 
were charged in UK and found guilty of conspiracy to murder by exploding liquid bombs on airlines 
flying from Britain to North America. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. 
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to be carried  by  through screening  point.97 These restrictions were initially adopted 
in Europe and North America and they were subsequently harmonized with Europe 
Union by an amendment to the European Commission Regulation which came into 
effect on 6th November, 2006.  
 
By definition LAGs include, but not limited to water and other drinks, soup, syrups, 
jams, stews, sauces and pastes; food in sources or containing a high liquid content; 
creams, lotions, cosmetics and oils; perfumes; sprays; gels including hair and shower 
gels; contents of pressurized containers (e.g. aerosols), including-solid mixtures; 
mascara; lips gloss or lip balm; and any items of similar consistency at room 
temperature. However, since technologies are currently deployed to detect certain 
liquid explosive, the Council adopted security control guideline for screening liquids, 
gels and aerosols known as LAGs, and these were conveyed to states in December 
2006 with an effective date of 1st March 2007.98 
 
The Council guideline recommended that all LAGs should be carries in containers 
with capacity not   greater than 100 ml. each and should be placed in a transparent re- 
salable plastic bag  of maximum  capacity  not exceeding  1l,  each and  passengers  
being  permitted  to carry only  one such bag. Exceptions are allowed for medicines, 
baby food and special dietary or other medical requirement.99 Apart from that, all 
                                                        
97Only small quantities of liquids may now be taken in hand luggage. These liquids must be in 
individual containers with maximum capacity of 100 milliliters each and the containers must be 
packed in one transparent, re-sealable plastic bag of not more than one litre capacity per passenger. 
98 http: www2.icao.int/en/AVSEC/SEP/LAGS-ST. Accessed on 3/05/ 2012. 
99 Legal Framework on Aviation Threats, P.39. 
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laptops and other electronic equipment had to be removed from bags and scanned 
separately.100 
 
The volumetric control that currently apply to LAGs were developed and 
disseminated by ICAO following the unveiling in 2006 of a terrorist plot to sabotage 
aircraft in-flight by assembling an improvised explosive device using hazardous 
ingredients carried in seemingly ordinary LAGs. Security tamper-evident bags I 
(STEBs) was developed to allow an exemption to volumetric control for liquids 
purchased at airport retailers or on board aircraft and carried by transfer passengers. 
At its meeting in March 2010, the ICAO Aviation Security Panel concluded that the 
threat from liquid explosives remains a concern. The Panel recommended that the 
ICAO Secretariat Study Group on the carriage and Screening of Liquids, Aerosols and 
Gels develop guidance for States on the implementation of technological solution for 
the screening of LAGs. It is believed that the deployment of such solutions would 
allow for the gradual removal of the current restriction on carry-on LAGs.101 
 
(b) Shoe Bomber Plot of 2001 
A sampling of other new criminal incidents include the “shoe bomber” plot in 
December 2001 where one Richard Golvin Reid, a British Born Al-Qaida trained 
terrorist, made an unsuccessful attempt to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes 
while on board  a flight  from  Paris to Miami. Reid was charged102 and pleaded guilty 
in 2002 in USA Federal Court to eight criminal counts of terrorism storming from his 
                                                        
100 http://www.indpendentraveler.com.travel-tip (accessed on 3/05/ 2012). 
101 See http://www.icao.int/Security/LAGS_STREBS/Pages/default.aspx (accessed  on 10/12/ 2013) 
102 See United States versus Richard Golvin Reid,  Criminal  Case 02-10013-26y of 2002 
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attempt to destroy the commercial aircraft in flight by denoting explosive hidden in 
his shoes. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  In response to that 
criminal attempt passengers worldwide were forced to remove their shoes for 
screening when flying on planes.103 
 
(c) Chechen Female Suicide Bomb of 2009 
In another incident, a Chechen female suicide bomber blew up two aircraft departing 
Domodedovo Airport, Moscow, to Volgograde and Sochi. Investigation carried out 
revealed that the act was necessitated by the failure of the relevant authorities to 
follow authorized security procedures and other shortcomings for enabling the 
terrorists to board the aircraft undetected.  
 
It was On December 25, 2009, after almost eight hours of flying from Amsterdam, the 
plane was preparing to land in Detroit when a loud pop sounded from among the 
passengers. Some among nearly 300 passengers quickly turned to Abdulmutallab, 
whose odd, specially designed undershorts were clearly burning. As a chaotic scene 
unfolded and smoke grew thicker, passenger grabbed him from his seat, flight 
attendant extinguished the blaze and pilots made am emergence landing at the airport 
near Detroit.104 
 
(d) The Underwear Bomb of 2009 
Likewise, a Nigerian born in Lagos, Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, an Al Qaida –
trained terrorist attempted a bombing aboard a flight Northwest Airlines Flight 253, en 
                                                        
103 “The New Air Travel Rules, published by Ken Dunny-Dunnway Enterprises.  (Also see http://www. 
airtravelrules.dunway.com(accessed  on 30/06/ 2012). 
104http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/chechen.terrorism.n(ccessed on 10/05/2012). 
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route from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan on the Christmas Day of December in 
2009 when he smuggled the bomb aboard in his underpants.105The accused popularly 
referred as  “the underwear bomber” was charged with  attempting to detonate plastic 
explosives hidden in his underwear while on board and  among the eight criminal 
counts of which he was charged, include attempted use of a weapon of mass 
destruction  He pleaded guilty to all 8 counts he was charged and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment106.   
 
2.3.7 Other New and Emerging Aviation Threats 
In the subsequent years following the September 11 attacks of 2001 at the World 
Trade Centre and Pentagon in America, there were a number of new and emerging 
threats sought to target commercial aviation worldwide. In other words terrorist now 
begun to use new techniques and new modes of operation in committing crimes 
against civil aviation. 
 
Some of the prominent acts involving new and emerging threats include the cargo 
bomb plots of 2010107, the 2002 El Al Ticket Counter Shootings at Los Angeles 
International Airport108, the 2004 bombings of two Russian airlines109, the 2007 
                                                        
105 See http: //www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us.umar-farouk-abudulmutallab-pleads-guilty-in-plane. 
Accessed  on 12/12/2012.) 
106 See the case of United States of America Versus Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Criminal case 10-
cr.20005,  
107 On October 29, 2010, two packages each containing a bomb consisting mechanism, were found on 
separate cargo planes and they were designed to detonate mid-air with the intention of destroying 
both planes over Chicago or another city in the US. The bombs were bound from Yemen to the 
United States, and were discovered at en route stop- over at East Midlands Airport in the UK and one 
in Dubai. 
108 On July 4, 2002, a gunman, Hehesm Mohamed Ali Hedeyet, opened fire at Islarel’s El Al airlines 
ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport, killing two people before an airline security guard 
shot him died. 
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Glasgow airport attack,110 the 2007 plot against Frankfurt Airport by the Sauerland 
cell.111 Others are the 2007 attempt by extremist to target fuel lines at JFK 
International in New York112, the 2011 suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domededovo 
international Airport113, and the 2011 shootings of US military personnel at Frankfurt 
International Airport114. 
 
Some other notable new aviation threats are non-metallic explosives, Liquids, 
Aerosols and Gels (LAGS), Cyber terrorism, lesser beams and suicide bombs.   
During the time, the noted criminal attempts including the 2002 plot to hijack an 
airliner and crash it into Changi International Airport in Singapore and other 
terrorist’s attempts prompted changes in airport security screening.115 
 
(a) Cyber-terrorism 
Another potential threat to civil aviation is Cyber-terrorism which has stressed the 
need to develop related countermeasures and is simply means the use of internet based 
                                                                                                                                                               
109 An article by Ben Brandt,”Terrorist Threat to Commercial Aviation: A Contemporary Assessment” 
published in November 30, 2011. And found in http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-threat-to-
commercial-aviation- a contemporary assessment (accessed on 30/04/ 2012). 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 At least 31 people were killed and several injured in a suspected suicide bomb blast at the 
Domodedovo airport (See http//: guardian.co.uk 2011/jan./24/:Accessed  on 8/06/, 2012. 
114 Two American soldiers were killed and two others seriously injured by gunman at Frankfurt airport. 
The gunman, who is a Kosovo national, is linked to terrorists groups. 
115 According to the Report of 14 May 2009 published by the International Centre for Political Violence 
and Terrorism Research, a Singaporean of Indonesian origin, Mas Selamat Kastari and other four 
members of Jemaah Islamiya Militant Network were alleged for attempting to hijack a plane with 
intention of crashing it into Shangai International Airport in Singapore in 2002.  In 2008 Selamat 
escaped from the Whitely Road Detention Centre which had high detention  facility  for terrorist in 
Singapore  and  in 2009 was re- arrested in Malyisian village  and is under detention.( see also 
htt://singaporenews altenative.blog.com/200). 
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on terrorist activities.116As of the newest threats to civil aviation, Cyber-terrorism was 
defined as the act to cause disruption to airport and aircraft operations and it could 
also be carried out by obstructing communication between airborne aircraft and air 
traffic control and navigation satellites.117 
 
(b) Insiders Threats 
The insider threats to aviation industry most are staff working at airports or airlines 
and they should not be overlooked or minimized118. Insider threats must be addressed 
along with enhanced screening capabilities, including employee, as screening 
background checks should also conducted on all those with access to aircraft. 
However, employee screening was not yet being implemented at all airports around 
the world due to operational and infrastructure-related reason. 
 
Typically, insider threats is described as disgruntled or unscrupulous employees trying 
to gain access to information they shouldn’t, and sharing it for personal gain, 
espionage or revenge due to political ideology, strong religious belief, corruption or 
bribe.119 
 
The Minister of Aviation for Nigeria, Princes Stella Odua, while opening a two days 
international Conference on Insider Threats on Civil Aviation held 2011 in Abuja 
Nigeria, has expressed  concern over the emerging  threats posed by airport and airline 
                                                        
116 Alexandar, Y. S, and Weetman, M. S, Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare: Threats and 
Response. Transnational Publishers Inc., U.S ISSBN 1-57105-225-9.2001. 
117http://www. en.wikipedia.org.wiki/cyberterrorism (ccessed  on 8/06/ 2012). 
118 The Inside Threat to Airport Security” An article by Steven Goff, published in the National Interest 
of America and retrieved from http://www.nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-insider (accessed  on 
13/06/2012). 
119 See “Insider Threats“ authored by Capt. Narinder Pal Yadv, UAE General Civil Aviation Authority, 
24 April, 2012. 
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staff to civil aviation.  According to the Minister, most criminal activities committed 
at airports have direct involvement of insiders (aviation staff) and she called for 
coordinated effort among states to address this challenges.120   
 
One example of insider threats is Rajib Karim who was employed with British 
Airways as an IT Expert at airline. He used his position by conspiring and sharing 
information with Anwar Al Awlaki to blow up a British Airways Aircraft. Police 
detected messages in his computer, showing that he had link with Awlaki, who is 
accused of having links to the attempted bombings of a plane over Detroit during 
Charismas in 2009 and an attempted explode ink printer bombs on freight planes 
heading to the US Karim was convicted and sentenced to serve 30 years 
imprisonment.121 
 
2.3.8 Threats Against Airline Facilities 
One aspect of aviation security that is not frequently addressed is the potential for 
terrorists to strike other aspects of aviation infrastructure beyond aircraft. Commercial 
airlines are highly reliant upon information technology systems to handle critical 
functions such as reservations and crew check-in.122 A good example is when an IT 
expert of British Airlines Rajib Karim who had conspired with a terrorist, Anwar al 
Awlaqi to erase data from British Airways servers thus disabling the airline 
website.123 
                                                        
120 Insider Threat More Dangerous To Civil Aviation Security, says Aviation Minister. An article 
retrieved from http://nigeriansmastereb.com/blog/index,php/2011(accessed on 25/06.2012) 
121http://www.guardian.co.uk./2011/feb/28/british.air (accessed  on 25/06/2012). 
122 See an Article by Ben Brandt “Terrorist Threats to Commercial Aviation:  A Contemporary 
Assessment” published in CTC Sentinel, November, 2011 Vol. 4 Issue 11-12, page 6. 
123  An article by Alistair McDonald,“ U.K. Prosecutors Tie BA Employee to Awlaki” published in Wall 
Street Journal of 2 February, 2011. 
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Also, the operational control centers operated by air carriers are another significant 
point of vulnerabilities, which conduct the airlines’ flight control, Meteorology and 
emergency management functions. However, despite their criticality to flight 
operations, these control centers are rarely heavily guarded, meaning that terrorists 
equipped with inside knowledge could shut down the global operations of a major air 
carrier, particularly if backup facilities were to be targeted as well.124 There is 
unconfirmed report that, the mysterious loss of Malaysian Airline flight MH370 
which took place in March, 2014 may be necessitated human intervention to the  
airline facilities aimed at cutting  off any communication with air traffic controllers. 
 
2.3.9 Threats Against Airports 
Another threat to commercial aviation is the increasing number of plots and attacks 
targeting airports themselves rather than aircraft.  For example in 2011 there have 
been two significant attacks staged at international airports in Frankfurt and Moscow. 
Generally, attacks against airports have been planned or executed using a variety of 
tactics, such as firearms, car bombs, suicide bombers, and hijacked aircraft and the 
targets have included airports airport facilities such as fuel lines, arrival halls, and 
curbside drop-off points. Terrorists could also breach perimeter fencing and assault 
aircraft on runways, taxing areas and gates125. This tactics was used during the 2001 
Bandaranaike airport attacks in Sri Lanka, when a team of Black Tigers126 used 
                                                        
124  Supra Note 122. 
125 Supra Note 153, p.7. 
126 The Black Tigers were a specially selected and trained group of suicide operative deployed by the 
Liberations Tigers of Tamil Eelam during their insurgent campaign in Sri Lanka 
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rocket-propelled grenades and antitank weapons to destroy half of Sri Lankan 
Airlines’ fleet of aircraft.127 
 
2.4 Preventive Measures to Aviation Threats 
In response to the increase of criminal incidents to civil aviation, the international 
community has dramatically increased aviation security measures to prevent or deter 
future attacks. Many of these measures are known to the public, including the 
hardening of cockpit doors, federalization of airport security screening staff. Other 
measures include the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
deployment of federal air Marshals (FAMs) and federal flight deck officers (FFDOs) 
aboard aircraft. Others were the implementation of new detection equipment and 
methods such as advanced imaging technology (AIT) often referred to as “full body 
scanners”128, increased amounts of screening for cargo, explosive trace detection (ET), 
full and behavioral detection and body “pat downs.”129  The Court in the case of 
United States v Bobby R. Lindsey130 determined the issues of behavioral detection and 
lawful search and seizure of passenger. Reviewing the previous decision in the 
previous case of Terry v Ohio131, which required  security officers to secure judicial 
approval of a warrant before searching a suspected passenger, the court ruled that the 
                                                        
127 Celia W. Dugger, “ Rebel Attacks on Airport Shocks Leaders of Sri Lanka, “ New York Times, July 
25th 2001. 
128 A full-body scanner is a device that detects objects on a person's body for security screening 
purposes, without physically removing clothes or making physical contact. Depending on the specific 
technology, the operator may see an alternate-wavelength image of the person's naked body, or merely 
a cartoon-like representation of the person with an indicator showing where any suspicious items were 
detected. For privacy and security reasons, the display is generally not visible to other passengers, and 
in some cases is located in a separate room where the operator cannot see the face of the person being 
screened. Unlike metal detectors, full-body scanners can detect non-metal objects, which became an 
increasing concern after various airliner bombing attempts in the 2000s. 
129 Pat down is an act or instance of passing the hands over the body of a clothed person to detect 
voncealed weapons, drugs, etc. 
130 451 F.2d 701 (1971) 
131 (392 U.S.1 (1968). 
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unusual behavior of the suspected passenger  was enough to cause increased concern 
on the part of  the  suspect. Therefore, it was held, in the context of possible airplane 
hijacking, and because of the limited time before the flight left, the security officer did 
not have time to secure judicial approval of a warrant. 
 
The air cargo security programme is also one of the security measures that were being 
put in place to mitigate risks to passengers and baggage screening, employee 
screening and airport access control. Also, ICAO recommended their Universal 
adoption not later than March 2007 in a state letter132 and reacted to the new threats 
with urgency and efficiency in calling a special meeting of the Council on 17  August, 
2006133 to explore ways of  countering the new threats. 
 
Generally, international aviation measures are stipulated in the ICAO’s Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPS) relating to the prevention or deterrence of unlawful 
acts against civil aviation, particularly Annex 17, for Security. These call upon all 
States to use clearly established criteria for risk assessments extended beyond 
international flights to include intra- flights. It was stipulated: 
 “Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written 
national civil aviation security Programme to safeguard civil aviation 
operations against acts of unlawful interference, through regulations, 
practices and procedures which take into account the safety, regularity 
and efficiency of flights”134. 
                                                        
132 Ref No.AS 8/11-06/100 Confidential. Accessed  on 1/12/ 2006. 
133 Working Paper (A36-WP/118) of the International Civil Aviation Organization on Aviation Security 
Programme presented by the Airports Council International during the ICAO Assembly-36th Session,  
at p. 2. 
134 See Standard 3.1.1. of Annex 17  to the Chicago Convention. 
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2.4.1  Measures Adopted by the International Community 
In response to the September 11 attacks, the international community through ICAO, 
IATA and EU adopted several legal and preventive measures to address new and 
emerging threats to civil aviation as follows: 
 
(a) Preventive Measures by ICAO 
Following the 9/11, ICAO as the international organization in charge of global 
regulation of international civil aviation had to respond swiftly to the sudden 
developments by introducing various measures to ensure the security of international  
navigation  by air  to be  least  disturbed by  global  terror. For instance, immediately 
after the attacks, the 33rd ICAO Assembly passed Resolution A-33-1, which directed 
the Council and the Secretary General to address new and emerging threats to civil 
aviation and to review the adequacy of the existing aviation security conventions. 
ICAO further passed several resolutions strongly condemning the use of aircraft as 
weapons of mass destruction.  One of such resolution called upon ICAO members to 
establish a Universal Security Audit Program modeled on USAP, launched in 1999 for 
assessing States on compliance with Annex 17 on security135. These also call upon all 
states to use clearly established criteria for risk assessment extended beyond 
international flights to carriage of fire arms on board aircraft by policing authority 
officers and other authorized persons. 
   
                                                        
135 Provision for international aviation security were first introduced into the Chicago Convention in 
1974 as Annex 17 Security and since then have been improved and updated 11 times. The last 12th 
amendment to Annex 17 was recently approved by ICAO Council and became applicable as of 1st July, 
2011. 
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In the case of United States v Benrus Eugene Brown136 the issue determined was at 
what point does the attempt to board an aircraft with a concealed weapon take place?  
It the defence of the suspected passenger who was found with a pistol at departure 
lounge that, until he set foot on the plane, he had not consummated boarding. 
However, in its decision the court concurred with the prosecution which argued that, 
at the  moment the passenger surrendered his ticket and passed into the departure 
lounge, this constitute an attempt to board an aircraft.  
 
Further measures adopted by ICAO were reviewing the laws and procedures 
governing aviation industry, such as introduction of new airport security procedures, 
the hardening of Cockpit doors, baggage screening, carry-on- luggage limitations, 
electronic scans, physical pat-downs, and even name profiling.  Resolutions were also 
made directing ICAO Council to address the threats to civil aviation by reviewing 
international conventions and Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention which provides 
for such measures as setting up administrative structure responsible for assessing the 
threats and coordinating necessary action to be taken.137Others include emergency 
action in the event of a hijack; control designed to prevent weapons or explosives 
from being taken on board aircraft and closer international co-operation to help 
prevent or deal with illegal acts.  For example, the revision of Annex 17 to the 
Chicago Convention proposed resolution for ICAO to take interim measures including 
applicability of Annex 17 to domestic flights and to require cockpit doors to remain 
locked during flight and upgrading of provisions regarding airport security control.138 
                                                        
136 CCH 11 AVI 17, 429 (1969) (see Gessell, 1993, pp.132&133). 
137 ICAO Press Notice, Resolution Calls for International Conference on Aviation Security” 25 
September, 2001. 
138http://www.iasa.com.au/folder/Security_Issue/usoap.htm(accessed on 10/06/ 2012). 
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The most important security measure by the international community was taken in 
2002 when ICAO adopted a comprehensive plan of action to reinforce aviation 
security worldwide139. A high –level ministerial conference on aviation security was 
held on 19 and 20 February, 2002 and endorsed a global strategy for strengthening 
and issued a public declaration on the subject.140  Also, in March 2002, the ICAO 
Council adopted standard for tighter in-flight security, including improved security 
around the cockpit areas such as reinforced cockpit doors,141 as well as other on-board 
security measures. In June 2002, the Council approved the establishment of a global 
aviation war risk insurance scheme (Global time) to cover the risks left by the 
withdrawal of commercial insurance coverage, in whole or in part following the 
events of the September 11.142 
 
At the Evian Summit of G8 leaders held in June, 2003, measures to enhance air 
transport security were agreed under the Enhance Transport Security and Control of 
Man-Portable Air Defense System (Man pads) action plan. This plan, among other 
things, proposed agreement to implement by November 2003 the new international 
standards for the installation of flight deck doors as adopted by ICAO. 143 
 
In short, these first measures by ICAO eventually formed the basis of the process that 
has culminated in the adoption of the new legal framework through adoption of 
Beijing Treaties for addressing new and emerging threats to aviation security. Also 
                                                        
139ICAO News Release “Aviation Security Plan of Action and New Green Routes Highlight 
Achievements of  2002 “  2002. 
140   Ibid.  
141  See “ Reinforced Cockpit Doors” in http://airside.com/events/war/newsdoor.htm (accessed on   
4/06/2012). 
142 ICAO Press Notice ”Global Aviation Security Strategy in Place to Boost Public Confidence” 10 
September, 2002. 
143 G8/Evian Summit, Enhance Transport Security and Control of Man-portable Air Defence System-
MANPADS-G8 Action Plan, 2003. 
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while the provisions of the previous aviation security conventions covered various 
component of these offences, they did not specifically addressed the aggravated 
aspects of diverting civil aircraft in service into weapon of destruction or deliberately 
using a hijacked aircraft to murder or injury of innocent people in the air or on the 
ground.  
 
On the other hand, ICAO has adopted more stringent air cargo security standards, as 
part of its ongoing efforts to enhance the overall security of air transport operations 
worldwide. The new measures emphasize more extensive screening of cargo, mail and 
other goods prior to placing them on board aircraft and better protection from 
unauthorized interference from the point where security controls are applied until 
departure of the aircraft.144 
 
Also included is the strengthening of provisions related to the deployment of security 
equipment, the security of air traffic service providers, training programmes and 
instructor certification systems, and cyber threats. The updated security requirements 
are contained in the 12th amendment of Annex 17 (Security) to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, adopted in 2010 by the Council of the Organization. As it 
was well elaborated by Mr. Roberto González, ICAO Council President: 
“This latest revision (the 12th revision of Annex 17) to the Security 
Annex has been in development for some time and reflects our 
determination to constantly review and adapt ICAO security standards 
to address a rapidly evolving security situation. It also complements a 
number of recent initiatives to significantly increase the level of 
aviation security, in a proactive and concerted manner,”145 
 
                                                        
144 See ICAO Strengthen Air Cargo Security Measures, in ICAO News Centre 2010, in 
htt://icaopressroom.worldpress.com. Accessed on  9/12/ 2013. 
145 Ibid. 
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(b) Preventive Measures by IATA 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA)146 working with security chiefs of 
major airlines formed what was called the Security Advisory Committee (SAC) which 
developed eight rules to ensure safety and security in air travel. The specific 
conditions   include creation of sterile areas for the boarding of all flights where a 
security screening of all passengers and their luggage was to be required prior to 
entering this sterile boarding zone. All person and items entering the sterile boarding 
area require authorization and subject to security control measures.  
 
Other measures adopted by IATA are developing direct and discrete communication 
system to link passenger screening points and other access points to an airport control 
centre capable and designated to act quickly in cases of unlawful action and the 
establishment of an authorized law enforcement body armed and equipped to conduct 
patrols within the airport complex and be readily available to assist in cases of 
suspected or actual unlawful interference with civil aviation operations. Others 
include erection of restricted access areas to be adequately enclosed thus preventing 
unauthorized entry to the airside of the airport; imposed an obligation to all staff 
working on the airside of an airport to display positive airport identification at all 
times; the installation of physical barriers to separate areas from all baggage, cargo 
and postal holds and facilities to enable the screening of such items; imposing a 
standard that aircraft parking areas be adequately policed at all times and establishing 
                                                        
146 IATA means International Air Transport Association whose mission is to represent, lead and serve 
the airline industry comprising of 240 countries.  It was formed in 19 April, 1945 in Havana Cuba 
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the security norm that all observation view- points which overlook an airport’s airside 
be adequately protected.147 
 
(c) Preventive Measures by EU 
The European Union (EU) also responded to the September 11 attacks by passing 
aviation security legislation in 2002 known as Regulation 2320/2002/EC148 which 
provide for establishment of common rules  in the field  of aviation  security.  Under 
the new law each Member state is required to adopt a national civil aviation security 
program, corresponding quality control program and training program.   
 
Also under the appropriate authorities responsible for coordination and the monitoring 
of the implementation of aviation security programmes are mandated to apply more 
stringent security measures such airport planning requirements, control of access to 
airside and other restricted of airports and aircraft.149 
 
The law also contains provisions for screening and search of passengers and cabin 
luggage, identification, screening and handling of hold baggage, screening of 
diplomats and other privileged persons and vetting and training of security staff. In 
March 11, 2008, following continued negotiation, the law was reviewed as EU 
Regulation 300/2008/EC with the objectives of establishing common rules to protect 
civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.   
                                                        
147 Wallis,R, How Safe Are Our Skies? Assessing the Airlines’ Response to Terrorism (Westport 
Praeger, 2003) p.70.  
148 Regulation 2320/2002 was implemented by three further Regulations in 2003, which are; Regulation 
622/2003/EC which laid down measures for the implementation of the common basic standard on 
aviation security, Regulation 121/2003/EC which  laid down common  specifications for national civil 
aviation security quality control programmes; and Regulation 1486/2003/EC which laid down 
procedures for conducting Commission inspection in the field of civil aviation security. 
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The reviewed law provides the basis for a common interpretation of Annex 17, setting 
out common rules and common basic standard on aviation security as well as 
mechanism for monitoring compliance.150 
 
(d) Preventive Measures by the EAC 
Air transport has played a pivot role in the regional integration process in the East 
African Community (EAC). Hence, the efforts of Civil Aviation Authorities and 
airports authorities from members Sates which are Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda 
and Burundi, brought about the birth of Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight 
Agency (CASOA).  CASOA is an Agency responsible for harmonizing regulations, 
standards and procedures for member states as far as aviation safety and security is 
concerned.151 
 
2.4.2 Preventive Measures by Individual States 
This part examines the responses by some individual states in addressing   aviation 
threats especially after the September 11 Attacks. The selected states are the United 
States of America, the United Kingdom, India and the United Republic of Tanzania 
 
(a) The United States 
Likewise, since the catastrophic events of the 11 September, 2001, stringent legal 
measures were taken by the United States to attack criminals, not just to cub it. The 
first response is the enactment of the Air Transportation Safety and System 
                                                        
150  Article 1 of the Regulation 300/2008/EC. 
151 Richard Ngovi  “ Adapting African Airports To New Security Challenges” and Article published   in 
Aviation & Allied Business Journal, at http:// www.aviationbusinessjournal.aero,(accessed on 21 
August, 2013). 
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Stabilization Act, signed by President Bush less than two months after the 9/11 
attacks.   
 
Also two months after the attacks, the American Congress passed another legislation 
known as the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 2001152 which federalizes the 
airport screening function and establishes the new Transportation Security 
Administration. The legislation also enhances baggage screening procedures and 
imposes more stringent personnel qualifications on Security employees. This new 
legislation was enacted with a view to improving security and closing the security 
loopholes which existed on that fateful day of September 11 and paved the way for a 
huge federal body called the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) which was 
established within the Department of Transportation.  
 
Other US responsive statutes are the Air Transportation Safety and System 
Stabilization Act, 2001153 which is one of two statutes spawned by the events of 9/11, 
the Homeland Security Act,154 which consolidates twenty-two agencies, including the 
TSA, into a new cabinet level Department of Homeland Security which an agency is 
conferred with jurisdiction over, inter alia, transportation security, customs, 
immigration and agricultural inspections and the Federal Aviation Regulation which 
were enacted to ensure the security of airports serving scheduled air carriers required 
to have screening programs.155  
                                                        
152Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 2001, Pub. L. 107-71, 15 Stat. 597  
153 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 2001, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C; 19 U.S.C; 42 U.S.C; 49 U.S.C). 
154 Homeland Security Act, 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as amended in 3 U.S.C; 5 
155 Lawrence E. Gesell, Aviation and the Law, 3rd ed. (Chandler: Coast Aire, 1998) at 179. 
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Other responses by USA include, the hardening of Cockpit doors, federalization of 
airports security screening staff and the creation of the Transport Security 
Administration (TSA), deploying of federal air marshals (FAMs) and federal flight 
deck officers (FFDOs) aboard aircraft, implementation of new detection equipment 
and methods, such as advanced imaging technology (AIT), often referred to as “ body 
scanners”. Also there was increased amounts of screening for cargo, explosive trace 
detection (ETD), fully body “ pat down” and behavioral detection officer (BDOs) 
enhanced security for visa applicants wanting to travel to the United States; and the 
use of watch lists to screen for terrorists to prevent them from boarding flights or from 
gaining employment in airport or airlines. 
 
However, certain measures such as nude –body scanning, invasive pat-downs, AIT 
scanning, inducing passengers to remove jackets, belts and shoes for inspection and 
requiring them to travel with minimal amounts of liquid in their possession- have 
drawn widespread complaints regarding their inconvenience, as well as questions 
about their supposed efficacy. It was further elaborated as follows: 
 “There are different types of body scanners but in general they emit 
radio waves over the body. A three dimensional image is created by 
measuring the heat reflected from the person. The body scanners can 
penetrate clothing and are designed to be an upgrade to the usual 
body “pat down”. The scan do blur out the image does reveal the 
naked body. Their use at Heathrow and Manchester airports and in 
the USA, has already given rise to considerable controversy in terms 
of privacy and civil rights and in relations to the legality of using them 
to scan children”156 
 
                                                        
156 See “Aviation Security” on Website of the Liaison Group of UK Airport Consultative Committee, p. 
4. In  www.ukaccs,info/security.htm (accessed  on 23/08/2013). 
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For example, in the case of Corbett v United States157, Jonathan Corbett, a frequent 
airline passenger filed a complaint in the US District Court for Southern Florida 
against the new nude–body scanning and enhanced pat-down procedures by 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) as a violation of his personal privacy 
and would be emotional traumatizing158. 
 
(b)  The United Kingdom 
Following the 9/11 and the increased number of aviation threats, the United Kingdom 
has also responded by attempting to tackle the situation by enacting several 
legislations. The main piece of domestic legislation passed in the immediate aftermath 
of 9/11 was the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 which improved the 
enforcement of aviation security requirements and the ability of the police to deal with 
potentially dangerous situations at airports and on board aircraft.  
The government also set up a special committee to consider what improvements were 
needed to aviation security in recognition of the new threat posed by suicide bombers 
and hijackers. As a result The Aviation (Offences) Act, 2003 which was purposely 
intended to make provision for the enforcement of 'certain offences' related to aviation 
was enacted.   
 
Also the UK Government has been keen to co-operate with international organizations 
in establishing a hard line against terrorism. The then Home Secretary, David 
                                                        
157 See Case No. 1: 10-cv-24106-MGC, US District Court for Southern Florida. Also the Pat-down 
Procedures include the use of nude body scanners, also called backscatter x-rays, that produce clear 
images of the body of those searched. Those who opt out the scanner receive an enhanced pat down, 
which involves touching all areas of passenger’s body, including the genitalia. 
 
158 TSA started using the procedures in November, 2010 
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Blunkett, made a statement in the House of Commons on 15 October 2001 where he 
outlined the need for having emergency legislation to combat terrorism aimed at 
improving airport security and increased powers for the British Transport Police.159 
 
Heightened Security Measures were also brought into effect in UK as a long-term 
enhancement to the permanent) security measures. These included random searching 
of hold baggage prior to, or immediately after, check-in and more searching by hand 
of passengers and their cabin baggage upon entry to the Restricted Zone, plus a 
regime of secondary searching at the departure gates. 
 
(c)  The United Republic of Tanzania 
Following the September 11 attacks and the increasing incidents of aviation threats, 
Tanzania responded in the war against the threats by enacting several new legislations, 
regulations and circulars.  The Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority Act 160 was enacted 
in 2003 as a regulatory legal framework for aviation industry in the country161.   
 
Other legislations include The Prevention of Terrorism Act,162 The Civil Aviation 
Act,163 and the Extradition Act.164  Also, in order to better implement the laws on 
                                                        
159 Ibid. 
160 Act No 10 of 2002 (and later was consolidated as The Civil Aviation Act, Cap. 80 R.E of 2006) of 
the Laws of Tanzania. 
161 Through Act No. 10 of 2003, the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA) was established to 
work with other Government departments and agencies on aviation matters including ratifying and 
domestication of the relevant international conventions and protocols. 
162 The Act No 21 of 2002 provides for comprehensive measures of dealing with terrorism. 
163 Chapter of the laws of Tanzania, Revised Edition, of 2006 which consolidated the former Tanzania 
Civil Aviation Act, No 13 of 1977 and the Tanzania Civil Aviation Act, No. 10 of 2003 to make 
provisions to enable effect to be given to the Chicago Convention; and generally to provide for the 
control, regulation and orderly development of civil aviation and to establish a regulatory Authority in 
relation to air transport. 
164 Cap. 368 of the Laws of Tanzania. 
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aviation threats, TCAA in 2007 enacted aviation security regulations known as 
Tanzania Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations165 under which unlawful interference 
which is part of aviation threats was defined to means an “act or attempted act to 
jeopardize the safety of civil aviation and air transport”. Under the Security 
Regulations, the acts of unlawful acts were named to include unlawful seizure of an 
aircraft in flight or on the ground; hostage taking on board an aircraft or at an airport 
and forcible intrusion on board an aircraft at an airport.  Others the introduction on 
board an aircraft or at an airport of unauthorized weapon or introduction on board an 
aircraft of a weapon or hazardous device or material; violence against a person on 
board an aircraft in flight if that act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft and 
to perform an act of violence against a person at an airport. 
 
Apart from the security regulations, TCAA issued a circular in which aviation 
stakeholders were warned to take several precautions on aviation security issues.166 
The circular requires unattended aircraft be properly secured to prevent unauthorized 
use; operators to always verify and identify all crews and passengers prior to flight 
departures; operators to verify baggage and cargo by person on board an aircraft; and 
employers and all members of security forces to wear proper identification at all times 
when on duty and those without should not be allowed into airport operation areas.  
(d)  The Republic of Kenya 
Kenya Airports Authority (KAA) is a state- owned corporation with mandate of 
developing, managing and maintaining civil aviation in Kenya. Being a country that 
                                                        
165 G.N. No 197 of 2007 for safeguarding and enhancing aviation security against acts of violence or 
unlawful interference. 
166 See the Aeronautical Information Circular No. 13/2003 of July, 2003 signed by the Director General 
of Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority 
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relies heavily on tourism with its strategic geographical location as an aviation hub, 
Kenya treasures the immense contribution of aviation to its gross domestic product. It 
is therefore ideal to look at the strategies and efforts of the Kenyan authorities in 
protecting the aviation industry from the new and emerging threats. As it was pointed 
out: 
The authority through the coordination of government agencies and 
stakeholders has been able to provide layered security measures that 
minimize the chances of perpetrators succeeding in their intentions. For 
instance, the Immigration Department is well within the International 
Civil Aviation 2015 deadline of issuing machine readable passports.  
Such a move will greatly reduce cases of fraudulent travel documents 
being used by would –be- perpetrators of terrorist activities. 
Additionally, there exist a strict vetting procedure for airport workers 
applying for airport movement permits. This serves as one of the 
remedies for dealing with inside threats.167 
 
 
Apart from that, Kenya Airport Authority has invested heavily in a state -of- the art 
Security equipment such as X-ray machines, explosive trace detectors, full body 
scanners and surveillance systems. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter highlights the general concept of aviation threats in terms of historical 
development, types, notable incidents and preventive measures.  It also shows how 
aviation industry is the most vulnerable and the most destructive if misused as 
demonstrated by the dramatic hijackings as well as other criminal acts and foiled plots 
over the past several decades. Further, it has been noted through this chapter that the 
techniques on aviation threats are dynamic and go parallel to the social and 
technological advancements. 
                                                        
167 Richard Ngovi, op cit, note 207  p. 3 
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It has also been observed that, the international community and individual states have 
effectively and comprehensively tried to respond to the aviation threats in order to 
restore public confidence in air travel as well as promoting the health air transport. 
However, it is obvious that despite the strenuous efforts by the international 
community and the individual states to respond to the threats, the number of plots 
identified in this chapter illustrate that terrorists are still maintaining a high level of 
interest in attacking aviation and it is imperative that that, global cooperation needs to 
be more intensified in dealing with the magnitude and complexity of new and 
emerging threats to aviation security. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
     3.0 OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON AVIATION 
SECURITY THREATS PRIOR TO THE 2010 BEIJING CONVENTIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of International Legal Framework on aviation 
security threats before the adoption of the 2010 Beijing legal instruments. In the 
course of discussion several Conventions and Protocols are critically examined and 
their adequacy and effectiveness in addressing aviation threats are tested in 
comparison with the 2010 Beijing Treaties.  
 
3.2      Development of the Laws on Aviation Security 
The international law on aviation security has a long history which goes back to1919 
when a Conference on International Air Law was held in Paris and adopted the Paris 
Convention for regulating aerial navigation168. Later, after the World War I, the Paris 
Peace Conference was held in 1922 and came up with the Convention on International 
Air for governing aspects of civil aviation and consequently created the International 
Commission on Air Navigation (ICAN) whose headquarters was in Paris169.  
However, in 1944, the Chicago Convention on international civil aviation was adopted 
by nations of the world who were gathered at Chicago leading to the creation of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)170 which in 1947 took over the 
                                                        
168See the Paris Convention for Regulation of Aerial Navigation, October, 13, 1919.  
169The International Commission on Air Navigation (ICAN) was created during the Paris Conference in 
December, 1922 to provide rules for air traffic. 
170 ICAO became a centre focus of the international community through which the international air law 
is not only applied but is also created.  The aims and objectives of ICAO are clearly stated in the 
Chicago Convention of 1944 which is the fundamental source of the current international air laws. 
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offices and role of ICAN.171 On the other hands, the Geneva Convention of 1958 on 
the High Seas which introduced aviation security into the international legal regime 
could not cover the unlawful acts against civil aviation in practice172.  
 
On that premises, apart from the Paris Conventions of 1919 and the Chicago 
Convention of 1944, ICAO went on with its efforts of  developing  and updating the 
laws on aviation security  by  adopting  several  other international Conventions and 
Protocols173. The other International legal instruments adopted later by ICAO include 
The Tokyo Convention of 1963174, The Hague Convention of 1970175 The Montreal 
Convention of 1971176 and The Airport Protocol of 1988.177 As stated earlier, in 2010 
ICAO further reviewed and amended the above named legal instruments and come up 
with the 2010 Beijing Convention and the 2010 Beijing Protocol to make the laws 
more effective in preventing and combating aviation threats in line with the prevailing 
situation. 
 
3.2.1 The Chicago Convention of 1944 
As pointed out herein above, the international treaties seeking to regulate aviation 
security have their sources on clutch of conventions, protocols and declarations 
                                                        
171 Encyclopedia of the Nations, “United Nations Related Agencies” The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) also see http:/www.icao.org.Retrieved on 18/09/2013. 
172 See the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958. 
173See Assad Kotaite, “Security of International Civil Aviation- Role of ICAO” (1982) VII Ann. Air & 
Space Law, 95. 
174Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, adopted in Tokyo 
Japan in 1963. 
175Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of aircraft, adopted in Hague in 1970. 
176Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which was 
later updated by the 1988 Airport Protocol. 
177The Montreal Convention which was mainly dealing with sabotage of aircraft in flight, was amended 
by the Airport Protocol, (Montreal Protocol) which was adopted in Montreal Canada, in 1988  to 
address  international legal terrorist acts affecting airports. 
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drafted outside the frameworks of the Paris Convention of 1919 and the Chicago 
Convention of 1944.178 
 
The objectives of the Chicago Convention were to codify the principles and 
techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development 
of international air transport with the view of ensuring safe and orderly growth of 
international civil aviation throughout the world.179 
 
However, it is unfortunate that the Chicago Convention lacked provisions specifically 
relating to acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation and such acts were 
extensively dealt with later when Annex 17 to the Convention was adopted. In other 
words, before 1960s when the international community experienced the newly 
emerging international challenges on aviation threats, the legal instruments on 
aviation security and the technical security measures on unlawful interference against 
civil aviation were not introduced into the international legal regime.180 
 
3.2.2 The 1963 Tokyo Convention 
As discussed herein above, before 1960s there was no direct legislation to regulate 
unlawful acts against civil aviation in the world181 and the first action taken by 
international community to include unlawful acts to civil aviation in the law, was the 
                                                        
178 Convention on International Civil Aviation signed in Chicago in 1944, ICAO Doc.7300/8 [Chicago 
Convention. 
179 See: http:// en.wikipedia. Org/wiki/international civil_aviation_ Organization (accessed on 27/04/ 
2012). 
 
180 Jung, S. Y,” A Legal Analysis of Aviation Security under International Legal Regime” A Thesis 
Submitted to McGill University in Partial Fulfillment of degree of Master of Laws (LL.M.) March, 
2005. 
181 http:www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokyo Convention (accessed on 27/10/2013).  
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adoption of the Tokyo Convention in 1963182 which is frequently referred to as the 
first legal step to combat unlawful interference with civil aviation. However, the 
Tokyo Convention was not intended to address hijacking rather it was focused on 
other offences committed on board aircraft and the issue of unlawful seizure of 
aircraft was added later as an afterthought in article 11 of the Convention.183 
 
The leading force to the adoption of the Tokyo Convention involved detailed 
examination of all the matters relating to the legal status of aircraft and in particular to 
important aspects like crimes and offences committed on board aircraft, jurisdiction  
relating to such  crimes and  the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts. In his paper 
presented to the International Conference on Aviation Security, Bin Cheng pointed 
out that the Tokyo Convention was primarily a reaction to discovery in cases such as 
USA v Cordon184 and R v Martin185 that aircraft, when they are flying abroad, 
especially over the high seas, was often literally oases of lawlessness, where no law 
was applicable.186 
 
Also, with the adoption of the Tokyo Convention in 1963, the contracting states in 
which a hijacked aircraft lands was obliged to take all appropriate measures to restore 
control of the aircraft to its lawful commander and to permit its passengers and crew 
                                                        
182Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, adopted by the ICAO 
International Conference held in Tokyo, Japan from 20th August to 14th September, 1963. The 
Convention entered into force on 4th December, 1969. 
183  Acharya, G. “Legal Aspects on Aviation Security Measures Taken at Airport “ A Thesis submitted 
to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirement of Degree of Master of Law (LL.M), 
Institute  and Centre of Air and Space Law, McGill University, 2005, at page 22. 
184USA v Gordova [1950] AV..R.p,1:87 F 
185R Versus Martin [1956] QB 272. 
186 Cheng, B,“ International Legal Instrument to Safeguard International Air Transport: The 
Convention of Tokyo, the Hague, Montreal, and New Instrument Concerning Unlawful Violence at 
International Airports” (Paper presented to the International Conference on Aviation Security, January 
1987) Unpublished. 
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to continue their journey as soon as practicable.187 Also, the Tokyo Convention has 
laid a foundation stone to the development of the laws in combating aviation threats 
which are jeopardizing the safety of commercial aircraft or passengers while the 
aircraft is in flight and that jurisdiction over the offence is vested in the State of 
registry, irrespective of the aircraft although third party States may assert jurisdiction 
under certain circumstances.188 
 
It is worth noting that, the Tokyo Convention though adopted in 1963 it came into 
force six years later, on 4th December 1969. It is stated that the rationale behind this 
was delay in ratification by members states due to the fact that the Convention was 
drafted prior to the series of hijackings in the late 1960s and hence it was not 
implemented with due  hast by most states.  Also, the complicated legal and political 
issues facing many states at the adoption of the Tokyo Convention were another 
reason for the late implementation. However, although states were slow in ratifying or 
acceding to the Tokyo Convention, it is worth mentioning that, within one year from 
1969 to 1970, 80 states ratified the convention, probably in response to spate of 
hijacking that occurred during the period.189 
 
Also, while the Tokyo Convention aimed at providing safety to aircraft, protecting of 
life and property on board aircraft and to promote the security of civil aviation, a wide 
range of powers are granted to the aircraft commander, members of the crew and 
passengers with sole aim to constitute international unified rules which  would  give  
                                                        
187 Tokyo Convention Art. 11. 
188 Ibid Art 3. & 4. 
189 Ibid, Art. 11. 
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the commander of every  aircraft in the world the power to preserve good  order and  
discipline on board the aircraft and to take all preventive measures or  measures of 
restraint necessary to that end. This power can be considered as a means to secure the 
maintenance of law and order on board the aircraft.190 
 
However, the Convention does not prescribe specific offences but rather relies upon 
offences as codified under national law and it applies to acts which, whether offence 
or not, affect the in-flight safety of persons or property of jeopardize the discipline on 
board a civil aircraft.  Also, although the Convention does not attempt to cover 
unlawful seizure of aircraft specifically not all forms of unlawful  seizure of aircraft 
were covered, nor  did it provide for a specific  response other than an obligation on 
states to  “ take all appropriate measures to restore control  of the aircraft to its lawful  
commander or  to preserve his control of the aircraft.191  
 
On the other hand, even though there is a requirement for states parties to take 
delivery of person whom the aircraft commander delivers because he has reason to 
believe the person has committed a serious offence according to the penal law of the 
state of registration of the aircraft, the Tokyo Convention lacks proper extradition 
arrangements enabling effective prosecution of hijackers. In addition, the failure to 
provide machinery for mandatory extradition, if prosecution was not pursued in the 
landing state, is considered a major deficiency of the Tokyo Convention.192 
                                                        
190 The power given under the Tokyo Convention includes to arrest, disembark and deliver to 
competent authorities of contracting state, any person committing or attempting to commit an offence 
or any act which jeopardize the safety of aircraft, persons or goods on board, or threatens to create 
disorder on board. Also See International Conference on Air Law, August-September 1963 at Tokyo, 
ICAO Conference Doc. No.5. 
191 See Article 11 of the Tokyo Convention, 1963. 
192 Ibid Article 8. 
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All in all, the Tokyo Convention of 1963 had considerable legal weakness, mainly 
resulting from the compromise between what is needed to be done to curb aircraft 
hijackings and what could be done to achieve subsequent ratification by a large 
number of States with important aviation threats. However, in spite of its 
shortcomings, the Tokyo Convention should be properly evaluated for the 
contribution to the development of public international air law and to the safety of 
civil aviation from any international dangers by introducing the foundation for 
international agreement aiming at preventing the offences from remaining unpunished 
in particular with respect to criminal jurisdiction, and the power of the aircraft 
commander.193 
  
3.2.3 The 197 0 Hague Convention 
The inadequacy of the 1963 Tokyo Convention and the increase in the number of 
hijackings resulted in the need to define the act of hijacking and recognize it as an 
international offence, led the ICAO Assembly adopting a resolution on the subject 
matter and to seek an appropriate legal framework to deal with the offence.194  As a 
result, the ICAO Council by its resolution of December, 1968, referred legal aspects 
of the problem of unlawful seizure of aircraft to the Legal Committee.  
 
On 1st December, 1970 a draft Convention was submitted to an ICAO conference at 
the Hague, attended by 77 states and was adopted on 16th December, 1970. According 
to Professor Dempsey, the Hague Convention of 1970 was the first meaningful step 
                                                        
193 Jung, S.Y, “ Legal Analysis of Aviation Security Under the International Legal Regime” A Thesis 
submitted to McGill University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement of the Degree of Master of 
Laws (LLM), March, 2005. 
194 See http://www.lawnotes.in/Hague-Convention -1970 (accessed on 10/11/2013). 
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taken to define the law of international hijacking, as it declared the hijacking of an 
aircraft to be an international offence.195 It is commonly known as the Convention on 
the Suppression Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft and was signed at Hague on 16 
December, 1970. Tanzania ratified the same on 9 August, 1983 and partly 
domesticated it in the Penal Code and the Extradition Act, Chapters 16 and 368 
respectively of the laws of Tanzania. 
 
Also apart from developing a clear legal policy and enforcement procedures to deal 
with such aviation related crimes196, the Convention made significant contribution to 
the effort of the international community to curb the unlawful seizure of aircraft and 
to remove the threats caused to civil aviation and it covers both international and 
domestic flights. For example it defines the offence of unlawful seizure of aircraft and 
obliges states to make the offences punishable by severe penalties.197 
 
The Hague Convention further gives specific definition of hijacking of aircraft and it 
include as well the threat to undertake such acts as an offence, although this is limited 
to a threat made on board an aircraft in –flight.  However, in order for one to succeed 
in his claims against such a threat or criminal act causing death or injury, it must be 
proved that the passenger involved was in course of any operation or process of 
embarking or disembarking as it was ruled in the case of Baker v. Lansdell Protective 
Agency, Inc198.  In this case, the US District Court held that the course of embarking 
                                                        
195 Prof. Dempsey, P.S,” Aviation Security; The Role of Law in the War Against Terrorism ”(2003) at 
666. 
196 Article 1 of the Hague Convention. 
197The Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft which was signed at the Hague 
on 16 December, 1970 and ratified by Tanzania on 9 August 1983.  
198Baker v Lansdell Protective Agency, Inc. 590 F. Supp. 165, US District Court, SDNY, 1984. 19 avi 
18193 (D,C,N,Y). 
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had commenced when the passenger placed his objects on the conveyor belt for a 
security check. 
 
Another important development under the Hague Convention was that the number of 
states competent to exercise jurisdiction over a hijacker was enlarged and a new basis 
for the exercise of jurisdiction by the state where the charterer on an aircraft has his 
principal place of business or permanent residence was introduced. Moreover, the 
Convention grants every contracting state the power to exercise jurisdiction over a 
hijacker if such state are affected by an offence committed under the Convention, thus 
making it impossible for hijacker to escape the normal process of the law.199 
 
Under the 1970 Hague Convention, also known as Hijacking Convention States are 
obliged to include hijacking in extradition treaties to be concluded between them. It 
should be noted that, at the diplomatic conference which discussed the draft of the 
Convention, the drafters rejected the proposal to apply compulsory prosecution or 
extradition. However, it was finally accepted that the contracting state in whose 
territory the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged to 
submit the case to its competent authorities, for the purpose of prosecution.  
 
This provision together with certain other requirements was designed to ensure that 
states either prosecute or extradite offenders in their territory. On the other hand, there 
was extensive debate over these provisions, particularly over the issue of hijacking for 
political motive and the discretion of states to prosecute in those circumstances with 
                                                        
199  Stancu,D.M,  Supra note 184 at p.12. 
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the intention to preclude political motive as a reason for not extraditing where 
prosecution of an offender does not occur.200 
 
Notwithstanding its efficiency in some areas, the Convention has a series of 
weaknesses. For example, the criminal offence must be committed by a person on 
board an aircraft” in-flight” and thereby it excludes offences committed by persons 
not on board such as saboteurs who remain on the ground. Also according to the   
Convention the aircraft is deemed to be in-flight at any time from the moment when 
all external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such 
doors are opened for embarkation meaning that, any hijacking initiated or attempted 
before the closing of the doors of the aircraft after embarkation, is not covered.  
 
Also, whilst the Hague Convention includes an accomplice offence, an accomplice 
only falls within the ambit of the Convention if the assistance is provided whilst on 
board the aircraft in- flight. The term “ in-flight” was limited under the Act to means 
when all external doors of the aircraft are closed following embarkation until the 
moment when only such door is opened for disembarkation.201 
 
Furthermore, the Hague Convention of 1970 does not cover the unlawful interference 
with air navigation facilities and services such as airports, air traffic control and radio 
communication and a lacuna lies in the word of a phrase in Article 2 under which 
States undertake to make the offences punishable by severe penalties which 
unfortunately, the term “severe penalties” was not elaborated. In short, the Convention 
                                                        
200 Ibid 
201 Ibid 
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is considered to have failed to address the issue of aircraft sabotage, while criminal 
incidents against civil aviation such as sabotage of aircraft, using bombs designed to 
explode during flight had became more prevalent202. This prompted the adoption of 
the Montreal Convention of 1971.  
 
3.2.4 The 1971 Montreal Convention 
Since both the Tokyo Convention of 1963 and the Hague Conventions of 1970 dealt 
only  with  unlawful seizure and offences committed  on board aircraft, and due  to the 
increased number  of acts of  violence  committed on board aircraft and on airport 
ground facilities, the ICAO  came up with the Montreal  Convention of 1971203  to 
remedy  these lapses and to criminalize such acts.  The Montreal Convention was 
signed in Montreal, Canada on 23 September, 1971 and as it was the case with the 
Hague Convention the same was ratified by the Government of Tanzania on 9 August, 
1983. The Convention which was specifically adopted for the purpose of suppression 
of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation has been domesticated in the laws 
of Tanzania.204 
 
Further, it should be noted that the Montreal Convention of 1971 apart from repeating 
some of the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1970, it was considered a 
breakthrough in combating terrorism against air transport as it pioneered a new series 
of offences which can be committed without the offender being on board aircraft by 
defining them broadly in order to cover all possible acts that might occur. In other 
                                                        
202 See Article 2 of the Hague Convention of 1970. 
203The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which was 
signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971 and ratified by Tanzania on 9 August 1983.  
204 See section 318A of the Penal Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Tanzania.  
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words, the Montreal Convention of 1971 addresses issues of airport security and 
sabotage of aircraft prior to flight.205 
 
Under the 1971 Montreal Convention, the definition of an aircraft “in service” was 
introduced, a term used in the offence concerning placement of a device which is 
likely to destroy that aircraft. This offence and the definition of “in service” ensure 
that a device or substance placed on the aircraft prior to an aircraft being considered 
in-flight is covered by the Convention and it places additional international legal 
obligations on States to act against a wider range of offences involving aircraft.206 
 
One of the limitations of the Montreal Convention is that it does not make it an 
offence to threaten to commit the offences in the Convention, unlike the Hague 
Convention which specifically criminalizes a threat to unlawfully seize an aircraft, 
although this is limited to person on board in-flight. One case which illustrates the 
practical deficiencies of the Montreal Convention is Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United 
States of America207where the question of interpretation and application of the 
Montreal Convention was determined following the bombing of Pan Am aircraft, 
Boeing 747 at Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, killing 270 people on board.208  In that 
case Libya opposed the request by US Governments for extradition of its two citizens 
                                                        
205 Achary, Supra Note 127, p. 27. 
206 Under the Montreal Convention offences which are termed to be unlawful acts against civil aviation 
are classified to include act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight likely to endanger 
the safety of that aircraft; destroys an aircraft in service or causes damage to such an aircraft rendering 
it incapable of flight; destroy. Damages or interfere with air navigation facilities, thereby to endanger 
the safety of aircraft in flight; places or cause to be placed on aircraft in service, a device likely to 
destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it impossible of flight. The term “ an 
aircraft in service” is defined under the convention to means from the beginning of preflight preparation 
for specific flight until twenty four hours after any landing.  
207 Libya Versus United States, 31 I.L.M 662 (1992) 
208 Article by Prof. Gowlland, V. D, “ The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and 
the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbies Case” in America Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 88 No4 (October 1988) pp. 643-677. 
              
 
 
81
to be tried in US on the ground that, in the absence of extradition treaties with US, and 
under the Montreal Convention,209 only Libyan authorities had jurisdiction to try their 
own citizen for such criminal acts.  The matter, however, was settled by the parties 
and the two Libyans were charged in a neutral Court in Netherlands210. 
Notwithstanding its value in some areas, the Montreal Convention of 1971 remains, 
like the 1963 Tokyo Convention and the 1970 Hague as it was still weak and not real 
effective.211 
 
3.2.5 1988 ICAO Aviation Security Plan 
Following bombing of a Pan Am Aircraft over Lockerbie in December, 1988, ICAO 
adopted an eight-points aviation security plan that became the basis for improvement 
in aviation security throughout the world. The plan include compulsory screening of 
checked passenger’s baggage, baggage reconciliation, screening of cargo and mail, 
control of access to sensitive areas at airports and carriage of items that cannot be 
easily opened. Other measures are better detection of explosives, building security 
into the design of aircraft and strengthening of the powers and organization of ICAO 
to enable it to implement more actively the safety standards212.   
 
3.2.6 The 1988 Montreal Protocol 
As noted herein above, one weakness of the Montreal Convention of 1971 is that it is 
limited to offences which affect the safety the aircraft” in service” or “in- flight”.  
                                                        
209 Article 5 and 7 of the Montreal Convention. 
210  Prof. Gowlland, V. D , Supra note 208. 
211  Stancu, M.D, “ Beijing Convention & Protocol: Responding to Future Threats” Published in the 
Global Journal of Airport and Airline Security, October 2010 Volume 16 issue 5,  P.12 
212 Louise Butcher, “Aviation Security” an article published in Business Transport (SN/BT/1246) 14 
June, 2011, House of Commons Library, at p..2. 
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However, this limitation was addressed to some extent by the Protocol for the 
Suppression of unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, (Airport Protocol) of 1988213 and hence expanded the reach of the Montreal 
Convention to extend beyond aircraft in flight and include airports serving 
international civil aviation, where air passengers are assembled before and after 
travel.214  
 
The 1988 Protocol specifically provides for offences against a person at an airport as 
well as the destruction or damage of facilities of an airport or an aircraft not in service 
where such acts endanger or likely safety at that airport. As it was elaborated: 
 “ The protocol commits the states ratifying it to make it an offence to 
carry out armed attacks at international airport or to cause damage or 
disruption at such airports. The protocol provides for severe penalties 
for these offences.”215 
 
In short the airport protocol was adopted following the bombing of several major 
airports in the 1980s that resulted in the death of waiting passengers, compelling 
ICAO adopt the protocol that effectively extended the principal provisions of the 
Montreal Convention to airport facilities.216 
 
                                                        
213The Montreal Convention which was mainly dealing with sabotage of aircraft in flight, was amended 
by the Airport Protocol, (Montreal Protocol) adopted in Montreal Canada, in 1988 to enhance the 
international legal terrorist acts affecting aviation. 
214 Samuel M. Witten,” Introductory Note to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Relating to International Civil Aviation and the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft” Published in JASTOR: International Legal Materials, 
Vol. 50, No.2 (2011), pp 141-159. 
215 Supra note 201. 
216The Airport Protocol of 1988 was negotiated in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in international 
airport terminals at the Rome and Vienna Airports in 1985. See Richard L Kilpatrick” supra, note at 
page 12. 
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3.2.7 Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention 
The increase in aviation related crimes and the failure of the legal regime to properly 
address  such  crimes, led to the  ICAO  holding an extraordinary Assembly Session in 
1974 and exercised its quasi-legislative  powers  to adopt Annexes to the Chicago  
Convention to tackle the unlawful seizure of  aircraft. One of the Annexes was the 
Annex 17217 which states and addresses various security measures regarding civil 
aviation including standards and qualifications for security personnel at international 
airports.218 
 
Further that, Annex 17 which is sometimes referred to as the Security Annex, is the 
most famous of all the international legal instruments designed to cater threats of the 
aviation industry being targeted by those with crime intent. It further binds ICAO 
member states to establish national civil aviation programs and supporting 
government institutions which are also under the Annex to share aviation threat 
information and cooperate with other states regarding their national security 
programs.219 
 
Also, the most important legislative function performed by ICAO is the formulation 
and adoption of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for international 
civil aviation220. These were incorporated into the 18 technical annexes to the Chicago 
                                                        
217Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention incorporate several of the requirements set forth in the Tokyo, 
Hague and Montreal Conventions. 
218 Richard L Kilpatrick,J.R.” Borrowing From Civil Aviation Security: Does International Law 
Governing Airline Hijacking Offer Solution to the Mordern Maritime Piracy Epidemic Off the Coastal 
of Somali?” Project Sponsored by One Earth Future Foundation, August, 11,  p.11. 
219  Supra, Note 177, p.12 
220 The Standard and Recommended Practices or SARPs, covers operational and technical aspects of 
international civil aviation security and requires each member state to have a national civil aviation 
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Convention221 and of critical  importance  to the future of  civil aviation and to the  
international  community at large are the measures taken by ICAO  to prevent  and 
suppress all acts of unlawful interference  against  civil aviation  throughout the world.  
SARPs for international aviation security were first adopted by ICAO on 22 March 
1974, and designed as Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention.222 
 
Annex 17 was basically concerned with technical measures for protection of security 
of international civil aviation, whereby each Contracting State was obliged to 
establish to its own civil aviation security program with such additional security 
measures as may be proposed by other appropriate bodies.223  In other words, under 
the international air law, each state is obliged to implement its own security standards. 
Likewise, airline operators are required to protect their passengers, assets and 
revenues and the States are further obliged to ensure that the carriers develop and 
implement effective complementary security program compatible with those of the 
airports out of which they operate.224 
 
The Annex imposes further obligation of the Contracting States, airport operators and 
airlines to ensure that the safety and security of passengers, crew, ground personnel 
and general is a primary consideration in the safeguarding action which they initiate.  
                                                                                                                                                               
security program and to create a governmental institution to develop and implement aviation security 
regulations. 
221  Nikhil George,” Global Air Safety and Regulations: Current Advancement” Project Assignment-
Aviation Law-I: AL-I   (Unpublished) at page 6. 
222 See Article 34 of the Chicago Convention, 1944. 
223 See Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, 1944. 
224 The ICAO Security Mannual Document 873 states that, basic responsibility for security of aircraft 
and rests with operator, likewise EU Regulations 2320/2002 requires each member state to ensure 
airports and air carriers providing service from that state to establish and implement security 
programmes to meet the requirements of the national civil aviation security programme of that state. 
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States are, therefore, urged to adopt measures for safety and security of passengers 
and crew of unlawfully diverted aircraft until their journey is continued.  
 
The obligation of the states, airlines and airport operators in as far as aviation security 
is concerned, was highlighted by the American case of In Re 9/11 Litigation225 when 
the Judge stated in her findings: 
” We live in vicinity of busy airports, and work in tall office towers and 
depend on others to protect us from the willful desires of terrorist to do us 
harm. Some of those on whom we depend for protection are private 
companies”. 
 
It denotes that airlines and airport operators are responsible for the risk arising out of 
unlawful interference with civil aviation. 
 
In the process of updating the law on aviation security, ICAO in November, 2010   
adopted amendment 12 to the Annex 17 as recommended by the Committee on 
Unlawful interference. The amendment apart from updating the international air laws 
strengthens aviation security provisions, particularly in relations to staff screening, 
security equipment capabilities, cyber threats and air cargo. The new and revised 
provisions became effective on 26 March 2011226 The latest amendment to Annex 17, 
known as amendment 13 was done in 2013 and became effective on 15th July, 2013.227 
 
                                                        
225 In this significant case, the Court held that, the airport operator, airline and airport security were 
negligently liable for their failure to satisfy their security responsibilities, and consequently allowed the 
terrorists to get on board and hijack the airplanes. The court further ruled that airlines and airport 
operators did have a duty to prevent potential terrorists from getting onboard the aircraft; and this duty 
is extended to ground victims. 
226  ICAO Doc  9952 on Annual Report of the Council. 2010. 
227  See  http://www.icao.int/Security/SFP/Pages/Annex 17 (accessed on 10/12/ 2013). 
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3.2.8 The 1978 Born Declaration on Hijackings 
The G-7 heads of states met in Born, Germany in 1978 and issued a declaration on 
hijacking known as The Born Declaration on International Terrorism.228 The 
Declaration had no binding effect to the parties, but establishes intention for these 
major economic powers to access all flights to or from any country that fails to 
extradite or prosecute hijackers. Under the Declaration, a country that refuses the 
extradition or prosecution of those who hijacked an aircraft and does not return it, 
action would be taken to cease all flights to and from that country and its airlines229. 
 
Also these potential sanctions from representatives of seventy percent of world 
aviation traffic created significant obligations on non-party states as the Declaration 
has subsequently been invoked to threaten against Afghanistan and later against South 
Africa.230 Besides the problem surfacing from the Born Declaration and the lack of 
respectable representation by the international community, there are certain practical 
gaps with respect to the application. For example; how would the decision to suspend 
air services be taken by the members of the Declaration, who will judge that a State is 
no longer in default, and how long the sanctions will last etc.231 Those problems 
mainly resulted from the hasty adoption of the Declaration during the period of G-7 
                                                        
228  To intensify  the joint  effort  to State  to combat  international  terrorism  by preventing each state  
from being  an available  safe heaven for any offender  and by  deterring  each state  from  encouraging 
the commission  of offence , on July 17, 1978  the leaders of G-7 (Canada, France, The Federal 
Republic  of  Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and USA) participating in Born Economic 
Summit, issued  a joint  declaration known as The  1978 Born Declaration on Hijackings which 
declared the parties  intention to take sanctions against any State that fail to fulfill its  international 
obligations under the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions. 
229James J,Busttil ,” The Born Declaration on International Terrorism: A non-binding International 
Agreement on Aircraft Hijacking”  3I I.C.L.Q 474 at  47&476. 
230 Richard L. Kilpatrick” supra Note 163 at 12. 
231 See James J. Busitti, supra Note 173 at 163. 
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economic summit on July, 1978 without the appropriately scheduled preparation 
procedures and the experts on aviation.232 
 
However, this does not mean that the Declaration is without significance, because it 
was the first international agreement calling for the use of aircraft boycott against 
State granting safe heavens to hijackers in order to force State to deal firmly with 
hijackers.233 
 
3.2.9 The 1991 Montreal Convention 
Subsequent to the attack to Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 
1988 and the explosion aboard a UTA aircraft over Niger in September 1989, the 
United Nations Security Council passed a Resolution 635 which urged ICAO to 
advise an international regime for marking a plastic and sheet explosives for detecting 
purposes. ICAO responded with the adoption of The Convention on the Marking of 
Plastic Explosive for the Purpose of Detection.234 It imposes states to destroy 
unmarked explosives by a certain date and report it to ICAO 
 
Briefly, the 1991 Convention requires signatory states to prohibit and prevent the 
unauthorized manufacturer, export or import of unmarked plastic explosives and 
where stocks of unmarked explosives are held, to destroy or render them permanently 
ineffective within a specific period. In recognition of the rapidly changing 
                                                        
232 See Ottp von der Gablentz, “ Prevention of Aviation Terrorism: The Government’s Point of View” 
in Conference Proceedings: Aviation Security (The Netherlands: International Institute of Air and 
Space Law, University of Leyden, 1987) at 117&118. 
233 See Mark E. Fingerman, “Skyjacking and the Born Declaration of 1978: Sanction applicable to 
Recalcitrant Nations” (1980) 10 Cal. W Int’l L.J. 123at 142&143. 
234 The Convention commonly known as The Montreal Convention of 1991 was adopted unanimously 
at the International Conference on Air Law, held in Montreal, Canada in early 1991. 
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technologies for detecting explosives, the Convention is accompanied with a technical 
annex which describes explosives of which the Convention applies and lists agents 
that may be used to mark the explosives.235 
 
3.3 Aviation Threats after the September 11 Attacks 
Since the catastrophic events of 11 September 2001, there have been several attempts 
against aviation security and these threats have ranged from shoe bombs to dirty 
bombs to explosives that can be assembled in flight with liquids, aerosols and gels. In 
every instance, the global community has reacted with pre- emptive and preventive 
measures that prohibit any material on board that might seemingly endanger the safety 
of flight. Also, some jurisdictions have gone to extremes in prohibiting human milk 
and prescriptive medications on board. Further, there had been stringent legal 
measures taken by the international community to attack such terrorist act and this 
goes to show that the law plays a significant role in ensuring aviation security. It is, 
therefore, believed that the 2010 Beijing legal instruments can play a crucial role in 
furthering this objective.236.  
 
3.3.1   What happened in the September 11 Attacks 
As it was pointed out in the previous chapters, the famous September 11 attacks were 
a series of four coordinated suicide attacks on the United States in New York City and 
the Washington DC areas on September, 11 2001 where a group of Al-Qaida hijacked 
four passenger jets. The hijackers intentionally crashed two planes, American Airlines 
                                                        
235 See an Article titled “ Evolving Threat to Civil Aviation is Countered by Legal Instruments  as well 
as  New Technology” by Halina H. Biernacki (ICAO Secretariet), Published in ICAO Journal  of Air 
Law of December 1997, p.8. 
236 Dr. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, “ The Beijing Convention of 2010: An Important Milestone in the Annals 
of Aviation Security” Airand Space Law 36 No.3 (2011) 243-255.  
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Flight 11 and United State Airlines Flight 175 into the Twin Towers of the World 
Trade Centre in New York City; both towers collapsed within two hours.  The 
Hijackers further crashed American Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia 
and the fourth jet, United Airline Flight 93, crashed into a field near Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to take control before it could reach the 
hijackers’ intended target in Washington DC. Nearly 3,000 people died in the 
attacks.237 
 
Hence, to cut the story short, the September 11 attacks marked the first time hijackers 
boarded a commercial flight fully intended to kill themselves and everyone else on 
board and on the ground.  Also, one of the unforgettable facts of the September 11 
attacks is that civil aircraft, which have become one of the essential means of 
transportation in modern society, were used and diverted by terrorists to become 
powerful weapons of mass destruction238. 
 
3.3.2  The Legal Framework Following the 9/11 
Following the September 11 attacks, the adequacy of legal systems governing aviation 
security were questioned, especially after discovering that all 19 hijackers who took 
part in the 9/11 attacks managed to pass several different checkpoints and board their 
aircraft without hindrance. These acts were the aggregation of various offences, such 
as the unlawful seizure of an aircraft in flight, the intentional destruction of an aircraft 
                                                        
237 Ibid. 
238See www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks (accessed on 20/10/2012). 
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in service, acts of violence on board aircraft, murders and other criminal acts causing 
injuries and damage.239 
 
In response, the international community had to introduce several legal and security 
measures to counter further occurrence of such criminal acts. However, the major 
legal challenge is that, the tactics for aviation threats are dynamic as when legal and 
security measures were put in place to counter the September 11 style attacks, the 
criminals quickly responded by going to on board of suicide attack with explosives 
devices concealed in shoes.   
 
When the tactics were discovered and shoes began to be screened, the criminals 
switched to devices containing camouflaged liquid explosive, when the plot failed and 
security measures were altered to restrict the quantity of liquids people could take 
aboard aircraft, we saw the criminals alter the paradigm once more and attempt the 
underwear bomb attack during 2009 Christmas. Also, due to the increased passengers 
screening implemented after the Charismas day 2009 attempt, the criminals decided to 
employ explosive devices sent via air cargo. 
 
In view of the new and emerging threats to civil aviation, it became necessary for 
ICAO in 2010 to review the international legal framework on aviation security such as 
the 1970 Hague Convention, the 1971 Montreal Convention and the 1988 Airport 
Protocol and hence came up with the updated new laws by adopting the Beijing 
Convention and the Beijing Protocol.  
 
                                                        
239 Ibid. 
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In fact, these two new international legal instruments are very significant in the 
development of international air law as among other things they criminalize acts 
against international civil aviation, such as hijacking and sabotage, and facilitate the 
cooperation between States with a view to ensuring that such criminal and terrorist 
acts are prevented and do not remain unpunished where they occur.240 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter is concerned with the overview of the international legal framework on 
aviation security before the adoption of the 2010 Beijing instruments. In so doing, the 
historical development of the law on aviation security was discussed whereby a 
number of Conventions, Protocols and Annexes treaties on aviation security were 
concluded with the aim of suppression and criminalizing unlawful acts to civil 
aviation, such as hijacking and sabotage.  
 
Further, following the increasing number of criminal acts to civil aviation especially 
between 1960’s and 1970’s the international community became more active in 
improving security measures and adopting new international treaties to prevent such 
acts. The Tokyo Convention 1963241 for example was introduced for establishing 
jurisdiction over offences committed on board aircraft and with extradition of 
offenders followed by the Hague Convention 1970,242 which was adopted as a remedy 
                                                        
240 See a paper on AVSEC International Threats (Beijing), presented in the fifth meeting of Director 
Generals of civil aviation (DGCA/5), of ESAF and WACAF States, held at Dakar, Senegal on 4th 
November, 2013 
241 The ICAO member states met in Tokyo in 1963 and adopted the Tokyo Convention, which 
concerned with legal rules governing offences occurring on board the aircraft and the issue of unlawful 
seizure of an aircraft was added as an afterthought in Article 11. 
242 The Hague Convention provides among other things that one who, during flight unlawfully, by force 
or threat thereof or by any other form of intimidation, seizes or exercises control of that person aircraft 
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by criminalizing hijacking and obliges state parties to make the offence punishable by 
severe penalties and introduce further provisions on extradition. The Montreal 
Convention of 1971243 followed to deal with sabotage of aircraft and followed a 
similar model to the Hague Convention and it was supplemented by Montreal 
Protocol of 1988244 which commits the member states to make it an offence to carry 
out armed attacks at international airports or to cause damage or disruption at such 
airports.  
 
Other legal measures by the international community was the adoption of European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism245 which facilitated extradition in the 
case of offences against aircraft and their passengers and takes some such offences 
outside the category of political offences. Likewise, some countries enacted or 
reviewed the laws to allow the use of full Body scanners, sniffer dogs, Explosive 
Trace Detection Equipment, Passenger Profiling, criminal record Checks and 
imposing restriction on liquids. 
                                                                                                                                                               
or attempts to perform such act or is an accomplice of such person, commits an offence for which 
extradition or prosecution and the imposition of severe penalties is required. 
243 The Montreal Convention addressed the issue of damage to air navigation facilities and aircraft 
sabotage, and extended its scope to certain activities proceeding embarkation and departure and 
subsequent to likely to endanger the safety of an aircraft, destruction of or serious damage to an aircraft 
or air navigation facilities, and communication of false information that endangers the safety of an 
aircraft. 
244 The Airport Protocol extended the principal provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention to airports, 
prohibiting acts of violence at airports and the destruction or damage of airport facilities. 
245 See http:Conventions. Coe.int. Retrieved 3 March, 2012. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  4.0 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 2010 BEIJING CONVENTION AND 
THE PROTOCOL 
4.1 Introduction 
As it was discussed in the previous chapters, since 1960s a number of international 
conventions and protocols on aviation security have been concluded under the 
auspices of ICAO to criminalize acts against civil aviation and facilitate co- operation 
between states and to make sure that such acts do not go unpunished. Despite their 
shortcomings, these early legal instruments such as the Tokyo Convention of 1963246, 
the Hague Convention of 1970247, the Montreal Convention of 1971248, the Airport 
Protocol of 1988249 and the Montreal Convention of 1991 have been widely used and 
accepted as the legal instruments for preventing and combating unlawful interference 
to civil aviation.250  The significance of these early conventions in the development of 
the international air law is well elaborated in the article written by one Halina B. 
Binarcki as follows: 
 “These five aviation security- related legal instruments adopted under the 
auspices of ICAO, are substantial contribution to the development of new 
principles of international law responding to the challenge of today”251 
                                                        
246The Convention is concerned not only with crimes but also all acts which, whether or not they are 
offences, may or do not jeopardize the safety of aircraft or of persons or property therein or which 
jeopardize good order and discipline on board. 
247  The Convention defines for the first time the acts of unlawful seizure of aircraft as an offence. 
Essentially, there must be use of or attempted use of force, the aircraft must be in flight and the offence 
must be aboard the aircraft. 
248 The aim of the Convention is to prevent and discourage acts of sabotage and acts of violence 
directed at aircraft in particular and at civil aviation in general. It further defines acts of unlawful 
interference with civil aviation, particularly sabotage. 
249 Attacks at Tokyo Narita, Rome and Vienna airports in December, 1985 let to the adoption of the 
Protocol for the suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation to combat violence against persons at such an airport. 
250 Diana M. Stance,” Beijing Convention & Protocol: Responding to Future Threats” in the Global 
Journal of Airport & Airline Security, Volume 6 Issue 5 of October, 2010,p. 3. 
251  Halina M. Birnacki. “ Evolving Threat to Civil Aviation is Countered by Legal Instruments as well 
as new Technology” Published in ICAO Journal of December, 1997,  p. 8. 
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Nevertheless, the international community after the September 11 attacks, 
acknowledged the fact that the above named legal instruments reflected the focus of 
states at the time of their adoption and now there is need to review and update them to 
respond to new and emerging aviation threats, either in the form of adoption of new 
international instruments or as amendment to the existing legal instruments. It was 
further emphasized: 
 “A study on the existing aviation security conventions concluded that 
the offences in these instruments do not adequately address new and 
emerging threats to civil aviation. In order to address this, the Legal 
Committee has recommended two new Protocols be developed to the 
Montreal and Hague Conventions”252 
 
It is on that premises that, ICAO held the 2010 Beijing Conference in China which 
was attended by 71 ICAO Member States and 4 Observers delegations including the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA). At the conclusion of the Conference, 
ICAO Member States adopted the two new Beijing treaties.253 It was further 
elaborated that, these new Beijing instruments update the existing regime in light of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks and developments in counter-terrorism law over 
recent decades.254 
 
However, in comparison with the previous legal instruments, this chapter analyses the 
effectiveness of the two Beijing treaties and their adequacies   in addressing new and 
emerging aviation security threats. In so doing, the chapter will critically examine 
                                                        
252 Ms Julie Atwell, “Instruments Addressing New and Emerging Threats to Civil Aviation” a paper 
presented during the CIPL Public Seminar at the Australian National University, held on 4th June, 2010. 
253 The 2010 Beijing Convention and the 2010 Beijing Protocol are available www.icao/DCAS2010 
(accessed  on 16/12/2013). 
254  Van Deer Toorn; Insights, ASIL, vol. 15, issue 13,2010. 
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some features and offences created by the new treaties and their relevancy in as far as 
civil aviation security threats are concerned. 
 
4.2 Adoption of the Beijing Convention and Protocol 
As stated herein above, the need for updating the new laws on aviation security threats 
was mainly sparked by the September 11 attacks which actually exposed the gaps 
existed in the Aviation Security Law System both nationally and internationally. As it 
was pointed out: 
 “The legal dimension of security challenge needs close scrutiny. Over 
times, ICAO has established a universally- accepted international 
legal system so that no safe heaven exist for perpetrators of acts of 
unlawful interference. However, with the new types of threats such as 
those committed on 11 September, 2001, gaps and inadequacies 
appear to exist in international legal conventions”255 
 
As a result, during the years 2005-2008 ICAO conducted a survey of its member 
States which revealed that the existing legal instruments did not cover notable new 
aspects of attacks such as the use of an aircraft as a weapon and other ancillary 
offences which include organizing or conspiring to commit such offences. It was 
further observed that the existing legal instruments focused on the persons actually 
committing the punishable acts, mainly on board an aircraft or at an airport, without 
specific provisions addressing the issue of persons organizing, directing and financing 
the commission of the unlawful interference against civil aviation256.  
 
                                                        
255 Prensentation on “ New & Emerging Threats Facing International Ci vil Aviation”, by Haile Belai 
on behalf of Mrs Folasade Odutola, during a Fifth Special Meeting of the Counter- Terrorism 
Committee held on 29 to 31 October, 2007, Nairobi Kenya. 
256 Diana M. Stancu, “AVESEC Conventions: Beyond Chicago Untill Beijing”, The Global Journal of 
Airport & Airline Security, October 2010, Volume 16 ISSUE 5, p. 13. 
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As a first and immediate response to the September 11 events, the 33 Session of 
ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A 33-1 which directed the Council and the 
Secretary General to address the new and emerging threats to civil aviation, and 
among other things, to review the adequacy of the existing aviation security 
Conventions.257  It was at the 34 session in 2009, that the ICAO Legal Committee 
addressed the initiative to amend the laws and debated and revised the amendments 
drafted by its special sub- committee.  
 
Also, pursuant to Resolution A33-1, the Secretary General undertook a study and 
drew a preliminary conclusion that the existing conventions should be amended or 
updated in several aspects in order to cover new and emerging threats to civil aviation 
such as the use of aircraft as a weapon of destruction or the spread of biological, 
chemical and nuclear substances258. This conclusion was endorsed by a large number 
of states through a survey conducted in 2005 and 2007 by the Secretariat Study Group 
on aviation Security Conventions.259 
 
It was further noted by the Study Group that, the actual perpetrators of the 9/11 died 
on that attack. But the remaining questions were: 
(a) What about those who planned the attack, financed it, recruited and trained the 
perpetrators?  Should their acts also be criminalized under international air laws? 
(b) What about those who conspired to engage in a credible threat which is aborted 
before it can be executed? 
                                                        
257 See Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP), Background and Evaluation, retrieved from 
http://www2.icao.int/en/AVSEC/USAP/pages/Back (accessed on 13/01/2014). 
258 Ibid. 
259 Jiefang Huang, Aviation Safety Through the Rule of Law, ICAO Mechanism and Practices, Walter 
Kluwer, Law & Business, Kuluwer Law International, p. 142. 
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It was on that basis that, proposals were submitted260 for conducting the 2010 Beijing 
Conference to review the Montreal Convention of 1971 and Hague Convention of 
1970. These proposal were developed in a series of ICAO meetings commencing in 
2007 involving key states and basing on these results, the ICAO Legal Committee 
established the Special Sub- Committee on the preparation of one or more instruments 
addressing new and emerging threats and appointed Julie Atwell from Australia as 
Repporteur and France’s Terry Olson as a Chairman of the Sub Committee.261 
 
Under the Chairmanship of Olson who serves as a an advisor to the French 
Directorate of Civil Aviation262 the Sub- Committee reached a broad consensus on a 
number of issues including the criminalizing of acts such as using civil aircraft in 
service as a weapon and employing dangerous materials or substances to attack 
aircraft or other targets on the ground. Finally, from 30 August to 10 September, 2010 
the Conference was held in Beijing China, the two important legal instruments were 
adopted which are the Beijing Convention of 2010 replacing the Montreal Convention 
of 1971 and the Beijing Protocol of 2010 amending the Hague Convention of 1970.  
 
It is worth noting that, the 1971 Montreal Convention was already modified once in 
1988 at a Diplomatic Conference in Montreal which came up with the 1988 Airport 
Protocol to address certain acts of terrorism at civil international airports and in the 
meantime, most States Parties to the 1971 Montreal Convention became parties to the 
                                                        
260 See the Statement from Xia Xinghua, President of the Beijing Diplomatic Conference, in ICAO 
Journal o1-2011,  p. 11. 
261 Report of the Fourth Meeting of Directors Generals of Civil Aviation of Western and Central 
African/Eastern and Southern Africa States held at Matsapha, Swaziland, 8-9 November, 2010.   
Prepared by ICAO ESAF/WACAF offices (Report-DGCA/4) at p2. 
262 See an Article titled: “Lead Up to the Beijing Accomplishments” published ICAO-Journal Issue-01-
2011, p.12. 
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1988 Airport Protocol. Rather than develop a second Protocol to the 1971 Montreal 
Convention, which would have led to unduly complicated treaty relationship among 
States Parties to the instruments, the 2010 Diplomatic Conference at Beijing 
concluded an entirely new and freestanding instrument effectively amending both 
underlying Montreal-related instruments.263 It means upon adoption, the 2010 Beijing 
Convention prevails over the Montreal Convention of 1971 and its Protocol signed in 
Montreal in 1988.On the other hand, it is further provided that, the 1970 Hague 
Convention and the Montreal Protocol will be read and interpreted together as one 
single instrument and will be known as “the Hague Convention as amended by the 
Beijing Protocol, 2010.264 
 
The motive of on international community in adopting the 2010 Beijing legal 
instruments is found in very short but in clear terms in the preamble of the Convention 
which specifies that the international community is deeply concerned about unlawful 
acts against civil aviation jeopardizing the safety and security of persons and property, 
seriously affecting the operation of air services, airports and air navigation. Further 
the preamble shows that civil aviation community recognizes new types of threats 
against civil aviation which require new concerned efforts and policies of cooperation 
of international nature and the international civil aviation community is convinced that 
in order to address these threats better, there is an urgent need to strengthen the legal 
framework for international cooperation in preventing and suppressing unlawful acts 
against civil aviation. 
                                                        
263  See paragraph 24 of the 2010 Beijing Convention which provides clearly that the Convention 
prevails over both earlier instruments. 
264  See paragraph 19 of the 2010 Beijing Protocol. 
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4.3 Signing and Ratification of the Treaties 
In accordance with Article 21 of the Beijing Convention and Article XX of the 
Beijing Protocol, both legal instruments are open to all states for signature at the 
headquarters of ICAO in Montreal until it enters into force.  States which have signed 
the Convention and the Protocol may ratify, accept or approve it at any time and state 
which have not signed it may accede to it at any time.265  Also in accordance with 
Article 22 of the Convention and Article XXIII, the new legal instruments shall enter 
into force on the first day of the second month following the date of the deposit of the 
twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
 
4.3.1 Impact of Ratification 
Upon ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the Beijing legal instruments, a 
State Party shall notify the Depository of the jurisdiction it has established under its 
national law in accordance with Article 8 (2) of the Convention and Article 4(2) of the 
Protocol.  The United States, China and the United Kingdom, among other states, 
signed the Convention and the Protocol on the spot upon adoption.266 According to the 
ICAO report, as of 30 September, 2014, the  treaties are not yet  in force  as they  have 
been  signed  by 30 states  and  ratified or acceded by  9 states only.   
 
 States which have signed the treaties are Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, 
China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica Republic, France, Indonesia, 
Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, 
Uganda, United Kingdom and Unites States. Others are  Gambia,  Benin, Kuwait, 
                                                        
265  See Article 26 of the Beijing Convention and Article XXI of the Beijing Protocol. 
266 ICAO Journal-Issue No. 01-2011,  p. 10. 
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Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, South Africa, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United 
Kingdom and United States of America.  The Beijing Protocol had been signed by the 
above-mentioned States plus India and Zambia.267 States which have ratified or 
acceded the treaties are Angola, Czech Republic, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guyana, 
Kuwait, Mali, Burma, and Suit Lucia.  
 
Hence during the 2nd Session of the African Union Conference of Ministers 
Responsible for Transport held in Luanda Angola in 21st to 25th November, 2011, it 
was clearly pointed that, the ratification of the two Beijing international air law 
instruments and their implementation contributes significantly to the development of 
the national, Africa as well as international civil aviation268. 
 
4.3.2 Status of Ratification by Tanzania 
As of  December, 2013, the United Republic of Tanzania was yet to ratify any of the 
two Beijing treaties. However, Considering that unlawful acts against civil aviation 
jeopardize the safety and security of persons and property and that aviation threats call 
for concentrated efforts globally, Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA) 269 on 
behalf of the Government of United Republic of Tanzania is working on the process 
for signing the two legal instruments to join and support the efforts of the international 
community in endeavour to attain a safe, secure and orderly conduct of civil 
aviation.270 
                                                        
267 Ibid. 
268  See a Paper titled “Ratification of International Air Law Instruments Including the AFCAC 
Constitution”, AU/TP/EXT/2A7 (II). 
269 Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA) is a body corporate established by Act. No. 10 of 2003 
to   regulate aviation industry in the United Republic of Tanzania 
270 TCAA Statement of Case on the Intention to Accede to the Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, 2010 (Beijing Convention 2010) and the 
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According to TCAA,271 upon signing of the Beijing instruments, Tanzania intends to 
ratify them thereby to necessitate consequential amendments to the National Laws to 
cover the offences, penalties and procedures under the said conventions. The 
legislations to be amended include the Penal Code,272The Extradition Act,273 The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act,274 and The Civil Aviation Act275 and the Civil Aviation 
(Security) (Amendment) Regulations276 as countermeasures to the new and emerging 
threats to aviation security. TCAA was in the process of seeking views of stakeholders 
and other institutions of the Government on the introduced amendments as contained 
in the two Beijing treaties and the consequential review of some of the pieces of 
National Legislations. 
 
4.4  Features to the 2010 Beijing Instruments 
The adoption of the 2010 Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol is a result of 
collective efforts of the international community to modernize the legal framework for 
aviation security and they are considered to be a significant development in the 
international air law. It is, therefore, believed that if the two international legal 
instruments are widely ratified and implemented, they can prevent repetition of the 
September 11 attacks. This is due to the fact that both treaties among other things are 
                                                                                                                                                               
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1070, 
(Beijing Protocol, 2010), Done in Beijing on 10th September, 2010. 
271  Ibid. 
272 Chapter 16 of the Laws of Tanzania 
273  Chapter 366 of the Laws of Tanzania 
274 Act N o 21 of 2002 with its consequential amendments to The Criminal Procedure Act, 1985,  The 
National Security Act, 1970, The Extradition Act, 1965,The Proceeds of Crime Act, 1991 and The 
Evidence Act, 1967. 
275  Chapter 80 of the Laws of Tanzania 
276  See the 2013 amendments to the Civil Aviation (Security) Regulations, 2007. 
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aimed at criminalizing the use of a civil aircraft to cause death, serious injury or 
serious damage to property or the environment.277 
 
In short, pursuant to the above named motive, the two legal instruments have come up 
with certain important provisions regarding the safety and security of aircraft either in 
flight or in service.  
 
4.4.1  Common Features 
The 2010 Beijing Convention and the Protocol are very important documents in the 
development of international air law and they are aimed at updating the legal 
framework in light of the September 11, terrorist attacks.  It is, therefore, obvious that 
the universal adoption of these two legal instruments signify the willingness of the 
international community to significantly advance joint cooperation in the prevention 
of unlawful acts relating to civil aviation and the prosecution and punishment of 
offenders.278 
 
In short each of the 2010 Beijing legal Instruments is a standalone document, but  
both share some features which are common as highlighted herein below: 
 
(a) New Principal Offences 
The most significance features which are common to both the Convention and the 
Protocol is the creation of new criminal offences in as far as civil aviation is concerns. 
Such offences include criminalizing the use of civil aircraft as a weapon and 
                                                        
277 Samwel M Witten, Introductory Note, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating 
to International Civil Aviation and the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, September 10, 2010. 
278 See  “Ratification of ICAO International Instruments” in ICAO’s Assembly Resolutions (A37-22) 
page 2. 
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criminalizing the use of biological, chemical or nuclear substance to attack civil 
aviation. 
 
On the other hand, apart from underlying the conduct of the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, both  legal instruments  deal with other illicit conduct that threatens the safety 
of international civil aviation and the protection of the public.279 
 
(b) Ancillary Offences 
Both instruments create new ancillary offences, relating to the commission of 
principal offences against civil aviation namely; making credible threat, attempt, 
organizing or directing others to commit aviation related offence, acting as 
accomplice, conspiracy and assisting another person to evade criminal investigation or 
prosecution for committing any offence provided for in the Beijing instruments. 
However, these ancillary offences may sometimes be deemed problematic in respect 
of legal certainty, for the alleged offenders might be apprehended long before an act 
and or an omission is carried out. 
 
(c) Expand Jurisdiction 
Should one proceed to a comparative analysis as per the procedural issues, jurisdiction 
for the prosecution of all such criminal acts related to aviation security was previously 
granted either to authorities of the state where the offence was committed or where the 
aircraft in question was registered or where it landed.  
 
                                                        
279 See Articles 1 of the 2010 Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol. 
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However with the adoption of the new Beijing legal instruments, jurisdiction is now 
extended to include the authorities of the state of which the alleged offender is a 
national. In other words, both legal instruments expand the jurisdictional provision by 
requiring States Parties to establish jurisdiction where the alleged offender is a 
national and establish other optional grounds for jurisdiction.280  This brings aviation 
security international law in line with the broad bulk of international criminal law 
provision, for it comprehensively incorporates a highly recognized principle of 
general international law. 
 
(d) Liability for Directors and Organizers 
Another common feature of both Beijing Convention and Protocol is that, they both 
specifically cover criminal liability of directors and organizers of an offence under the 
treaties and hence making a threat to commit an offence under the treaties be 
criminally accountable when the circumstances indicate that the threat is credible.  
Apart from that, under certain conditions, agreement or contribution to commit an 
offence, whether such an offence is actually committed or not, may be punishable. 
 
(e) Promote Cooperation Between States 
On top of that both treaties update the provisions for promoting cooperation between 
states in combating unlawful acts directed against civil aviation and emphasize human 
rights treatment.281  
 
                                                        
280  Article 8 of the Beijing Convention and Article 4 of the Beijing Protocol. 
 
281  Article11 of the Beijing Convention and Article 7bis of the Beijing Protocol. 
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Further, both instruments provide that it is an offense to directly or indirectly threaten 
to commit one or more of the principal offences282 or to organize or direct the 
commission of an offense. It is believed that these provisions are meant to harmonize 
recent UN counter-terrorism Conventions.283 
 
(f) Inclusion of Fugitive Offences 
The 2010 Beijing legal instruments include a fugitive offence which criminalizes any 
assistance to persons evading investigation, prosecution or punishment, knowing that 
he or she has committed one of the offenses or is wanted to prosecution or to serve a 
sentence.  
 
This crime is a kin to an accessory after the fact offenses known to many common law 
jurisdictions and will help restrict the movement of those seeking to flee states where 
face prosecution.284 
 
(g) Criminalize Conspiracy 
Both new legal instruments incorporate a conspiracy which criminalizes the planning 
of offense in conjunction with others, reflecting both the common law and civil law 
traditions.  
 
This is the first time UN counter-terrorism convention has included such a provision 
and it is designed to allow enforcement officers to apprehend and prosecute offenders 
before terrorist attacks can be carried out.285 
                                                        
282 Art. 1(3) Beijing Convention. 
283Art. 1.(4)(b) Beijing Convention. 
284 Art.1(4)(d) Beijing Convention. 
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(h) Prosecution and Extradition 
Another common feature for the Beijing treaties is that, they include nationality of the 
offender as a mandatory ground for jurisdiction for states parties.286 This will help to 
expand the extra-territorial scope of instruments and ensure that a greater number of 
states parties will have jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite know offenders and they 
include optional jurisdiction on the basis of nationality of the victims of offenses.287  
 
The Convention and Protocol also include new provision aimed at supporting 
extradition and mutual legal assistance obligations. In particular, none of the offences 
can be considered a political offence in order to avoid this obligation.  However, 
under the new laws no state may be compelled to extradite a person or provide mutual 
legal assistance if there are substantial grounds to believe it would lead to prosecution 
on discriminatory ground.  
 
(i)  The “Al Qaeda Clause” 
Another important common feature to both 2010 Beijing legal instruments is the 
inclusion of the so called “Al Qaeda Clause”288 which is aimed at addressing the 
problem of terrorist groups as it was the case for the September 11 attacks where the 
famous terrorist group of “Al Qaeda” was believed to be involved.  
 
Although there is no established definition of the term “Al Qaeda Clause” however, as 
the clause itself carries the name “Al-Qaeda” which is a famous terrorist group in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
285 Art. 5 (a) Beijing Convention and Art.4 (a) of the Beijing Protocol. 
286 Art. 8(1)(e) Beijing Convention and Article4 (1)(e) Beijing Protocol. 
287 Art 9 and 10 Beijing Convention and Article 7bis of the Beijing Protocol. 
288 See Article 2 of the 2010 Beijing Convention and Article 2bis of the Beijing Protocol. 
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World, it is obvious that “Al-Qaeda Clause “refer to the clause which was purposely 
incorporated in the Beijing instruments to deal with such terrorist groups or 
organizations as legal entities and link such legal entities to individual perpetrators. It 
means, the scope and objective of Al Qaeda Clause is to link one or more contracting 
states to a legal entity, whose managers and /or proprietors have perpetrated, in that 
capacity, the primary offences envisaged in the Beijing Convention and in the Beijing 
Protocol.289  
 
Article 4(1) of the Beijing Convention and Article IV (2bis) of the Beijing Protocol 
provide clearly on the said Al-Qaeda Clause as follows: 
 “Each State Party, in accordance with its national legal principles, 
may take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its 
territory or organized under its laws to be held when a person 
responsible for management or control of that legal entity has, in that 
capacity, committed an offence set forth in Article 1. Such liability may 
be criminal, civil or administrative.” 
 
The said offences highlighted in Article 1 of both Beijing Convention of the Protocol 
of which the Al-Qaeda Clause applies include: 
(a) unlawfully and intentionally seizes or exercises control of an aircraft in service by 
force or threat  or by coercion or by other form of intimidation, or by any 
technological means, 
 
(b) Makes a threat to commit the offence enshrined in (a) herein above or unlawfully 
and intentionally causes any person to receive such a threat, under circumstances 
which indicate that the threat is credible. 
 
                                                        
289 See Article 4 of the Beijing Convention and Article IV of the Beijing Convention. 
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(c) Attempt to commit the offence set forth in (a) herein above and organize or direct 
others to commit such offence or participate as an accomplice in offence in such 
offences. 
  
It is further provided that the above named liability is incurred without prejudice to 
the criminal liability of individuals having liability committed the offences290 and that 
if a State Party takes the necessary step to make a legal entity liable, it shall endeavour 
to ensure that the applicable criminal, civil or administrative sanctions are effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and that such sanctions may include monetary.291 
 
It is important to note that, those who negotiated the Beijing instruments did not draft 
a new clause but relied upon similar clause contained, inter alia, in the International 
Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999 and the 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime with one notable exception, that 
is they made the liability of legal entities dependent upon the discretion of contracting 
parties.   In line with addressing terrorists groups or organizations, the Al-Qaeda 
Clause is also aimed at linking one or more states to a legal entity whose managers or 
owners have perpetrated in that capacity, the primary offence envisaged in the 
instruments.  
 
Professor Magliveras further commented on the objective of inclusion of the “Al 
Qaeda Clause” in both the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol as follows: 
                                                        
290 Article 4(2) of the Beijing Convention and Article IV2bis (2) of the Beijing Protocol. 
 
291 Article 4(3) of the Beijing Convention and Article IV 2bis (3) of the Beijing Protocol. 
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 “The insertion of the Al Qaeda clause in the Beijing Convention and the 
Beijing Protocol is an attempt to cover a gap as regards the possible 
liability of legal entities in the commission of offences against the safety 
and the security of civil aviation”.292 
 
As per the clause itself, the Professor identifies four crucial issues which are      
definition of the term “legal entity”; the question of double jeopardy; the link between 
the legal entity held liable and its managers; and the nature of both the liability and 
sanctions.293 
 
(j)  The Military Exclusion Clause 
One of the most common and controversial aspects to both 2010 Beijing legal 
instruments concerned the “Military Exclusion Clause” where the majority of States 
agreed to a provision in both treaties that activities of armed forces during an armed 
conflict should be excluded from the scope of the new regime.  It means that, there 
can be no prosecution under the new Beijing treaties for what would otherwise 
constitute an offence against civil aviation, if done by armed forces during an armed 
conflict.  
 
It is considered that the “Military exclusion clauses” may create practical problems, 
especially in cases where a civil aircraft is used for military related purposes.294 For 
example, the use of a bomb against a civil airliner by military forces during an armed 
conflict could not be prosecuted under the Beijing Convention295 It means that the  
                                                        
292  K.D. Magliveras” The New Regime in Aviation Security Law and the Al-Qaeda Clause, published in 
International Enforcement Report, 27, Issue 3, March, 2011, pp. 597,598. 
293 Ibid.  
294   See Article 6(2), Beijing Convention. 
295 Art 6 of Beijing Convention. 
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treaties contain a now – standard provision, originating with the 1997 Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorist  Bombings  which  states that  the Convention  does not  
govern the activities  of armed forces during an armed  conflict or the activities  of 
military forces  of a state in the  exercise of their official duties.296   
 
In short, the military exclusion clause clearly blurs the general international law 
principle of distinction between combatants and non-combatants in jus in bello.  The 
clause in the long run may create practical problem, especially in cases where civil 
aviation aircraft is used for military or related purposes. 
 
4.4.2  Features of the Beijing Convention 
(a) Scope of  application   
Just like its predecessor, the Beijing Convention applies to offences involving aircraft. 
Air navigation facilities and airports servicing international civil aviation.297 With 
regard to the offences committed from an aircraft in flight, against or with an aircraft 
in services, the legal instrument applies to a different scenarios as follows: 
 
(i) It applies when the aircraft’s actual or intended place of  takeoff or landing is in 
a state other than the state of registry of the aircraft. The word actual captures a 
situation in which the aircraft is forced to divert from its route, landing in most 
cases in a place other than its original destination298. 
                                                        
296 Article 6 (2), Beijing Convention. 
297 See Articles 1 and 2 of the Beijing Convention. 
298 Art. 5 of the Beijing Convention. 
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(ii) It applies where the   offence takes place in the territory of a state other than the 
aircraft’s state of registry. In this two scenarios, it is immaterial whether the 
aircraft in question is engaged in an international or domestic operation to the 
extent the aircraft involved is diverted and forced to land in a state other than its 
state of registry. The Convention also applies where the alleged offender is 
found in a state other the aircraft’s state of registry. 
 
(iii)  With regard to the offence such as damaging or destroying air navigation 
facilities, the Convention applies to the extent that such facilities are used for 
international air navigation. Given that these facilities are in most cases used 
interchangeably for domestic and international operations, an entirely domestic, 
terrorist attack against, for instance, an air traffic control centre, where all 
offenders and victims are nationals of the state in whose territory the act took 
place, may very well trigger the application of the instrument.299 However, the 
Convention is silent as to the scope of application of offences against airport 
facilities or persons located in such facilities and just like the Airport Protocol, 
the Beijing Convention does not provide a definition of an airport serving 
international aviation.300   
 
(iv) The Convention also applies to domestic flights where the operator “dry leases” 
the aircraft. In this situation the aircraft is, in most cases, registered in other state  
                                                        
299 See Art.le 5 of the Beijing Convention. 
300 See Arts.1 &2 of the Beijing Convention. 
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and here, both  the state where the offence was  committed and the state of 
registration of the aircraft have jurisdiction.301 
 
(b) Creation of New Principal Offences 
The Beijing Diplomatic Conference incorporated several new principal offences in the 
Beijing Convention which include the use of an aircraft as a weapon of mass 
destruction, the release of BCN weapon, the transport offences and hijacking by 
coercion or technological means:302 
 
(i) Use of Civil Aircraft as a Weapon 
The most  novel  aspect of  the Beijing Convention  is the creation of  a new criminal 
offence  of using  an aircraft  in service  for purpose  of causing  death, seriously body 
injury or  seriously damage  to  property  or the environment303. Whereas the Beijing 
Protocol’s changes to the Hague Convention were relatively modest, the Diplomatic 
Conference took a significantly more assertive and ambitious approach to amend the 
underlying Montreal Convention of 1971 and the Airport Protocol of 1988 specifically 
by responding directly to the September 11 attacks by criminalizing the use of a civil 
aircraft as a weapon for causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage to 
property or the environment under the 2010 Beijing Convention.304  This  new offence 
is very obvious response to the factual scenario that rose on 9/11 but it also addresses 
                                                        
301  A dry lease involve a leasing arrangement where the lessor provides the aircraft and the lessee is in 
charge of securing the crew to operate it. The lessee is responsible for making the necessary 
arrangement to secure the crew. 
302 Art.2 Beijing Convention. 
303 See article 1(1) (f) of the Beijing Convention. 
304 Article 1(1) of the Beijing Convention. 
              
 
 
113
the fact that a terrorist’s use of a weapon of mass destruction contravenes the spirit of 
the Chicago Convention305. 
 
In other words, under the new Convention, using an aircraft as a weapon is now a 
specific offence and this covers conduct such as flying aircraft into a building as 
occurred in the September 11 attack.306 The most interesting feature of this offence is 
that it has included environmental and property damages such as buildings307 that 
could be caused by such an unlawful acts. 
 
(ii)  Biological (BCN) Weapons 
The second offence under the 2010 Beijing Convention is the releasing or discharging 
from a civil aircraft any Biological, Chemical or Nuclear (BCN)308 weapons or 
explosives, radio actives or similar substances in a manner that is likely to cause 
death, serious injury, or serious damage to property or the environment.309 
 
While BCN weapons were apparently not directly implicated in the September 11 
attacks, the negotiations of the Beijing Convention took the opportunity to include 
these offences in the new instrument to create a legal framework for international 
cooperation on the issue.  It is worth noting that, this offence as included in the new 
                                                        
305 See articles 3 &4 of the 1944 Chicago Convention. 
306 Article. 1 (1)(f) of the Beijing Convention. 
307 The use of aircraft to destroy public buildings and infrastructure would probably have been 
considered an offence under the relevant definitions of terrorist acts under the Terrorist Bombings. 
Convention. However, the Beijing Convention, negotiated under the framework of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, makes this offence clear and explicit 
308 Articles 1 (a)(g) and 2(h) of the Beijing convention 
309 Articles 2 (e) of the Beijing convention 
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Beijing Convention provides, inter alia, a response to bioterrorism310, which is a new 
and emerging threat to civil aviation. 
 
(iii) Use of Dangerous Items on Board Civil Aircraft 
The other new offence created under the Beijing Convention is similar to the second, 
but specifically criminalizes the use of the same dangerous items against or on board a 
civil aircraft. In this scenario, the target is the actual aircraft and the persons on board, 
rather than anything outside the aircraft. This is a situation that has occurred with 
some frequency over the recent years.311  
 
(iv) Transportation of Dangerous Materials 
The 2010 Beijing Convention further criminalizes the transport of dangerous 
materials, such as explosive or radioactive material, a biological, chemical or nuclear 
(BCN) weapon or source or special fissionable material if a state can demonstrate 
specific mental elements in relation to the transport of each type of dangerous 
material.  However, in addition to demonstrating that the transport of dangerous 
materials was done illegally and intentionally, each of the four subsections of this new 
transport offence requires an additional showing or specific knowledge or intent.   
 
A major development is the inclusion of a provision of criminalizing the transport of 
dangerous materials- such as explosive or radioactive materials, a BCN weapon or 
source or special fissionable material- if proof is shown of specific mental elements in 
                                                        
310 A bioterrorism attack is a deliberate release of viruses, or other germs (agents) used to illness or 
death in people, animals or plants 
311 Anahad O’Connor  & Eric Smith, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y 
Times, Dec.25, 2009, available at htt://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.hotmail (discussing 
the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on 25th December, 2009 
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relation to the transport of each type of dangerous material. For example, an 
individual may be liable for transporting explosive or radioactive materials only if the 
person transported the material knowing they were intended to be used for a terrorist 
purpose or if the person transported source or special fissionable material knowing 
that they will be used in a nuclear explosive activity.312 
 
These requirements restrict scope of the offences to cover only transport connected 
with illicit proliferation or terrorism. The changes also preserve the rights of states 
parties to the NPT, ensuring state officials are not prosecuted for transporting nuclear 
materials as permitted by the NPT. For those not party to NPT, the offence will apply, 
except that transport of source or special fissionable material is permitted if done 
pursuant to a safeguards agreement concluded with the international Atomic Energy 
Agency.313 
 
(v) Violence on Board an Aircraft in- Flight 
Under the 2010 Beijing Convention, it is an offence for any person to perform   an 
unlawfully and intentionally act of violence against any person on board an aircraft in 
flight if that act of violence is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft314.  In other 
words for this offence to be proved it must be committed by a person on board an 
aircraft, the aircraft must be in-flight and the act perpetrated must endanger the safety 
of the aircraft.315   
                                                        
312 Ibid. 
313 The Beijing Convention, supra note 4 arts.1 (1)(i) and (7). 
314 Ibid Article 2(b). 
315  Article 1 (a) of the Beijing Convention and also See the case of Herman v Trans World Airlines, 
330 NYSD 2nd 829, the Supreme Court in America held that  although  the aircraft in which the 
passenger was travelling had been hijacked and had flown to the desert and the  passenger was kept in 
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It means, for the offence under these provisions to be proved to have been committed, 
three elements must be established; (a) it must be committed by a person on board an 
aircraft, (b) the aircraft has to be in flight and (c) the act perpetrated should endanger 
the safety of the aircraft. For the sake of clarity, the aircraft is considered to be in-
flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors closed following 
embarkation until the moment when any such doors are opened for disembarkation. In 
the case of forced landing, the aircraft is deemed to continue be in-flight until the 
competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and 
property on board.316 
 
(vi)  Devices Likely to Endanger or Destroy an Aircraft in Service 
The Convention also creates offence against a person who places or causes to be 
placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance that 
is likely to destroy that aircraft; or to cause damage to it that is likely to endanger its 
safety in flight.317According to the Conventions, for the offence to be committed 
under these provisions, it must relate to the destruction of the aircraft or the damage 
that renders the aircraft unserviceable or adversely affects the safety of the aircraft. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the aircraft for several days, he was nonetheless considered to have been on board aircraft, irrespective  
of whether the purpose of the flight had been fulfilled or not. 
316 The Beijing Convention does not define “ on board “. However, it must be noted that the term “ on 
board” has been judicially defined in absolute term to mean that as long as a person is physically in the 
aircraft, it matters not whether the flight had been terminated or not. See the case of Herman v Trans 
World Airline, 330 NYSD 2nd 829 (Supreme Court 1972), where the Court held that although the 
aircraft in which the passenger was travelling had been hijacked and had flown to the desert and the 
passenger was kept in the aircraft for several days, he was nonetheless considered to have been on 
board, irrespective of whether the purpose of the flight had been fulfilled or not. See also the case of 
Pfug v Egyptair, 961 F 2d, 26 (Second Circuit, 1992). 
317 Article 1(c) of the Beijing Convention. 
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Likewise, it is an offence under the Convention when a person destroys an aircraft in 
service or causes damage to such an aircraft that renders it incapable of flight or that 
likely to endanger its safety in flight.318 Under the Convention an aircraft is 
considered to be in service from the beginning of the pre- flight preparation of the 
aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four 
hours after any landing. Furthermore, the period of service will, in any event, extend 
for the entire period during which the aircraft is in flight. 
 
Here again, the offence must relate to the destruction of the aircraft or the damage that 
renders the aircraft unserviceable or adversely affects the safety of the aircraft. 
However it is interesting that the Beijing Convention does not define the words 
“device” or “substance.” 
 
(vii)  Violence act to person at an Airport 
Under the 2010 Beijing Convention, it is an offence to perform act of violence against 
a person at an airport serving international civil aviation319. For the offence to be 
committed, the act must cause or likely to cause serious injury or death or to destroy 
or seriously damage the facilities of an airport serving civil aviation or aircraft not in 
service located thereon or disrupt the services of the airport, if such an act endangers 
or is likely to endanger safety at that airport.320 This implies that any damage to an 
airport or its infrastructure, in so far as it does not affect the safety of persons, would 
not be an offence under this law. 
                                                        
318 Article 1(b) of the Beijing Convention. 
319 Article 1.2 of the Beijing Convention. 
320  Article 1(c) of the Beijing Convention. 
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(viii) Damaging Air Navigation Facilities 
It is an offence under the Beijing Convention when a person destroys or damage air 
navigation facilities or interferes with their operations, if any such act is likely to 
endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.321  This undoubtedly refers, inter alia, to 
cyber-terrorism but links the offence exclusively to the safety of aircraft in flight.  
 
However, if as a result of an act of cyber-terrorism a taxing aircraft that has opened its 
doors for disembarkation but the passengers are still on board awaiting 
disembarkation, that act would not be considered an offence in terms of the 
passengers in the process of disembarkation. In other words, the offender would not 
be committing an offence under the Beijing treaty either against the second aircraft or 
its disembarking passengers. One aviation expert, Manuela Gull, highlights the danger 
of cyber-terrorism in the aviation industry by saying: 
 “Cyber-terrorism can be used in many ways. In its simplest form, it 
can be used as a means of disinformation or psychological warfare by 
manipulating media attention regarding possible threats, thus causing 
disruption to airport and aircraft operations.  In its more serious form, 
cyber-terrorism could lead to fatalities, injuries and major damage at 
airport and to aircraft in flight”.322 
 
A famous aviation law expert, Dr. Ruwantissa considers the inclusion of the offence 
related to cyber-terrorism in the new Beijing Convention as a step forward in the right 
direction in fighting one of the threats which affect the peace of nations. According to 
him, the particularity of Cyber-terrorism is that the threats are enhanced by 
                                                        
321 Article 1(d) of the Beijing Convention. 
322 Article by Manuela Guill,“Cyber-terrorism Posed Newest and Perhaps Elusive Threat to Civil 
Aviation; in ICAO Journal  (June 2008) at p. 18. 
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globalization and the ubiquity of the internet. To him, Cyber-terrorism is a global 
problem in search of a global solution.323 
 
(ix) Communicating False Information 
It is an offence under the Convention where a person communicates false information 
while the person is aware that the information is false, thereby endangering the safety 
of an aircraft in flight324.  In considering the commission of this offence, the 
exclusivity of ”safety in flight” is very important factor and that this offence rules out 
message communicated negligently, where the purveyor of the message did not bother 
to find out the veracity of information he was providing. For instance, if a phony 
telephone call claims that there would be a bomb on board a flight that would be 
operated the next day and the air operator cancels that flight incurring an economic 
loss, there would be no offence committed under these provisions, as the aircraft in 
question was not in-flight as defined in the Convention. 
 
(x) Releasing BCN From Aircraft 
It is also an offence under the 2010 Beijing Convention for a person to release or 
discharge from an aircraft in service any biological, chemical or nuclear (BCN) 
weapon or explosive, radioactive, or similar substance in a manner that causes or is 
likely to cause death, serious bodily injury to property or the environment325.  In other 
                                                        
323 Dr. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, “The Beijing Convention of 2010: An Important Milestone in the Annals 
of Aviation Security” Air and Space Law 36 No.3 (2011): 243-255 © 2011 Kluwer Law International 
BV, The Netherlands. 
324 Article 1(e) of the Beijing Convention. 
325  Article 1(g) of the Beijing Convention. 
              
 
 
120
words, this offence provides, inter alia, a response to bioterrorism326, which is one of 
new and emerging threats to civil aviation. While some bioterrorism agents such as 
the small pox versus can be spread from person to person, some agents such as 
anthrax are incapable of doing it. 
 
(xi)   Penalty and Extradition 
An interesting provision is contained in Article 3 of the Beijing Convention, which 
states that each State Party undertakes to make the offences discussed   under the 
treaties punishable by several penalties.  With regards to extradition of offenders, the 
Beijing Convention obligates the States party in the territory, to submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities are required to 
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a 
serious nature under the law of that state.327 
 
(xii) New and Emerging Aviation Threats 
One of the most important distinctive features of the Beijing Convention, which 
makes it stand out from its predecessors, is that it bases itself on responding to new 
and emerging threats to aviation security. 328  In its preamble, the Beijing Convention 
recognizes in limine that   States parties to it are deeply concerned that unlawful acts 
against civil aviation may jeopardize the safety and security of persons and property; 
seriously affect the cooperation of air services, airports, and air navigation; and 
                                                        
326  Bioterrorism attacks is a deliberate release of viruses, bacteria or other germs used to cause illness 
or death in people, animal or plants. 
327  See Article 14 of the Beijing Convention and Article 8 of the Beijing Protocol. 
328  Dr. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, “The Beijing Convention of 2010: An Important Milestone in Annals of 
Aviation Security” Air and Space Law 36 No3 (2011) 243-255.)© 2011 Kluwer Law Institute BV, The 
Netherlands.  
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undermine the confidence of the peoples of the world in the safe and orderly conduct 
of civil aviation for all States329.   
 
4.4.3  Features of the Beijing Protocol 
The Beijing Protocol amended the Hague Convention of 1970 and elaborates on the 
hijacking offence and strengthens the provisions in the several specific but useful 
ways.  In its preamble, the Protocol recognizes that the war against new threats to civil 
aviation requires concerted efforts and policies of cooperation on different states.  
 
Further that, the Protocol is self explanatory in that it is aimed at updating the 
international legal framework and improves its effectiveness for better addressing the 
new and emerging aviation security threats with the objective of suppressing acts of 
seizure or exercise of control of aircraft.330 The following are some highlights on the 
distinctive features of the Protocol: 
 
(a) Expands Scope of Hijacking Offences 
The Beijing Protocol significantly expands the scope of hijacking offence to include 
hijackings that occur pre- or post- flight, as well as a wide variety of ancillary 
offences, such as attempt to commit the offense, accomplice liability, conspiracy and 
assistance after the fact. 
 
 
                                                        
329  Ibid. 
 
330   See the Preambles of both the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol, at p. 1. 
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(i) Detailed Extradition and Legal Assistance 
Whereas the Hague Convention limited the offence to individuals on board the flight, 
the Beijing Protocol eliminates such a requirement, recognizing that not all persons 
involved in airplane hijackings will physically board the aircraft. The Protocol further 
includes more detailed extradition and legal assistance provisions than the underlying 
Hague Convention, particularly, it provides that a request for extradition or legal 
assistance may not be denied on the sole ground that it is a political offences or an 
offence inspired by political motives.331 
 
Further, the Protocol includes a saving clause which permits denial of assistance if 
requested State has substantially grounds to believe that the request was made to 
prosecute a person on account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, 
political or gender.332 
 
(b) State Jurisdiction 
In terms of jurisdiction, liability is imposed to the State which is party to the Protocol 
to take measures necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences created under 
the Protocol and any other act of violence against passengers or crew committed by 
the alleged offender in connection with the offences.  However, in order for a State to 
create such jurisdiction, the offence must be committed in the territory of the State, or 
on board aircraft registered in that state, or on board aircraft which lands in such a 
State with the alleged offender still on board.333 
 
                                                        
331 Article 8 bis of the Beijing Protocol. 
332 Article 8 ter of the  Beijing Protocol. 
333 Article 4 (1) (a)-(c) of the Beijing Protocol. 
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Also under the Protocol, the State jurisdiction may be created when the offence is 
committed against or on board aircraft leased without crew to a lessee whose principal 
place of business or if the lessee has no such place of business, whose permanent 
residence is in that State, or when the offence is committed by a national of the 
State334and a State Party to the Protocol may establish its jurisdiction over any such 
offence when it is committed against a national of that State or when the offence is 
committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the territory of that 
State.335 
 
Apart from that, each State who is member to the 2010Beijing Protocol is mandated to 
establish its jurisdiction when the person, who is alleged to commit the offence, is 
present in its territory and it does not extradite that person. The Protocol also include a 
saving clause which permits denial of assistance if the requested State has substantial 
grounds to believe that the request was made to prosecute a person on account of that 
person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic, political opinion or gender.336 
 
Article 19 of the Protocol provides that the Hague Convention and the Montreal 
Protocol will be read and interpreted together as one single instrument and will be 
known as “ the Hague Convention as amended by the Beijing Protocol, 2010. 
 
(c) Addresses New and Emerging Threats 
As results of reviewing the Hague Convention, the Beijing Protocol creates several 
offences which are also aimed at addressing new and emerging threats to civil aviation 
as follows: 
                                                        
334 Article 4 (1) (d) of the Beijing Protocol. 
335 Article 4(2) (a) and (b) of the Beijing Protocol. 
336  Article 8 ter of the Beijing Protocol. 
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First, it is an offence under the 2010 Beijing Protocol for any person to unlawfully and 
intentionally seizes or exercises control of an aircraft in service by force or threat, or 
by coercion, or by other form of intimidation or by any other technological means.337  
According to the protocol, an aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning 
of the pre- flight preparation by the ground personnel or by the crew for a specific 
flight until twenty-four hours after any landing. In the case of forced landing, the 
flight is deemed to be in service until the competent authorities take over the 
responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and property on board.338 
 
Second, under the Beijing Protocol, making threats to commit the above named 
offence or causing any person to receive such threat, under circumstances which 
indicate that the threat is credible is also an offence under the Protocol.339   Also, 
according to the Protocol, a person is considered to commit an offence under the if he 
organizes, directs others or organize such aviation threats,340 or such person 
participate as an accomplice in the commission of an offence set forth on the 
Protocol.341 
 
Third, under the provisions of Article 1(3) (d) of the 2010 Beijing Protocol, it is an 
offence for any person unlawfully or intentionally assists another person to evade 
investigation, prosecution or punishment, knowing that the other person has 
committed an act constitutes an offence set forth in the Protocol.   
                                                        
337 Article 1 of the Beijing Protocol, 2010. 
338 Article 3 of the Beijing Protocol. 
339 Article 1 (2) (a) and (b) of the Beijing Protocol. 
340Article 1(3)(b) of the Beijing Protocol. 
341 Article 1(3)(c) of the Beijing Protocol. 
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Fourth, the Beijing Protocol significantly expands the scope of the hijacking offence 
to include hijackings that occur prep- or post-flight, as well as a wide variety of 
ancillary offences, such as attempt to commit the offence, accomplice liability, 
conspiracy, and assistance after the fact.342 
 
4.5  Challenges to the Beijing  Legal Instruments 
From the analysis of the provisions of both the 2010 Beijing Convention and the 
Protocol, it is obvious that the purpose of ICAO in updating the international air law 
to address new and emerging threats to civil aviation is somehow achieved. However, 
after going  through the provisions  of the two  legal documents, reading different 
materials and  discuss with  several  aviation stakeholders, it is undeniable  fact that  
there are challenges which need  to be addressed in as far as the new  laws are 
concerned as follows: 
 
4.5.1  Slow Response in Ratification 
The 2010 Beijing Convention and the Protocol were adopted in September, 2010, with 
the urgency need to addressing new and emerging threats to aviation security. 
However, to date there is a slow response by ICAO Members States in complying 
with the pre- conditions for the laws to be operational. This is due to the fact that, each 
of the Beijing treaties is a stand- alone international legal document and hence 
Member States are free to ratify one, both or neither of them and that each instrument 
requires 22 ratification to bring it into force343.  As of August 2013, the treaties have 
                                                        
342 Article 3 (1) of the Beijing Protocol. 
343 ICAO Working Paper, Presented by the Secretariat 
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been ratified or acceded by eight countries only which Angola, Czech Republic, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Mali, Burma an Saint Lucia.344 
 
The above-named situation is a big challenge which prompted the 37th Session of the 
ICAO Assembly to adopt Resolution A37-23345 which urges all States to sign and 
ratify the two instruments as soon as possible, and directs the ICAO Secretary General 
to provide assistance, as appropriate, with the ratification process if so requested by 
Member State. In the course of implementation, the Secretary General has taken 
action to organize a number of events to promote the instruments and has prepared 
administrative packages for ratification.346 
  
4.5.2  Controversial Military Exclusion Clause 
One of the most controversial aspects of the ICAO Diplomatic Conference during the 
adoption of the treaties concerned the issue of military exclusion clause whereby the 
activities of armed forces during an armed conflict was excluded from the scope of the 
new legal regime. In other words, under both treaties, there can be no prosecution for 
what would otherwise constitute an offence against civil aviation, if done by armed 
forces during and armed conflict. Geogilas is of the view that this clause is clearly 
blurs the general international law principle of distinction between combatants and 
non combatants in jus in bello and in the long run and in the fullness of time, it may 
become highly problematic.347   
                                                        
344See  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beijing Convention (accessed on 9/10/2013). 
345 Promotion of the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol of 2010. 
346 Available at htt://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/Pages/AdministrativePackages.aspx(accessed on 
9/10/2013. 
347  Stratis G. Georgilas on   “The Suppression of Illegal Acts in (International) Civil Aviation and the 
Reponsibility of the State: New Development” 2010 at p. 6. 
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In fact, the military exclusion clause as it was incorporated in the new legal 
instruments is likely to create some practical problems during implementation, 
especially in cases where a civil aircraft is used for military related purposes. 
 
Generally, throughout the negotiation process of the Beijing instruments, there were a 
number of attempts to introduce significant amendments to the military exclusion 
clause. Nonetheless, the final wording of the clause remained almost unaltered.   
 
In other  words, with the existence of the Military Exclusion clause in the Beijing  
instruments, the following questions may been exemplify the complexity of the 
problem at hand: 
(i)  Would the destruction of an international airport by armed forces constitute an 
act of unlawful interference under the Beijing instruments or rather a justified 
act of self- defense? 
(ii) Is military aggression against civil aviation in times of peace, as opposed to self- 
defense, captured by the military exclusion clause? 
(iii) Should the activities of armed forces against civil aviation during an armed 
conflict be recorded as acts of unlawful interference against international civil 
aviation? 
 
Generally, an examination of previous and recent incidents involving activities of 
military forces and civil aviation show the urgent need of extending the jurisdiction of 
the laws to as well cover criminal activities by military forces against  civil aviation. 
For example, in 1973 an Israel fighter aircraft shot down a Libyan civil aircraft that 
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had lost its course over the occupied Egyptian territory in Sinai, which resulted in 108 
fatalities.  Likewise, in 1990, Iraq armed forces plundered Kuwait International 
Airport and later seized and removed to Iraq fifteen aircraft belonging to Kuwait 
Airways and in 1999, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) requested the 
involvement of ICAO Council after Congolese airlines aircraft was shot down at 
Kindu Airport, presumably by Rwanda and Burundi military forces.348 
 
Also, in December, 2004 Israel military forces heavily bombarded Gaza International 
Airport destroying all infrastructures including the air navigation facilities, runways 
and taxiways. The attack rendered the airport completely inoperative349.  In July, 2014 
Malaysian airline flight MH-17 was shot down by antiaircraft missile fired by pro-
Russian separatists on Ukraine- Russian border killing all 298 people.  Malaysian 
Government has said that the flight was flying on ICAO approved route.350 
 
Following these criminal acts against civil aviation, it obvious that ICAO is obliged to 
address the problem by improving the law to cover such activities of armed forces.   
The law should aim to make it clear that it does not purport to legitimize acts that  
otherwise would  be unlawful or preclude  in any way the possibility of prosecution. 
 
4.5.3   Non applicable to Customs and Police Services 
Following the long- standing precedent set by the Chicago Convention, neither the 
Beijing legal instruments applies to aircraft used in military, customs or police 
                                                        
348 See  articles.latimes.com (accessed on 11/9/2014). 
349www. Gazaairport.com/history.html (accessed on 11/9/2014). 
350 www.rte.ie/news/2014/0717/631440-ukraine-plane,crash (accessed on 10/9/2014).  
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services. However, in the absence of a definition of these services, one could seek 
guidance from the Chicago Convention which denies its application to State aircraft 
and goes on to say that aircraft used for military, customs and police services shall be 
deemed to be State aircraft.351 
 
4.5.3  Lack of Definitions of Key Terms 
The 2010 Beijing Convention and the Protocol do not defined some key terms, a 
situation which may create some problems and confusion when there is need of 
interoperating them.  For example, under the provisions of Article 1(c) of the Beijing 
Convention, a person commits an offence if he places or cause to be placed on an 
aircraft in service a device or Substance that is likely to destroy that aircraft; or to 
cause damage to it that is likely to endanger safety in flight. Surprisingly, although the 
two terms are key for one to commit such an offence, it is interesting that the Beijing 
Convention does not define the words “device” or “substance. 
 
We have see under Article 1(a) of the Beijing Convention that a person is considered 
to commit an offence if that person unlawfully and intentionally performs an act of 
violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely to endanger 
the safety of that aircraft.   It means that, the offender has to be physically within the 
aircraft and these provisions therefore, does not ex facie apply to offence committed 
outside the aircraft. However, the Convention does not define the term “on board”. It 
was held in the case of Herman v Trans World Airline352 where the Court  held that 
although the aircraft in which passenger was traveling had  been hijacked and  had 
                                                        
351  See Articles 3 (a) and (b) of the Chicago Convention. 
352 330NYSD 2nd 829 (Supreme Court, 1972). 
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flown  to the desert  and the passenger was kept  in the  aircraft  for several  days, he 
was  nonetheless  considered  to have been on board, irrespective of whether the 
purpose of the flight had been fulfilled or not.353 
 
Also the term “in flight” is not  defined under the Convention, but as it is the case for  
other legal instruments the aircraft may  be presumed to be “in flight” at any time 
from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until 
the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. 
In the case of forced landing, the flight shall be deemed to continue until the 
competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for persons and 
property on board.    
 
The next consideration within specific offence is that the act perpetrated should 
endanger the safety of the aircraft. This seemingly excludes acts of air rage, which, in 
many instances, only affect the safety of the person against whom the offence is 
committed. Hence by restricting the offence to the safety of the aircraft in flight, the 
Convention has ensured that every offence under this provision must essentially 
endanger the safety of the aircraft in which the offence is committed. 
  
4.5.4  Exclusivity of Safety in Flight 
We have seen the Beijing Convention covers an instance where a person commits an 
offence if he communicates information that the person knows to be false, thereby 
                                                        
353 See also the case of  Pfug v. Egyptair, 961 F 2d, 26. 
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endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight354. This seemingly rule out a message 
communicated negligently, where the purveyor of the message did not bother to find 
out the veracity of this provision. For instance, if a phony telephone call claims that 
would be a bomb on board a flight as defined in the Convention.  
 
This consideration may be particularly relevant in the context of the title of the treaty, 
which is a “Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International 
Civil Aviation” which obviously does not restrict itself to safety or security issues. 
Another consideration is that if such a communication were to come just the doors of 
an arriving aircraft are opened for disembarkation and passengers are injured or killed 
in a stampede, this provision would not apply. 
 
4.5.5  Lack of Mandatory Requirement 
One of interesting provisions is contained in Article 3 of the Beijing Convention, 
which states that each State party undertakes to make the offences set forth in Article 
1 of the Convention punishable by severe penalties. Here the key word is 
“undertakes”. It is worthy of note that the drafters of the Convention have not used the 
word “shall” which would have made the requirement peremptory. In regular 
parlance, “undertake” would mean to agree to be responsible for a job or project and 
to do it355. Therefore, logically one could argue that Article 3 of the Beijing 
Convention makes State parties promise that they would make offences under the 
Convention punishable. On the other hand, the word “shall”  would have made the 
requirement obligatory. 
                                                        
354 Article 1(e) of the Beijing Convention. 
355 See MacMillan Dictionary, at www. Maccmillandictionery.com/dictionary/American/undertake. 
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4.6  Conclusion 
This chapter outlines the significant features of the 2010 Beijing Convention and 
Protocol and in comparison with the previous legal regime, critically examined the 
adequacy  and effectiveness of the new laws in addressing aviation security threats. It 
has been noted under this chapter that, contrary to the previous treaties, the new 2010 
Beijing treaties guarantee the range of individuals who can now be brought to justice 
for their role in civil aviation attacks including those who participate before, during 
and after such acts. Not only that but also, unlike the previous treaties, the new 
Convention and Protocol specifically criminalize the act of conspiracy to undertake an 
attempt against civil aviation and hence introduce the legal concepts of conspiracy in 
common law countries. 
 
In addition to that, both treaties incorporate a conspiracy which criminalizes the 
planning of offence in conjunction with others reflecting both the common law and 
civil law traditions and it designed to allow  enforcement officers to apprehend and 
prosecute offenders before terrorist attacks can be carried out. It is obvious that, if the 
new Convention and the Protocol which are widely signed, ratified and incorporated 
into the national laws of member states, they will help in preventing and combating 
new and emerging aviation threats as new legal instruments among other things, 
criminalize several of such aviation threats which were not covered by the previous 
conventions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 CONCLUSION, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1   Overview 
The tragic event of 9/11 highlighted some weaknesses in the international air laws on 
aviation security and were the impetus behind the long term process that led to the 
adoption of the 2010 Beijing Convention and Protocol.  Hence, in order to achieve the 
objective of the research, this study reviewed the historical background to the 
international law on aviation security from the 1944 Chicago Convention which 
created ICAO to the 2010 Beijing Convention and the Protocol.  
 
In so doing the study analyzed the provisions of several international treaties 
including the 1963 Tokyo Convention, the 1970 Hague Convention, the 1971  
Montreal Convention, the 1988 Airport Protocol and the 2010 Beijing Convention and 
the Protocol. The objective was to see how the laws are adequate and effective in 
addressing threats to civil aviation. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
From the research conducted, it is obvious that the previous international air law 
regime though addressed civil aviation security threats, the scope of coverage of the 
threats did not encompass modern threats and hence prompted the need to fashion and 
update the laws.  In this context, the adoption of the 2010 Beijing legal instruments 
represents a notable efforts on the part of the international community to address 
terrorism involving civil aviation. As it was rightly pointed out, “the new Beijing 
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treaties constitute a valuable contribution of the international legal community to the 
area of aviation security.”356 
 
Furthermore, with the cheap availability of nuclear, biological and chemical materials 
(BCN) worldwide, coupled with a few individuals and groups ready to cause death, 
injury and or damage of catastrophic proportions to man, women, children, property 
and the environment without regard to race or religion, it became incumbent on the 
world community to address these threats which reflect not only civil aviation but 
global peace and security. Many respondents interviewed during the research believe 
that the new Beijing legal instruments are likely to contribute to achieve that end. 
 
Generally, from the study conducted it may be concluded that the 2010 Beijing legal 
instruments are more adequate and effective as compared to the previous laws and  
many  aviation stakeholders have wholeheartedly praised the adoption of the  new 
instruments as a landmark achievement in the areas of civil aviation law and security. 
For example, ICAO’s Secretary General called them a “landmark achievements in the 
area of civil aviation law and security357 while the Chairman of LC/34 has written 
that the Beijing instruments will shape the aviation security framework for the rest of 
the century.358 
 
                                                        
356See and article by Alejandro Piera and Michael Gill  titled: “ Will the New ICAO-Beijing  
Instruments Build  a Chinese Wall for International Aviation Security?” Published in Vanderbilt 
Journal  of Transnational Law (Vol.47:145). 
357 Raymond Benjamin, Establishing a New Era of Consensus and Action on Global Aviation Security 
Priorities, 66 ICAO  Journal,1, 3 (2011). 
358 See Michael Jennison, The Beijing Treaties of 2010: Building a “Modern Great Wall” Against 
Aviation Related Terrorism,23  Air & Space L.9,11 (2011). 
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It was rightly pointed out that, despite their significant in the development of 
international air laws, the Beijing  legal instruments  may not by themselves build a 
Chinese wall for aviation security359 as the effectiveness of such international laws 
will mainly depend on the collective responsibility and commitment of all states in 
terms of implementation and compliance.  In a way, the instruments, just like the SUA 
Protocol360, demonstrate the perception that terrorism is an international crime that 
can only be tackled successfully by concerted international action.  
 
5.3 Observations 
It is incontrovertible that, given the innovative terrorist acts perpetrated against civil 
aviation, the 2010 Beijing Convention and Protocol are proactive and timely initiative 
of ICAO and international civil aviation community. On that basis, one could assume 
that whatever the new treaties provide is in response to immediate need of Member 
States of ICAO. The most important thing observed through this study is that, aviation 
security primary goal should is not only be to close the gaps and inadequacies in the 
international legal regime but to prevent acts from happening. 
 
Through the doctrinal research conducted and consultations made to various 
stakeholders, 361 it is obvious that, before the incidents of September 11, aviation 
                                                        
359 See “Will the New ICAO-Beijing Instruments Build a Chinese Wall for International Aviation 
Security, an Article published in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,  pp 236. 
360 Convention  for the Suppression  of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against  the Safety of Marine 
Navigation, adopted on 10 March,1988. 
361 Several aviation stakeholders  both  local  and international were consulted  on the subject. These 
include staff of Tanzania Airports Authority (TAA), Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA), 
Zanzibar Airports Corporation, Tanzania Government Flight Agency, Swissport.  Huston Airport 
System USA and Dubai Airport, TAV Airport in Turkey etc.  Also there are staff and passengers of 
airlines such as Emirates Airline, Turkish Air, British Airways, Air Malawi, Uganda Air, Kenya 
Airways, Precision Air, delegates of International conferences on aviation Security such ACI held and 
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security was not a priority and there was no effective and well-coordinated 
international legal framework to combat such aviation threats. Further that, the 
weakness identified include laxity in screening passengers and baggage, poor control 
of access to secure areas at airports and weakness in protecting air traffic control 
system and facilities. 
 
It was also observed that, after the 9/11 incident, the international community had 
implemented additional preventive measures to enhance aviation security, the most 
important of which is the compulsory screening of all people and items boarding 
aircraft or entering the airport. Actually, many of the respondents interviewed support 
the introduction of airport screening which is aimed at ensuring that no item that 
might be used to endanger an aircraft or passengers or any airside facility has been 
concealed and ultimately proceed to the aircraft or airside. Other measures include 
strengthened cockpit doors, increased use of on-board security officers, increased 
attention to air cargo, and greater attention to airport access and perimeter control. 
Apart from that, extra security measures such as random screening and security probes 
were introduced in some airports. 
 
Further, the research observed that, after the introduction of the above named 
preventive measures, several challenges were identified, as trends of attacks against 
civil aviation changed rapidly when terrorists decided to be more innovative by using 
new technologies and new modes of operation. Such new and emerging threats 
include the use of non-metallic explosives, liquids, aerosols and Gels, cyber terrorism 
                                                                                                                                                               
Cape Town, South Africa,  Calgary Canada and, Academic Staff   and of Singapore Aviation Academy, 
lawyers 
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and suicide bombers. Terrorists also started to use new and very high technology 
including pen guns and mobile guns. 
 
Further observed that, given the various innovative terrorist acts perpetrated against 
civil aviation, the adoption of the 2010 Beijing Treaties is a proactive and timely 
initiative by the international civil aviation community.  However, having a good law 
would not necessarily have prevented such terrorist acts.  It could be argued that most, 
if not all such criminal events are due to lack of effective implementation of the 
provision of Annex 17 which requires high level of physical protection by searching 
and screening of passengers and baggage to prevent the introduction of potential 
weapons on board. 
 
It has been, therefore, observed that, nowadays, aviation security is not simply about 
stopping dangerous goods or contraband items going on board aircraft or being 
brought into countries, but it is also about focusing security resources and stopping 
persons with unlawful intention. It was further noted that, apart from the existence of 
2010 Beijing treaties, the adoption of the amendments 12 and 13 of Annex 17 to the 
Chicago Convention by ICAO in 2011 and 2013 respectively is a very important 
development in the international legal regime against aviation threats.  It is worth 
noting that, the amendments which became applicable since 1 July, 2011 and 15 July, 
2013 respectively update and strengthen aviation security provisions, particularly in 
relation to staff screening, security equipment capabilities, cyber-threats and air 
cargo362. 
                                                        
362  See Abyratne, the Beijing Convention of  2010  at 246 describing the convention  as a landmark to 
new and emerging threats to civil aviation  
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It was further observed through the research that, though the adoption of the two 
Beijing Treaties are the results of collective efforts on international community to 
update and modernize the legal framework for aviation security, a good number of 
people interviewed expressed their concern on the failure of good number of States 
including Tanzania to sign and ratified the said documents. It has been noted that as of 
March, 2014, the Beijing Convention had been signed by only 24 States while the 
Beijing Protocol had been signed by only 26 States363 out of 191 ICAO member 
States.364 
 
It is obvious that, efforts by the international community to prevent criminal attacks 
which are threats to civil aviation have failed and hence more strategies are needed to 
counter the problem timely. This is due to the fact that, a look at the history of such 
attacks have virtually never been foreseen by security organs. For example, the 
aviation security system was caught by surprise when   an airliner was attacked on the 
tarmac by terrorist team firing automatic weapons; when a parcel bomb sent by mail 
exploded in an airliner’s cargo hold in the mid-flight; when a bomb was brought on 
board by unwitting passenger and when terrorists used aircraft to stage the September 
11 attacks. In other words the history of attacks on aviation is the chronicle of a cat- 
mouse game, where the cat is busy blocking old holes and the mouse always succeeds 
in finding new ones. 
                                                        
363 According to Working Paper on “Promotion of the Beijing Convention and the Beijing Protocol of 
2010” presented on the ICAO Secretariat to the High- Level Conference on Aviation Security (HLCS) 
held at Montreal Canada on 12th to 14th 2012, the 24 States which   as of 12 July, 2012 signed the 2010 
Beijing Convention are Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, China, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Dominican Republic, France, Gambia, Indonesia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama, 
Paraguay, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, Uganda, United Kingdom, and United States. The 
Beijing Protocol has been ratified by the above- mentioned States plus India and Zambia 
364 http://www.Sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-becomes-191st member(accessed on 2/02/ 2013).  
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Importantly, as of 30 September 2014, the treaties are not yet in force and they have 
been   ratified  by 9  states only which are Angola, Czech Republic, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Guyana, Kuwait, Mali, Burma, and Saint Lucia.  Since it is a conditional 
precedent that, for the 2010 Beijing treaties to be operative, each must be ratified by at 
least 22 states, such a poor response by states in ratifying these legal instruments is a 
big challenge to their  implementation. 
 
5.4 Recommendations 
From the research conducted, it is obvious that aviation security concerns have 
constantly been dealt with by reacting to events. For instance, passenger screening 
came about as a result of aircraft hijacking incidents, passengers and baggage 
reconciliation was implemented following the Air India Flight 182 bombing, 
heightened screening measures for passengers and baggage resulted from the attack of  
September 11, liquid and gels were restricted because of an immediate and urgent 
threat in August, 2006.  It is therefore, recommended that proactive rather than 
reactive approach is fundamental to effective legal regime on aviation security. This is 
due to the fact that effective aviation security system should not focus on the “last 
war” fought rather it needs creativity and continuity to protect against tactics used  
and to be  used by terrorists in the past and in the future. 
 
Obviously, it is imperative to enhance international, regional and sub regional 
cooperation on terrorism and prevent acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation. To 
achieve these goals, states should be encouraged to ratify these international treaties. 
Yet, even if these instruments achieve widespread ratifications, the question mark 
remains over implementation at the national level. Will the majority of states that 
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eventually decide to ratify the Beijing instruments adopt implementing legislation? In 
any event, aside from encouraging ratification, there is a clear need for ICAO to go  
one step further and develop guidance material to educate states on the need  to adopt 
national implementing legislations. 
 
Further, international and regional cooperation is very crucial in drawing up a 
workable strategy for combating such criminal acts against civil aviation. It means, in 
order for the war against aviation security threats to succeed, there must be 
cooperation by all States in taking the required preventive legal and security measures.  
In other words, not one state assures security of civil aviation; rather the whole chain 
of aviation security needs cooperate to prevent terrorists from attacking civil aviation 
as there would be no meaning for some states investing in security measures if others 
fail to meet the similar degree of proficiency. Hence, failure of some states to 
implement such security measures could cause damage to other states with a higher 
security standards. Further, apart from the need of having international co-operation in 
preventing and combating unlawful acts to civil aviation, the preventive measures 
such as airport screening should also target all people who use airports including 
airports and airline staff as they could be used by terrorists in fulfilling their goals. 
Also the preventive security measures should always be dynamic and flexible, rather 
than static and predictable. 
 
Clearly, criminal acts which are threats to civil aviation are now posing great 
challenges to the international community than ever before. It is therefore 
recommended that, there is an urgent need to meet the obligation brought about these 
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acts and to take strong measures to counter potential threats through enacting and 
amending national legislations to focus on all passengers, cargo and mails which use 
air transport. Also the laws should put emphasis on having effective airport access 
control, training of airport security personnel, having modern security screening 
equipment and adopt better approach of making use of improved technology at 
airports.  
 
In order to effectively implement the new international legal framework, there is need 
to further develop the improved contingency measures and plan in the approved 
Airport Security Program (ASP); thereby meeting the requirement for approval by the 
appropriate authority for Aviation Security (AVSEC). These contingency measures 
should be developed basing on the new and emerging threats to civil  aviation and as a 
minimum, the plan should put much emphasis on having modern technology on 
screening of passengers, baggage, cargo, mail and stores.  
 
Importantly, there is need for aviation stakeholders worldwide to exchange views on 
the challenges, threats and opportunities in civil aviation securities and to review the 
mechanisms that strengthen international measures with particular attention to 
countering terrorist acts against civil aviation, enhancing international aviation 
security standards and implementing the newly adopted international legal instruments 
in order to respond more effectively to new and emerging threats.  
 
It is obviously, the objective of the international community is to see the international 
legal framework fit for purpose, both in dealing with perpetrators and in acting as 
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deterrent to future instances of criminal acts which are threats to civil aviation.   It is 
therefore, recommended that there should be a continuous updates and reviews of the 
international legal framework in line with the new technological development in 
terrorism. 
 
Last, but certainly not least, in order  to effectively prevent threats to civil aviation, it 
is highly recommended that, ICAO activities should be geared toward ensuring that  
states fully comply with standards related to  aviation security  and  improve their 
ability to oversee and manage aviation security issues.  Similarly, a much higher level 
of implementation of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention, ICAO Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPS) and stringent observance of guidance materials 
such as ICAO Security Manual- is needed. Clearly, from the research conducted, it is 
obvious  that the problem in addressing  aviation security threats is not inadequacy  or 
ineffective of the legal regime, but rather  failure   to implement and comply with the 
laws  and  the required standards.   
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